Chapter 2: Mixing Representation

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Abstract

Representatives of the U.S. House combine representation roles depending on strategy and context (Saward, 2014). The way an individual mixes these roles defines the character of representation, as seen by the Representative. While only recently recognized as a layer of representation in theoretical work, no empirical analysis of mixing representation has yet been done. In this study, I deploy a unique data set and new methods to uncover the precise mixing of representational roles for individual members of the House. I collect press releases from the 113th Congress. Utilizing a series of content analysis models, these documents are then classified as characterized by representation roles prominent in both political theory and empirical work in American politics. I then identify three common patterns of mixing representation: the strategic-delegate, the partisan, and the show horse. Applying new methods to new data, this study defines representation as a blend of representation roles, which change in response to strategy and context.
Recently, Michael Saward (2014) elaborated a theoretic claim about representation that has been understudied, even ignored, in work on representation. That is, representatives shift their representational role depending on personal strategy and context. In contrast to most work on representation, a single representative does not fall neatly into one type or another of representation. Rather, she combines and distills them, when it suits her ends or when she is constrained to a particular role. This shape-shifting is an inherent part of the representation. Shape-shifting has anecdotal support; it may even be intuitive. However, most theoretical and empirical work ignores such behavior, relying instead on ideal-types of representation.

In contrast to Saward’s argument, most theories of representation are typologies at their core. For instance, the divide between delegates, trustees, and politicos (Burke, 1986; Eulau et al., 1959; Pitkin, 1967) or representative who are like their constituents and those who are distinct (Chabal and Daloz, 2006). Mansbridge (2003, 2011) and Rehfeld (2009, 2011) debated over forms and ideal types of representation, particularly what Mansbridge called gyroscopic representation. A host of other theoretical scholars have also classified representation types (see, e.g., Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Disch, 2011; Pettit, 2009; Phillips, 1995). This theoretical debate over defining representation has only intensified in the last decade.

Empirical political science, too, has shown a tendency towards clear representational roles over shape-shifting representation. However, there is much less debate over the form representation takes. A large portion of legislative studies begins with the assumption that members of Congress seek reelection. From this assumption, a predictable, and sizable, range of behavior must follow. In light of the assumption of reelection, scholars in the line of Mayhew (1974) have examined committee assignments (Adler and Lapinski, 1997; Frisch and Kelly, 2006; Katz and Sala, 1996), voting (Jacobson, 2003; Wilkerson, 1990) appropriations (Evans, 2004; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985; Stein and Bickers, 1994), and even congressional reform (Adler, 2002). Use of the single representative goal of reelection has spread to studies
outside of the U.S., including Italy (Golden, 2003), Ukraine (Thames, 2007), and the United Kingdom (Bowler, 2010). In all of these studies, the assumption of reelection the prime goal of representing has granted considerable insight into how legislators behave and why.

However, in defending this assumption, Mayhew argues that reelection is desired by all members because it is proximal. That is, a member must first achieve reelection to do anything else. In this very language is the acknowledgement that there are other representative ends—more distal, that justify the pursuit of reelection—and yet, this explanation for legislative behavior is largely unexplored, with a few exceptions. Notably, Fenno (1973) searched out and classified underlying goals in the House. While he recognized reelection and local representation as a sizable goal, he also detailed other prominent motives for representatives. Among these other goals is a desire to create good public policy (e.g., Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing, 1994) and accurate personal gain (e.g., Palmer and Schneer, Forthcoming; Parker, 1989). Beyond Fenno’s additional representation goals, the study of partisanship and polarization suggests the goal of promoting the party platform (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996).

Unfortunately, these studies are insufficient for understanding how and why representatives mix over possible representational roles. The literature to date suffers from two problems. First, there is little to no discussion or analysis of how representatives mix their roles, given context and strategy. Second, the empirical work over-assumes the importance of reelection, without any large-scale study of other possible representation goals. While Fenno’s work has this theoretical sophistication, it lacks the methodological sophistication to find how these roles mix for all individual members in multiple contexts. In contrast, the partisan and polarization literature is rife with advanced analysis, yet often lacks a theoretical grounding in representational roles. Even when a concept of representation is present, rarely does the study incorporate more than one such role or goal.

I merge the theoretical and normative work with an expansive, detailed, and robust analysis. To begin, I explore a particular kind of behavior—communications with constituents—
for evidence of more distal goals and mixtures of representation roles. I find that, while some of a member’s behavior is linked to reelection, a good portion of behavior is aimed at achieving other ends: the national good, public policy creation, and the partisan brand, among others. These results not only suggest the wide range of goals legislators pursue, the analysis also identifies a particular mixture over these goals for each member of Congress, in addition to common mixtures among legislators.

In this chapter, I identify a range of representation roles, and the mixture over those roles, for each member. I begin by elucidating the kinds of roles and more distal goals we may expect legislators to pursue. For analysis, I turn to press releases as a flexible source of both behavior and explanation for behavior. I employ semi-supervised content analysis to classify press releases by underlying framing of representation role.

In the next chapter, I explain why particular mixtures over representational roles occur for different legislators and on different issues. To use Saward’s terms, I look for indications of strategy and context that change the mode of representation. I examine a number of explanatory variables, from both the individual and her district. Finally, I explore changes in goals by issue area and other contextual conditions, since context likely constrain and call for different representation roles.

1 Types and Mixes

There are dozens of typologies of representation. Some identify the representative, by classifying ideal-types (Rehfeld, 2009), views (Pitkin, 1967), forms (Mansbridge, 2003), or conceptions (Disch, 2011, 2012), among others. Other typologies classify the behavior that stems from representation, such as performances (Pitkin, 1967), presentations (Fenno, 1978), or reelection behaviors (Mayhew, 1974). To give a sense of the range of typologies, Saward (2014) gives a list of twelve common divisions of representation found in the literature. This list is not comprehensive, but is representative of the range:
1. trustees and delegates (and politicos)
2. functional roles played in government systems
3. promissory, surrogate, gyroscopic (Mansbridge, 2003)
4. descriptive and substantive representation (e.g., Chelis et al., 2008)
5. a politics of ideas and apolitics of presence (Phillips, 1995)
6. liberal and republican models of representation (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2013)
7. conceptions of roles of the “good representative” (Dovi, 2008)
8. formal or positional government roles (prime minister, member of parliament, etc.)
9. principles and agents
10. likeness and distinction (Chabal and Daloz, 2006)
11. indicative and responsive (with the latter category divided into “directed” and “interpretive”) (Pettit, 2009)
12. modes of “informal” representation: e.g. stakeholder (Macdonald, 2008), advocate, champion.

This list give a good sense of the range of representation typologies in theoretical and empirical political science. Saward (2014) argues that no typology can sufficiently capture the dynamics of representation because “such roles can be mixed and matched outside and across their theoretical or political points of derivation” (726). While Saward argues from a theoretical point, I measure how representative mix and match across representational roles and why they do so, given particular circumstances.

To be sure, the concept of mixing representation roles is not a new one. Notably, Eulau et al. (1959) argued that the ideal-types of delegate and trustee were really a continuum of
behavior, over which a representative could be more like a trustee or more like a delegate. Eulau called the middle ground of this continuum the “politico”. From an empirical ground, Fenno (1973) observed representatives acting for a number of different representational goals, including reelection, the creation of good public policy, and the amassing of political influence. Representatives then emphasize different goals based on the legislative environment, particularly committees, in which they find themselves. Saward objects to these mixtures of representational models or goals; he sees them simply as further divisions of types which constrain “productive further analysis of innovative blurring and hybridizing of roles” that representatives may engage in as they carry out the practice of representing and legislating (2014, 725). To support, or discard, Saward’s point, one must know the degree to which politicians do mix over these types in practice and the context that causes such mixing.

Any empirical analysis of mixing over representation types must limit the number of types under examination. As seen, there are an ever-multiplying number of typologies, many of which have overlapping features. I limit this analysis to five theories: Burke (1986), Pitkin (1967), Mansbridge (2003), Mayhew (1974), and Fenno (1973). Burke’s division of trustee and delegates is a historic and parsimonious understanding of representation. As such, it proliferates through other typologies (see in (1), (9), and (10) from Saward’s list). I position mixing over trustee and delegate as a baseline analysis. Pitkin’s work was a monumental point in the conceptualization of representation, bringing together previous work into a unified typology. Like Pitkin, Mansbridge’s typology was a pivot point in understanding representation types. Her typology is an innovative blending of theoretical with empirical concepts of representation. I include Mayhew as the standard approach to representation behavior, particularly in the name of reelection in empirical political science. And finally, Fenno offers a more nuanced empirical approach to representation roles, which also holds a prominent position in the study of American politics.

I leave three kinds of typologies out the analysis. The first is of structural roles, such as (8) and (12). Individual representative generally occupy such roles as a result of their
positioning within the political order. Mixing over these roles is possible, but happens over a longer period of time than the other typologies and any such shape-shifting is mostly a result of context, not strategy. The second exclusion from this analysis is of descriptive representation, as found in (4) and (10). This is an important component of representation and has been widely studied (see, e.g., Chelis et al., 2008). Descriptive representation requires the representative to look like those she represents. The representative is therefore limited in the number of descriptors she can take on or mix over. In addition, descriptive representation resides not just in the behavior or explanation of that behavior, but in the relationship of the representative to a group of constituents. Such measurements are outside the scope of this study.\(^1\) The third kind of role I exclude is of the explicitly normative cast, such as (7) conceptions of roles of the “good representative” (Dovi, 2008). These conceptions, like descriptive representation, require an additional layer of measurement: that of what a constituency considers “good” representation. Again, such measurements are beyond this study but may prove fruitful for future work.

Before I turn to the analysis of representation roles, let me briefly review the typologies in play. Burkean representation divides into two camps: delegate and trustee. Burke describes the delegate representative as one inspired by a desire to provide for the local electorate. Constituents vest delegates with authority to re-present their interests in the most straightforward sense: the representative acts as a mouthpiece for the will of the people in her district. In contrast, the trustee representative uses his own judgment to make decisions in the best interest of the nation entire or in the long-term interests of a constituency. With this desire as a guiding principle, the representative may very well make decisions against the wishes of his electorate. The trustee model focuses on the institution in which the representative will serve; the delegate model focuses on the body from which the representative was elected. To be fair, the trustee model of representative behavior need not discard the local

\(^1\)Although I do include analysis of Pitkin’s typology, one category of which is descriptive representation, this type shows up very infrequently in my analysis because its identification resides in knowing external characteristics about the representative aside from his behavior.
constituencies entirely. Some conceptions of the trustee model suggest that the representa-
tive behave in the best long-term interests of the local district. By focusing on long-term
gains over short-term preferences, the trustee may still act contrary to the preferences of the
locality. It still places the trustee in a position to use her own judgment when making policy
decisions.

Pitkin (1967) argues that there are theories of representation outside of the delegate and
trustee models. She distinguishes four categories of representation—formalistic, descriptive,
symbolic, and substantive—that delineate the broad sweeps of political theory in regards
to representation, particularly what kinds of behavior representatives can do legitimately.
Each theory suggests that the legitimacy of the representative process stems from a different
aspect of the relationship between she who represents and they who are represented. While
these theories, singly, capture an important component of the concept of representation,
none alone portrays the full concept.

Formalistic representation relies on formal institutions and structures to grant legit-
imacy to representatives. These formal institutions—such as elections, appointment, or
lottery—peacefully bestow power in a representative to represent the interests of the con-
stituents. Symbolic representation requires the making of a symbol. Rather than formal
processes imbuing a person with the authority to act, the constituents’ feelings toward their
symbol—the person or thing that represents them—grants that symbol legitimacy to repre-
sent. However, this connection is one where the representative stands in for the constituency,
takes the place of that constituency, thus symbolically representing a group of people.

Instead of creating a symbol, descriptive representation creates a representation of the
constituency itself, like a mirror or a piece of art, something that resembles the constituency.
Legitimacy comes when the representation looks like those being represented. Finally, sub-
stantive representation moves beyond the physical similarities of representatives and con-
stituents to consider how well their interests and behaviors align. That is, the representative
behaves legitimately when his actions promote the substantive interests of his district.
As the most recent updating to these theories of representation, Mansbridge (2003, 2011) creates four modes of representation as studied in empirical work: promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic, and surrogate. Each of these describes a different set of behaviors that arise from the same connection between the representative and the constituency. Promissory representation is concerned with the principle-agent problem of representation, that is, with the constituency’s ability to control the actions of the representative. In contrast, in anticipatory representation, the representative shapes the perceptions of the constituency over his behavior. In essence, the representative anticipates the constituents’ reaction to a behavior and works to reshape that reaction favorably. Gyroscopic representation suggests that the representative acts on her own preferences and beliefs, like a trustee, but that these actions gain approval from the constituency because they are what the constituency wants anyway. Thus, the representative acts outside of the constituency, but those actions orbit around the preferences of the constituency. Finally, surrogate representation redefines the constituency to extend outside the geographic space of a district. The surrogate representative adopts the preferences of groups which may lie partially or entirely outside his electorate.

Delving deeper into the empirical literature, there are two theories of congressional behavior that prominently discuss a legislator’s approach to representation. Mayhew (1974), focuses on reelection as the most proximal goal, arguing that congressmen engage in three behaviors to achieve this goal: credit-claiming, position-taking, and advertising. All interactions with the constituency entail advertising. Often, members will also take a stance on a public issue, thereby engaging in position-taking. When a member not only takes a position, but claims credit for some behavior that entails more work—drafting legislation, introducing an amendment, securing district funding—that comprises credit-claiming.

Another empirical political scientist, Fenno (1973) observes representatives pursuing five goals: reelection, good public policy, influence in the House, influence in Washington, and personal gain. In communications, these goals transmit into frames, within which representatives present the substance of their work. Reelection requires a local frame to appeal to
the district. A goal to create of good public policy expresses itself in press releases concerned with the pros and cons of a particular policy. Discussion of pros and cons outside of a specific policy area tend to be framed with American values, such as vague notions of increasing freedom or equality or claims of carrying on the American Founding tradition. Influence in the House and Washington are ambitious or institutional frames, presenting material as it relates to House or institutional power. Personal gain would naturally have a personal frame; however, these frames are unlikely to appear in public press releases. To this list from Fenno, I make and additional two frames explicit. First, the natural corollary of a local frame is a national frame. Second, given the increasing role of partisan politics since the 1970’s, a partisan frame is also likely. I include these additional frames within Fenno’s typology because they echo the sentiment in which Fenno created the original five; that is, national and partisan frames come from a desire to promote the national interest or the party platform. This language parallels Fenno’s.

All of these theories are archetypes. We do not expect any individual representative to be wholly in one camp or another: all trustee with no delegate, all promissory with no anticipatory representation, always position-taking with no credit-claiming. The relative distribution over these theories constitute a legislator’s approach to representation and is an important, even crucial, component for understanding how representatives carry out the task of representing.

2 Measuring Representation Mixtures

2.1 Data

To test the existence and the mixture of these types of representation, I turn to press releases from the U.S. House. I collect a large sample of press releases, issued between 2009 and 2014 ($N = 154,000$).

In recent years, researchers have increasingly turned to press releases (e.g., Ball, 2012;
Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing, 2014; Grimmer, 2013; Sellars, 2000; Yannikis, 1982) and other congressional communications (e.g., Niven and Zilber, 2001; Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers, 2010) to test theories of representative and legislative behavior. This turn has been facilitated by the availability and ease of collecting of online data, as well as advances in statistical analysis of big data and text-as-data.

Beyond these convenience reasons, press releases are a particularly good avenue for testing representation roles from a theoretical and methodological vantage. First, press releases are flexible, both in terms of frequency and content. Each representative decides how many press releases to issue, when to release them, the topic(s), the framing of those topics. This flexibility means that the existence, timing, and content of any single press release was a strategic decision on the part of the representative. This strategy and context mirror that found in choosing and mixing over representational roles. Secondly, press releases are simultaneously a behavior and an explanation of behavior. This is useful for testing the five typologies because some—Burke, Pitkin, and Fenno—describe types of representatives while others—Mayhew in particular, but Pitkin and Mansbridge to a less degree—suggest types of representative behavior. Finally, press releases are ideal for considerations of methodology: all members of Congress issue press releases, most in large numbers. This lends robustness to any results, and makes it possible to do subset comparisons between members, issue areas, and districts.

Of all recorded congressional communications, press releases are the most suited to a large-N study of representational strategies. Unlike in floor speeches or campaign ads, members of Congress can issue press releases at any time on any topic. Floor speeches are constrained by the issue under debate; campaign ads are limited to the opponents and issues of the campaign. Press releases do not have these constraints. Unlike social media—Tweets or Facebook posts—press releases can be much longer in length, which allows for multiple topics, multiple frames, and more robust analysis. Also unlike all forms of social media or newsletters, almost all members of Congress issue press releases with considerable frequency.
This frequency and commonality across members enables a consistent and nuanced analysis.

However, the sample is incomplete for two reasons. First, members may selectively post or withdraw press releases from their sites. Without monitoring communications as they are released, there is no way of knowing how common or frequent this practice occurs. I assume such withdrawals are relatively rare, since press releases are given to the press and therefore part of the public record in other locations. Second, congressmen from the 112th and 113th Congresses who did not continue into the 114th Congress—either from personal choice or defeat in reelection bids—are not in the sample. Their websites, and thus their press releases, are no longer available. Fortunately, the House maintains relatively high reelection rates for incumbents, so the sample of press releases includes ninety percent of expected press releases.

### 2.2 Model

To determine the type of representation embedded in each press release, I use a semi-supervised classifying system of content analysis, specifically a multiclass Support Vector Machine (mSVM). As a semi-supervised model, Support Vector Machines rely first on hand-coded classifications for each observations. Thus, I selected a random sample of the press releases ($N = 500$), called the training set. For each press release in the sample, I identified it as belonging to one or none of the possible types for each of the five theories. That is, for Burke’s typology of representation, I classified each press release as embodying either delegate, trustee, or neither model of representation. The other classification is necessary both methodologically and theoretically. The mSVM tests each category against all others, which means that for the last of the categories to be tested, there will be some press releases that define the “other” space. This aligns with a theory of mixing over representation types. That is, if a representative can be a delegate at some times and a trustee at others, a single press releases may also conceivably blend, or in Saward’s terms, blur the distinction between types. The rules I utilized to classify press releases into each category can be found in Appendix A.
Once each press release in the training set, I located each observation as a point in multidimensional space, using multidimensional scaling. Given the classes to which the points belong, the mSVM generates hyperplanes to separate the data cleanly between the two groups. The hyperplane that maximizes the distance to the nearest data-point of each class in the training set then becomes the algorithm to predict classes in the testing dataset. This maximization between classes minimizes the generalization error on the testing set.

Basic SVMs are binary linear classifiers, working with just two classes. To extend the model to a case with more than two classes, I employed a multi-class SVM, which, for each class, maximizes the distance between the nearest point of that class and the nearest point from all other observations (the one-versus-all method). This produced more robust results than a one-versus-one method.

2.3 Results

The mSVM yields a classification for each press release as belonging to one category for each theory. Aggregate results for all press releases are found in Figure 1.

The most prominent trend resides in the largest categories for each theoretical typology. The majority of press releases are delegate, substantive, gyroscopic, position-taking, and local. This accords with the classic notion of representation as a principle-agent relationship, where representatives listen to the locality and faithfully follow their wishes. Gyroscopic and position-taking representation suggest a representative who believes in the same stances on issues as the constituency, acting not necessarily because the constituency demands it, but because the representative believes it. There may be some tension here between delegate representation and gyroscopic. That is, delegates do not insert their own preferences, whether or not they align with the districts, whereas the gyroscope relies solely on his own preferences. For most behavior, the difference would be indistinguishable, since the same preferences would result in the same behavior, regardless of whether the origin was from the district or the representative. However, the framing in press releases allowed me to untangling the
Figure 1: Mixing Representation, aggregate
motive for a behavior. Although, to be sure, in the aggregate presented in Figure 1, the same press releases which are delegate, may not be those which are gyroscopic. Another interesting contrast comes between delegate and local. Not all local press releases are delegate; they cannot be mathematically. Therefore, there is a small but present portion of press releases which represent the long-term local interests, as in the trustee model.

A few other interesting comparisons are possible. For instance, substantive representation is not necessarily about a policy, given that there are many more press releases that are substantive than are policy-oriented. Perhaps this is a failing of Pitkin’s theory. That is, substantive representation incorporates legislative work, but is not exclusively about legislative work. For studies of Substantive vs. descriptive representation, this gap between legislative work and other substantive work should be considered. A similarly confusing comparison arises between surrogate and descriptive representation. Only two press releases exhibited descriptive representation; likely because descriptive representation relies on information external to the communication, namely the degree to which the speaker looks like the audience. While descriptive representation does not show up in the press releases, surrogate representation does. Since surrogates promote the interest of groups, this press releases are the most likely place to find descriptive representation, albeit with more analysis.

Note, too, a few surprising proportions. Partisan representation frames make up a small subset of press releases, only eight percent. Given the partisan rancor and much work documenting polarization among elites, this is an unexpectedly small number of press releases. In contrast, policy framing is more common than partisan framing, which indicates that representatives are engaging in legislative deliberation over the specifics of a policy in a good portion of their press releases. This, along with the large size of trustee representation, is reassuring for those concerned with legislative gridlock. It appears that representatives do talk and care about passing good public policy, even if they cannot always enact such

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2Formalistic representation is also strikingly rare, occurring in only three press releases. Formalistic representation, either authorization or accountability, discusses the election, a behavior which is tightly regulated by the Federal Election Commission and the Franking Commission.
policies.

Figure 1 tells us that most of the representation types do exist. However, it does not suggest that individual members of Congress mix over representation types. While delegate representation characterizes fifty-four percent of press releases, it may also characterize fifty-four percent of House members. To examine if and how individuals mix over representation types, I identify the percentage of each member’s press releases belonging to each category for each theory. Figure 2 presents this information for the House Speaker, John Boehner. And indeed, he, like many members, mixes over representation types. His representation mixing resembles the baseline for the House. The biggest difference are an increase in party and policy frames at the expense of local representation. Boehner also engages in more position-taking than the baseline, thereby claiming-credit less frequently.

While there are some members who are ideal-types for some typologies—Patrick McHenry (R-NC) is all delegate, Vern Buchanan (R-FL)’s press releases are all substantive, Gregg Harper (R-MS) engaged exclusively in position-taking—the vast majority mix over the possible types of representation. For a sense of the range of representation mixing for each typology, see Table 1.

Despite this great variation by individual, there are some common patterns to the mixing of representational roles. To begin uncovering these patterns, I searched for positive correlations between categories of representation across theories. Table 2 shows all correlations above 0.4. These are correlations over the percent of an individual’s press releases that fall into the various representation roles; they are not correlations between the roles expressed in press releases without reference to the representative. The strongest correlations all make sense. Given the very definition of the categories, these correlations are expected. That is, delegates should employ local frames; trustees do focus on policy matters; symbolic politics engage in neither position-taking nor credit-claiming. From these correlations, three patterns emerge. The first—the strategic-delegate—pairs delegate representation with local frames. However, this traditional model of representation gets a strategic twist with
Figure 2: Mixing Representation, Speaker Boehner
Table 1: Representation Mixtures, individual variation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Delegate</th>
<th>Substantive</th>
<th>Credit-claiming</th>
<th>Position-taking</th>
<th>Advertising</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>Paulsen (R-MN)</td>
<td>Velazquez (D-NY)</td>
<td>Buchanan (R-FL)</td>
<td>Gutierrez (D-IL)</td>
<td>Harris (R-MD)</td>
<td>Meadows (R-NC)</td>
<td>Bishop (R-UT)</td>
<td>Thompson (D-MS)</td>
<td>Becerra (D-CA)</td>
<td>McHenry (R-NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McHenry (R-NC)</td>
<td>Forbes (R-VA)</td>
<td>Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)</td>
<td>Price (R-GA)</td>
<td>Sanchez (D-CA)</td>
<td>McHenry (R-NC)</td>
<td>McIntyre (D-NC)</td>
<td>Chabot (R-OH)</td>
<td>Bishop (R-UT)</td>
<td>Conaway (R-TX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
anticipatory representation. Running contrary to principle-agent models of representation, behavior in this pattern also tries to shape perceptions of events through anticipatory representation. Second, partisan representatives rely on the individual’s personal preferences and expertise—reflections of trustee and gyroscopic representation—to promote policies and the party. Finally, show horse representatives combines symbolic politics with advertising. This is low-cost behavior that puts the representative’s name in front of constituents with little effort on the representative’s party: no policies passed, no positions staked, no substance communicated.

These three divisions have corallaries in the literature. For instance, in their analysis of Australian elections, Studlar and McAllister (1994) find that candidates, both incumbents and challengers, fell into one of three representation roles: local, partisan, and legislators. The study here elaborates on the character of these roles, while combining the latter two—partisan and legislator. The third category found here, that of show horse, has its counterpart in the division of congressmen into show horses and work horses (Payne, 1980). While this study does not uncover a two-dimensional division, partisan representatives could be compared to work horses in their orientation towards the legislature and policy (see also, Langbein and Sigelman, 1989).
3 Discussion

These results—both individual and patterns—strongly indicate that representation is more complex than previously assumed. Rather than engaging in only one kind of representation, all members of the House mix the kind of representation they do, changing their communicated relationship to constituents based on strategy or context. This chapter identified the particular mixtures that representatives have. The next chapter explores why representatives hold different mixtures of representation roles, as a response to both strategy and context. As such, there is now empirical support to shape-shifting representation presented by Saward (2014). In addition to supporting this theory, the analysis here gives specifics to how individuals mix and match representation roles. Theses mixtures could prove helpful in explaining other behavior—such as committee membership or voting—since representation roles should proliferate throughout a representative’s behavior.

Some patterns of mixing representation emerge from this analysis. The first brings together competing strands of representation theory—the delegate and the strategist—into the same behavior. The second emphasizes the party agenda operating through alternative strands of representation, namely policy and gyroscopic representation. Finally, a good portion of representation is words in the wind, relying on symbolic politics and simple advertising without much substance or work.

These patterns show how representatives mix over types of representation, but they do not suggest why certain patterns emerge or why a representative chooses one type of representation over another. Given that politics is a strategic enterprise, the choice of when to represent in what way is also strategic, too. The next chapter examines the conditions under which representatives are more likely to take on particular modes of representation, which hints at the underlying strategies of representatives. Some of the variation can be explained by strategic choices stemming from individual and district traits, such as ideology, urban density, and district policy preferences. Some of the variation is also contextual; it depends on the issue being discussed and the timing, especially in relation to the next
election or to legislative conditions. This strategic and contextual analysis brings into sharp focus why representative shift or retain their representation types in response to a changing political landscape.
Appendix A: Classification Schema

To classify the press releases as belonging to one category or another, I employed the following principles for each of the theories. For Burke, I asked if a press release was about the here and now. If the topic were about a national or regional issue, as opposed to a district one, then it was trustee. If the press release focused on the past or the long-term, it too was trustee. Only press releases about the district at the contemporary point in time were delegate.

For Pitkin, very few press releases were formalistic or descriptive. Formalistic press releases made reference to the electoral process, references with are tightly regulated by the Federal Election Commission. Descriptive representation in press releases had to make reference to a distinct group and the representative’s belonging to that group. Substantive and symbolic representation were much more common. To distinguish between them, I borrowed from Hall (1998), who defined symbolic representation as work done when the representative knows it has no chance of success. I modify this. Because it is impossible to know what the representative knows, I designated press releases as symbolic when the behavior discussed would make no substantive difference when passed. Common topics of symbolic press releases included awarding medals, selecting art competition winners, visiting the district with no particular policy agenda, designating holidays, renaming buildings, and issuing a statement about a member of the community. In contrast, substantive press releases dealt with issues of tangible impact.

Sorting out the categories of Mansbridge’s typology was the most difficult of the theories. Because the forms of representation depend on the motivation of the representative, it can be impossible to discern this from press releases. Surrogate was the clearest; when a member discussed the interests of a group outside or across the boundaries of her district, that press release was classified as surrogate. Promissory press releases either made reference to past promises or explicitly invoked the preferences of the district/public and the representative’s obligation to promote them. Press releases that spun an event or issue into a favorable light
for the representative were classified as anticipatory. Gyroscopic press releases invoked the beliefs, history, or thought process of the individual representative. Conceptually, anticipatory representation can be difficult to separate from the others. Therefore, I classified a press release as anticipatory only when it did not fit the guidelines of the other categories.

For Mayhew’s categories of representational behavior, all press releases are advertising. Therefore, this theory did not have an “other” category. If the representative took the additional step of outlining a position—a more costly behavior—then the press release was labeled as position-taking. If the press release also suggested that a member created a good—which is an even more costly behavior—then it was classified as credit-claiming. There are certain behaviors that line on the line between position-taking and credit-claiming: voting, writing a letter, or co-sponsoring a bill. While each of these behaviors may be credit-claiming, I did not classify them as such, because the threshold of work is relatively low. That is, many representatives can write a letter or co-sponsor legislation. All members vote. This is not credit-claiming; it is legislating. Press releases about voting are position-taking by explaining the reason behind the vote. For letter writing, if the press release indicated the additional step—that a favorable outcome resulted from the letter—then that press release embodied credit-claiming behavior. Similarly, if the representative “authored”, “introduced”, or “sponsored” legislation, I classified that as credit-claiming.

Finally, for Fenno, I identified the press releases using the following schema. Since frames may overlap—local partisan preferences, national policy, etc.—I classified press releases into the category which language framed the majority of the press releases. To be clear, if a press release was about a national policy, such as the Affordable Care Act, but the language was all about Republicans and Democrats, then the press release was labeled as having a partisan frame. Alternatively, if another press release, also on the Affordable Care Act, was littered with language about the small business owners in Detroit, then that press release had a local frame. The allocation followed a simple plurality process. Whatever frame constituted the majority of the language of the press release, the press release was classified
as belonged entirely to that frame. This is the only practical way to classify for this method. Other methods, particularly non-parametric Bayesian topic modeling, can sub-dived the documents. However, these methods cannot, *ex ante*, overlie the theories.

Local press releases mentioned the district, the state, or occasionally the region. Content was framed of importance to the local community and its members. In contrast, national frames were concerned with the United States as a country, often in contrast to other countries. These frames populated issues such as foreign aid, immigration, and defense. Policy press releases discussed the pros and/or cons of a specific policy area or legislation. While the policy may have a positive or negative spin, other frames—such as local or partisan—may classify the press release into those frames if the local or partisan language predominated. Values frames were less specific than policy frames. They often made reference to what should happen, invoking the American culture or founding. Ambitious framing of press releases, while rare, discussed the internal workings of the House or of Washington, usually about procedure or future career plans. Also uncommon, institutional framing situated the powers of the House or Congress in opposition to other branches, usually the presidency, but occasionally the Supreme Court or bureaucracy. Finally, partisan press releases were characterized by an abundant use of partisan terms, such as Democrat, Republican, President Obama, the names of other party leaders, and chamber party control.
References


