

Chapter Three

Party Structure and Representational Impact: Public Preferences on Social Welfare and Civil Rights

The more comprehensive but also more dispersed and more gradual triumph of the volunteer model that was evident in state party politics, along with the more focused triumph of the same thrust in the politics of presidential selection, were inevitably intertwined. Established volunteer parties were much easier to reform at the presidential level. Successful reforms for presidential selection often spilled over into reform efforts within individual (organized) state parties. But in the end, the old world summarized in the overviews of Elazar, Mayhew, and Shafer, as reflected in the more systematic scale of structural indicators developed here, did indeed undergo the upheaval projected by Mayhew and Ware around the pivotal year of 1970. Table 3 of the previous chapter, in particular, summarizes the new world of party structures that resulted.

But how does such party structure affect policy responsiveness and democratic representation? That is, how does it filter public wishes on their way into government? How large is this filter, and in what direction does it operate? And if there was a major change in the balance of organized and volunteer political parties around 1970, does the intermediary—filtering—character of this new balance look different from the old? As an intermediary variable, party structure can be neither the sum and substance of representational relationships nor their main driver. Social backgrounds, party programs, constitutional arrangements, and issues of the day all interact to play the latter role. Yet a further contribution from this particular variable still seems well worth pursuing, given its

intervening structural character and its centrality to contested issues of democratic responsiveness in the United States for so very long.

Social Welfare

Measuring Democratic Responsiveness

To attempt a preliminary answer to this linked set of analytic questions, it is necessary to have a measure of policy wishes in the general public for the period from 1952, when what became the National Election Study first appeared, until the current moment. The measure must be capable of distinguishing party activists from their rank and file, just as it must be capable of distinguishing both populations between the two major parties. And of course, the measure must make it possible to divide such elite-mass partisan distinctions between residents of states with organized versus volunteer party structures. A dataset that will accommodate these needs comes from William J.M. Claggett and Byron E. Shafer, *THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MIND: The Issue Structure of Mass Politics in the Postwar United States*, and that is the dataset used here.¹

Policy wishes for the critical opening investigation are taken from public preferences on social welfare.² These were the initial impetus for what became the New Deal party system. They are available—and consequential—for all the years since. They still arguably constitute the policy spine for that system a full eighty years later.³ As

¹(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²*Ibid.*, especially Chapters One and Six.

³For the evolution of social welfare as a policy domain, see James L. Sundquist, *POLITICS AND POLICY: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1968); Robert X. Browning, *POLITICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986); Edward D. Berkowitz, *AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE: From Roosevelt to Reagan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1991); and James T. Patterson, *AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-1994* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

above, these data are pooled in twenty-year periods: 1950-1968, 1970-1988, and 1990-2008. Scores are standardized so that they can range from -1.00 at the liberal end to +1.00 at the conservative end of the ideological continuum. Partisan activists are those who undertake specialized activities on behalf of a political party or its candidates; their rank and file are those who do not undertake these activities but still identify with the party and get to the polls in November of presidential years.⁴

While items contributing to the social welfare index vary with the array of substantively relevant questions that are asked in a gradually changing ANES, they were selected to fall within a single explicit definition of the policy realm:

Social Welfare involves efforts to protect citizens against the randomness—that is, the harshness and individual inequities—of the economic marketplace. While there are myriad ways to accomplish this, direct personal benefits are the crucial touchstone, while *social insurance* provides the irreducible programmatic core.⁵

Within this array, certain ‘marker’ items, widely accepted as belonging to the welfare domain, do recur, providing reasonable assurance that a slowly changing measure still captures the same basic policy concerns. Among these markers for the social welfare measure are:

Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own.

Some feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals, and through private insurance like Blue Cross or other company paid plans.⁶

⁴In the manner of William Claggett and Philip H. Pollock, III, “The Modes of Participation Revisited, 1980-2004”, *Political Research Quarterly* 59(2006), 593-600.

⁵Claggett and Shafer, *op. cit.*, 5.

⁶*Ibid.*, 21, which also notes lesser wording changes in the second marker item across time.

The Old World: Partisan Alignments

Figure 1 begins the process of teasing out representational impacts from party structure by presenting the overall contours to partisan preferences in this first postwar period, 1950 through 1968. To that end, the figure offers three graphic representations of the ideological location of four key categories: Democratic activists, Democratic rank and file, Republican rank and file, and Republican activists. The resulting aggregate scores for the policy wishes of these four partisan populations in effect become part of the strategic landscape of American politics at particular points in time. Among them in the analysis that follows, critical further distinctions will often involve: a) the ideological distance between the preferences of active partisans, Democrats versus Republicans; b) the ideological distance between these activists and their own rank and files, hence Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, and of course c) all such strategic contributions *further distinguished* by the differences between organized and volunteer political parties.

Within that framework, Figure 1.A begins the analysis by offering a picture of the nation as a whole, one conforming very closely to the canonical version created by Herbert McClosky and colleagues in the 1950s.⁷ Both the McClosky portrait and this one make two basic points about partisan alignments in what was in effect the late New Deal era:

- There was already a clear ideological distance between rank and file Democrats and rank and file Republicans on social welfare, with Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right.

⁷Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman, & Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers", *American Political Science Review* 54(1960), 406-472.

- Party activists held more clearly demarcated (and hence more extreme) positions on these same concerns, though Democratic activists were just a hair off to the left of their rank and file while Republican activists were sharply off to the right of theirs.

Figure 1

In order to pursue the difference between organized and volunteer parties as intermediaries within this overall picture, it is essential to go on and stratify Figure 1 by party structure. But at least for this period, it is necessary first to stratify by political region, since the American South had what was effectively a party system all its own.⁸ Accordingly, even this opening portrait of partisan relationships must look at Non-South versus South before inquiring into the further structural divide, organized versus volunteer. If such regional stratification proves to be empirically unnecessary, it can be dropped from the analysis. But as Figures 1.B and 1.C attest, this stratification is in fact essential since the South was, at least at that time, doing something very different from the rest of the nation in terms of ideological alignment.

The result further distinguishes the two political parties, making them almost different *kinds* of ideological coalitions. For the Republican Party, the three figures together—1.A, 1.B, & 1.C—obviate the need for further regional stratification. Even at this early date, rank and file Republicans as well as activist Republicans were ideologically interchangeable by region, at least when the focus is welfare preferences. Organized versus volunteer structures will go on to distinguish among the Republican state parties, as below, but a further regional distinction is not essential. Yet the same

⁸The story is a familiar one. See, for example, Nicol C. Rae, *SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Stanley P. Berard, *SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).

three figures surface a major regional divide inside the Democratic Party, South versus non-South, and this distinction cannot be overlooked.

Within it, rank and file Democrats in the non-South appear as additionally left of the national mean. (Figure 1.B) By extension and even though rank and file Republicans did not require a regional distinction, mass Democrats and Republicans in the non-South are simultaneously farther apart than they appeared for the nation as a whole, courtesy of this Democratic repositioning. Accordingly, while activist Republicans were no farther off to the right within the non-South or within the nation as a whole, activist Democrats now appear as *half-again* as far away from the national average as they were in a picture of the composite nation, moving additionally left of their own rank and file while at the same time expanding the distance between active members of the two parties.

This suggests in passing that the original McClosky findings might have benefited from a further South/non-South division when creating a national portrait, given the clearly dissident alignment characterizing the American South at Figure 1.C. Republicans in the South, whether activist or rank and file, were effectively a residual population at this point in time, so that distinctions among Democrats were more or less the entire practical story, regardless of their content. Yet those distinctions were empirically immense:

- Rank and file Democrats in the South, unlike their non-Southern brethren, were only ever so slightly left of center on matters of social welfare. Among partisan categories, they were the truly centrist population for the nation as a whole.
- More strikingly, activist Southern Democrats were comfortably to the *right* of their own rank and file as well as comfortably to the right of the national average.

Indeed, within the South, they were considerably closer to rank and file Republicans than to rank and file Democrats.

The Old World: Party Structures

That graphic overview allows the analysis to move on to its central concern, the difference between organized and volunteer political parties. In the abstract, hypotheses could be generated in either direction for the impact of party structure on the representation of public wishes for the domain of welfare policy in the aftermath of the New Deal:

- Volunteer parties, being theoretically more responsive to their constituencies by way of the greater input of issue activists, could have moved into alignment with the revised welfare preferences of the New Deal earlier than organized parties, with their potentially resistant structures. Such a result would imply that volunteer activists ought to be farther to the left of the national average among Democrats and farther to their right of that average among Republicans.
- Alternatively, organized parties, with the long and *local* service of party office-holders making them more focused on winning elections and delivering policies, could have felt compelled to adjust to what became the dominant ideology of the New Deal earlier than their volunteer opposites with their idiosyncratic issue base. This would imply that organized activists should be farther to the left of the national average among Democrats but *less far* to the right of that average among Republicans.

Fortunately, Mayhew offers an empirically rooted hypothesis to organize the analysis, based on his survey of organized versus volunteer parties in the immediate

postwar years. In this, he opts clearly for the second structural possibility. His picture of the grand deal struck between President Franklin Roosevelt and organized Democratic parties in the states, with welfare policy front and center, suggests that a) it should be Democratic party activists from organized party states who were more in line with the welfare program of the national Democratic party, and that b) Republican party activists, while clearly to the right of their own rank and file in both types of parties, should be closer to the national average in organized party states, through their institutionalized ability to respond to a revised electoral context:

But reaching the Presidency was one thing, using and keeping it another. After he took office, Roosevelt came to a quick understanding with the local Democratic organizations on the terms of support downward in federal money and jobs in exchange for loyalty upward in elections, national conventions, and Congress. This easy and basic accommodation was evidently [to be] honored and valued by Democratic Presidents for three decades.⁹

An explicit comparison of the role of party structures, as embodied in the systematic scales developed here, is then facilitated by converting Figure 1 and some successors to a more simplified and condensed form, using numerical scores for the four party sub-groups. Table 1.A (“Nation”) converts the bars from Figure 1.A into tabular form to show how this is done. Tables 1.B and 1.C then provide the same structural divisions for non-South and South respectively. In the process, Table 1.A immediately makes two further points about partisan alignments in the nation as a whole:

- First, as now stratified by organized versus volunteer structures, the organized party states were more liberal and the volunteer party states more conservative in every partisan category: Democratic activists, Democratic rank and file, Republican rank and file, and Republican activists.

⁹Mayhew, *Placing Parties in American Politics*, 318, 321.

- Second, Republican activists were almost exactly as far to the right of their own rank and file for both organized and volunteer parties; the distinction added little to the internal Republican story. For Democratic activists, however, there was a key additional distinction: Democratic activists were clearly to the left of their rank and file in organized party states, but modestly to the *right* of this rank and file in volunteer counterparts.

Table 1

Which is to say: at least for this point in time, organized party structures, as opposed to volunteer party structures, were pulling the active Democratic Party toward the dominant ideology of the majority party in the nation as a whole. Welfare preferences among the Democratic rank and file confirm that organized parties were more likely to be found in states with more liberal welfare preferences, though this does raise the chicken-and-egg question of whether they were drawn there naturally or drawn there by their organized party structures. Regardless, Democratic *activists* were additionally left of this rank and file in organized party states in a way that was not characteristic—actually reversed—by Democratic activists in volunteer states.

The point is underlined but given important distinctions when the focus becomes the non-South, that is, the nation minus its Southern dissidents. The opening analytic result from this change of focus is to emphasize the basic background fact that a national picture at this time did not truly apply *nationwide*. (Table 1.B) The Republican Party in the non-South still looked nearly identical to a national picture of the party as a whole. But organized parties among the Democrats were now considerably farther left than they appeared in the whole nation, among both Democratic activists and their rank and file.

Volunteer parties in the non-South were likewise left of their national portrait, yet they trailed the organized parties among non-Southern Democrats by a considerably increased margin, again among both activists and their rank and file.

More strikingly, organized party states in the non-South showed an increasing symmetry to their partisan ideological alignments, from Democratic activists on the clear left through Republican activists on the clear right with the two rank and files placed in-between, though Republican activists did retain a distance from their rank and file that was greater than the comparable Democratic distance. Yet the volunteer party states were aligned in a fundamentally different fashion, courtesy of their volunteer party Democrats. In this, party activists were not pulling their rank and file toward the national party program; they still actually anchored the Democratic right, albeit only marginally. Any hypothesis about their incipient contribution to greater distance from the ideological center, along with additionally greater distance than their organized counterparts, is clearly not supported.

And all the while, the South continued to do something very different in these post-New Deal years, including its own very different organized versus volunteer division.¹⁰ (Table 1.C) In the South, both party types continued to feature Democratic activists comfortably to the right of their rank and files and actually right of the national average. But now, stratified by party structure, Democratic activists in those Southern states with organized parties were considerably closer to their rank and file than were

¹⁰The great survey of Southern parties at the time was V.O. Key, Jr., *SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). While his focus is more like that of Elazar than that of Mayhew, there are constant indications of party structures that would map onto the schema formalized by Wilson and applied by Mayhew. Hence Louisiana was more explicitly organized, Arkansas more impressively volunteer, etc.

Democratic activists in states with volunteer parties. Moreover, while this still did not make organized party activists into ideological liberals, it did sharply distinguish them from Southern Democratic activists in volunteer party states, who were strikingly conservative, more conservative even than the national *Republican* rank and file.¹¹

The Reformed World: Partisan Alignments

That was the older world, initially demarcated by Ware and Mayhew in their accounts of organized versus volunteer political parties, a world which was destined to shift precipitously around the cut-point used here, namely 1970. Much else was shifting in the issue alignment of American politics at that point, so larger changes were hardly being driven by party structure alone. Yet the latter did represent the long-delayed triumph of a reform model first articulated in the late nineteenth century, the great era of organized parties in American politics. So it would have been surprising if a structural change of this magnitude, on the part of what were after all the main political intermediaries of their time, did not make contributions of its own to the shifting nature of American politics, as indeed it did.

Once again, it is necessary to begin with the overall contours to partisan preferences in this successor period, before looking for differences between organized and volunteer parties within those contours. For the nation as a whole, the situation in this new world is easily summarized. (Figure 2.A) For 1970-1988 as opposed to 1950-1968, the national picture acquired an increasingly symmetric alignment. (Compare Figures

¹¹Key, *op.cit.*, showed the Southern Republican parties as skeletal in most places, and the Ns for Southern Republican activists are derisory in the Claggett and Shafer data during these years. When they are further subdivided into organized versus volunteer, the numbers simply become too small for any ideological ratings to be stable and robust. But their numbers were so small that these Measures based upon them should rightfully be ignored, as Table 1.C indeed does

2.A & 2.B) The two rank and file populations moved only slightly farther apart, but became truly equidistant from the national mean. Their activist counterparts diverged even less while likewise becoming more symmetrically aligned. Yet in order for this activist symmetry to surface, something newly distinctive was required. To wit: both Democratic and Republican activists had to move leftward, and both did. In the process, Democratic activists moved additionally off to the left of the national average, while Republican activists pulled back toward it.

Figure 2

What was additionally different in this reformed era—an effect truly striking in its scale—was that contemporary adjustments to a previous national picture resulted largely from the *demise* of an old (and hallowed) regional distinction, South versus non-South, the one still so central to the preceding period. In that sense, the two great regional subdivisions continued to tell very different stories about ideological *change*. It was just that the overall result was convergence rather than divergence this time. For its part, the non-South looked almost identical in both the old and the new orders. (Compare Figures 2.C & 1.B) The national movement back toward the center among Republican activists was largely fueled by Republican activists in the non-South. But apart from that, the three other partisan categories remained essentially as they had been in the preceding period, a stability only underlined by the fact that partisan and ideological change in the American South was convulsive on the ground and far-reaching in its implications.

For its part, the South was politically transformed, coming into full alignment with the national picture. This required the same moderating move back toward the middle on the part of Southern Republican activists, and that move was accomplished.

The Republican rank and file did become modestly more conservative, but this was a truly modest change. So the real differences—what explained the overall Southern convergence—were changes inside the Southern Democratic Party. There, the rank and file moved clearly leftward, to the point of converging on the same ideological terrain as its non-Southern counterparts. (Compare Figures 2.D & 1.C) This was an aggregate shift of impressive scope, though as we shall see, it was not uniform internally. At the same time, Southern Democratic activists moved even more sharply leftward, traveling all the way across the middle of American society until they came to rest slightly to the *left* of their non-Southern colleagues. Put together, activists plus their rank and file, this was a convulsive transformation of the Southern Democratic Party.

Further Twists to a New Structural Mix

In its time, scholars disputed the impact within this overall picture of the general move toward volunteer parties driven by issue activists, a debate fuelled initially (but also partially obfuscated) by the war over proper institutions for delegate selection and presidential nomination.¹² By hindsight, however, many of these scholars moved eventually into a conditional consensus about the propensity of new activists to drive toward the ideological extremes. It was just that some analysts applauded this result, while others judged it as harmful to democratic representation in the longer run.¹³ Yet as scholars came increasingly to refocus on the *ideological polarization* that increasingly

¹²An especially pungent—and democratically pessimistic—incarnation of this debate is Nelson W. Polsby, *CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

¹³See Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, *DISCONNECT: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009) versus Alan Abramowitz, *THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

characterized American national politics, this underlying activist dynamic was more and more explicitly recognized and elevated in its consequences:

These activists may push the parties toward extreme stands on multiple issues if two conditions are met. The first is that activists are motivated by policy goals and thus advocate non-centrist positions on the policies that motivate them. The other is that the parties' nomination processes are open to diverse actors other than those currently controlling the party agenda, thus giving issue activists more influence over the selection of party candidates and party issue positions.

In contemporary party politics, both of these conditions are clearly met.¹⁴

By implication, three nested hypotheses about the role of organized versus volunteer parties during this successor period can be teased out of that scholarly evolution. These hypotheses might not—and indeed, they did not—appear self-evident in their own time. Yet they are hard to escape in its aftermath:

- First, that volunteer parties, with their greater receptiveness to issue activists, should pull ideologically away from their organized counterparts—to the left among Democrats and to the right among Republicans;
- Second, that while some distinction between organized and volunteer parties might well survive—established patterns of behavior can survive their institutional context, at least for a time—they should nevertheless be reduced;
- And third, that the crucial background fact for both developments was just that a growing share of these parties ended up on the volunteer side of this long-running division.

A Different South?

¹⁴Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, John C. Green, Richard Herrera, and Rosalyn Cooperman, "Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics", *American Political Science Review* 104(2010), 324. Consequential precedents for this argument include Thomas M. Carsey and Geoffrey Layman, "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate", *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2006), 464-477, and Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, "Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion", *American Journal of Sociology* 114(2008), 408-446.

Yet before any effort to tease out the impact of organized versus volunteer state parties in this reformed world, with its greater ideological symmetry and its shrinking regional differences, it is necessary to add two fresh controls—one quite large—to the analytical mix. For in fact, there is every reason to expect that a major aspect of Southern change was not shifting party structures alone, but also a changing *social composition* within both party types. And it is clear that the change in the balance of party types nationwide, the one that confirms old hypotheses about structural evolution and thereby distinguishes the new period, guarantees that our central structural distinction is not being applied to the same collection of states during both periods.

In fact, it will be easy to demonstrate that the largest single force bringing the South into national alignment during this new period was the enfranchisement of Southern blacks, producing a one-way flow—really a one-way flood—of new Southern Democrats. Once that is accomplished, it will be necessary to note a weaker but opposite echo, in which non-black Southerners began to swell the Southern *Republican Party*.¹⁵ And once both of those are registered, it will be necessary to *remove* a very different kind of barrier to perceiving the impact of the grand shift from organized to volunteer parties nationwide. As it turns out, the simplest and most direct comparison of the two party types understates the impact of a change in the balance between them. Only when that too is accomplished will it be possible to address those three organizing hypotheses about the impact of party structure in a reformed world.

¹⁵Very different explanations, conducing nevertheless to the same result, are Earl Black and Merle Black, *THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), and Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnson, *THE END OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

By far the most dramatic change in partisan alignments between time-periods for either of our major geographic regions in the entire period between 1950 and 2010 arrived between our first and second period in the American South. On the one hand, this change does not appear to have been centrally driven by the great shift in the balance of party structures nationwide, since there is no counterpart change to partisan alignments outside the South, where the bulk of the structural shift occurred. On the other hand, party types remain fully capable of working differently within this larger change, giving it a further shape—this is, after all, their crucial intermediary role—even when they do not give drive the initial change itself. So the immediate question is *what else* would have been changing the nature of Southern politics between these two periods, and the lead answer is nearly inescapable.

Table 2

This was the period of black enfranchisement in the American South, and the social composition of the Southern electorate changed hugely as a result. In substantive terms, this change is more directly tied to civil rights as a policy domain, and we shall pay more attention to it at the back end of this chapter. But the shift of preference alignments in the South was large for welfare issues too, such that the changing social composition of those alignments cannot be ignored here. Table 2.A begins these adjustments by recasting the picture of partisan alignment in the old and new South by first confining the analysis to whites only, then putting the whole (enfranchised) South back into the picture. Three things stand out:

- First, the two parties differ hugely in the ideological impact of black enfranchisement. Ideologically, the Democratic Party is a fundamentally different

institution with and without its new black identifiers. (Compare Figures 3.A & 3.B) The latter contribute by far the largest part of the Southern Democratic move leftward between the two eras. By contrast, the Republican Party is essentially unchanged.

- Second and said the other way around, the Democratic Party would look much more conservative in the new era if this changing racial composition of party supporters were *removed* from the picture. (Compare Figures 3.B & 3.C) Absent black identifiers, its rank and file continues to sit just about on the national average, and while its activists do move leftward, the non-blacks among them still end up at a much more moderate location.

- Third and in the face of all that, the single largest shift within the entire national story nevertheless occurs in the *white* South. This is a major move leftward by Southern Democratic activists from volunteer states, traveling from solidly conservative (+.27 in the old world) to modestly liberal (-.11 in the new). While it becomes even larger when black activists are added back into the totals (at -.24), the bigger part of this shift was already registered among non-black activists.

In ideological terms, then, this changing social composition of the two Southern parties had major representational impacts within the Democratic Party, nearly none within its Republican counterpart. Table 2.B is a reminder, however, of what this does *not* imply. Most definitively, it does not imply that stable policy preferences were accompanied by a stable social composition for the *Republican* Party. Even in the face a huge new increment of Democratic identifiers, courtesy of the enfranchisement of black Southerners, the Republican Party was growing as a share of the whole South. (Compare Tables B.1 & B.3) Indeed, when the focus was the non-black South, the share of

Southern identifiers in the Republican rank and file effectively doubled between the old world and this reformed period. (Compare Tables b.2 & B.3) It was just that this had no further impact on the policy preferences of the two Republican populations, old or new. Said one way, those non-blacks who were newly Republican obviously shared the welfare preferences of previous Republican identifiers. Said the other way, partisan change in the Southern Republican Party was constituted from those who shared the social welfare orientation of the national Republican Party.

The Same Nation?

Table 3 then introduces a different perspective on change across the two periods, one involving the nation as a whole and focused directly on the shifting balance of organized versus volunteer parties. The social composition of the Southern electorate was obviously changing. Ideological positioning among partisan categories was changing as well, even outside the South, even within the South among Southern whites. Yet so was the *balance* among party types, and ideological scores by themselves cannot capture all of the contribution from this further shift. In the old world, organized parties had covered roughly fifty percent of American society. In the reformed world, they covered only twenty-five percent. So tables that offer just a summary number for the ideological preferences of the various organized and volunteer categories inherently understate the importance of volunteer parties in the second period, since their ideological preferences are built on a numerical base that in fact *doubled* between periods.

Table 3

The simplest way to underline this is to bring back the partisan alignments of 1950-1968 and 1970-1988 as they were at Figures 1 and 2, but insert a third—an “as if”—alignment between them. Table 3.A is thus the actual result for the aggregate scores of the four partisan populations in the second period. Table 3.C is the actual result of the same aggregates in the first period. Table 3.B is then new, keeping the ideological *scores* from the first period, but recalculating them in proportion to the presence of organized and volunteer parties from the second period. The result is a picture of what the first period might have looked like, had it already been characterized by the balance of party types that appeared in the second..

What becomes clear is that the change between periods was even larger than summary numbers from the four partisan categories (in Tables 3.A & 3.C) would indicate, since such summary numbers do not reflect the additional increment from the changing balance between organized and volunteer parties. Accordingly, when the world of 1950-1968 is recalculated as if it had been characterized by the party balance of 1970-1988, the impact of party structure becomes modestly but clearly larger than in the unadjusted figures:

- Seen this way, the two Democratic populations, that is, party activists and their rank and file, would both have been less liberal in the old period. (Compare Figures 3.A & 3.B) In other words, both Democratic populations moved somewhat more to the left in the successor period than unadjusted numbers would suggest. (Compare Figures 3.B & 3.C) This is a further ideological change traceable directly and mechanically to the shifting balance among organized versus volunteer parties.

- And the same outcome is even more substantial among the two Republican populations. Seen this way, its both party activists and their rank and file would likewise have been farther to the right in the old period. (Compare Figures 3.A & 3.B) As a result, both Republican partisan populations would have moved even more toward the ideological middle in the successor period than unadjusted numbers would suggest. (Compare Figures 3.B & 3.C) This is again a shift traceable directly to the changing balance of party types.

The Reformed World: Party Structures

With those further adjustments in place, it becomes possible to return to the story of organized versus volunteer political parties *within* this overall picture of ideological alignment by partisan preferences, and to test the result against the three prior organizing hypotheses. Many lesser distinctions between the old world and the reformed period can be isolated in Table 4 as well, but each portrait—for the nation as a whole, the non-South, and the South—features a central development that appears particularly diagnostic.

For the nation as a whole, this is the death of an old ideological regularity, previously connecting welfare preferences to party types. In the old ideological array, organized party states lay to the left of volunteer parties in all four partisan populations. (Compare Figures 4.A & 1.A) In the reformed world, with a new balance of party types in a revised collection of organized versus volunteer states, this distinction has declined among Democrats while actually reversing among Republicans. What this means is that the old tendency for organized parties among the Democrats to pull their states toward the New Deal consensus and volunteer parties to lean away from it has withered, while

the similar tendency for organized *Republican* parties to pull toward that consensus and volunteer Republican parties to pull away has disappeared.

Table 4

Yet with a focus on the representational impact of party structures, this national picture, despite the overarching theme of regional convergence in the ideological positioning of partisan populations, remains sufficiently different by region that understanding change in the nation as a whole requires putting this regional difference back on the table. Two points stand out, one for each region, when this is accomplished:

- The first is that reform does indeed appear to have undone the old alignment within the social welfare domain. This is most evident in the non-South, and the latter part of this chapter plus Chapter Four will suggest that new issues—civil rights, then cultural values—were hard on an old order where organized parties preferred to stay with social welfare but volunteer parties preferred to move on to new concerns.
- The second major regional effect in the reform era is then produced in the South, which manages to come into alignment with the national picture by resurrecting the old—the previous—difference between party types on social welfare. In this sense, the decline of the previous South/non-South distinction in social welfare owes a great deal to the *difference* between organized and volunteer parties in the South.

On the one hand, then, with the South removed from the analysis, the non-South produces an even purer version of the evolving national difference between organized and volunteer parties. (Table 4.B) Now, the previous pattern, whereby every partisan category in the organized states was to the left of every parallel category in volunteer states, has disappeared completely. (Compare Tables 4.B & 1.B) Moreover, just to ice

that particular cake, all four partisan populations among volunteer parties in the new period have moved to the left of where they had been in the old era. In that older world, these volunteer parties had not even assumed a straightforward left-to-right alignment on social welfare. In the new world, they have not only assumed that alignment, but their Democrats are now fully as liberal as counterparts among the organized parties, while their Republicans are actually more moderate than *their* Republican counterparts—not more conservative, as they once were.

On the other hand, when viewed through the lens of party structure, the reformed South proves to be doing something very different. (Table 4.C) First, all four *Southern* Democratic populations have moved leftward between periods—activists and their rank and file, in organized and volunteer states. More strikingly, as these Southern Democratic populations did so, they simultaneously resurrected what looked like the old and not the reformed alignment by party structure, in which Democratic activists in organized parties were pulling their states toward the social welfare consensus, while Republican activists were doing so as well. (Compare Tables 4.C & 1.C) Conversely, Democratic activists in volunteer parties in the South were less successful in pulling their states toward that consensus, while Republican activists in volunteer parties were more successful in pulling them away. If the South had come into alignment with the previous ideological character of the nation as a whole, then, it had done so in the manner that had characterized the old and not the new array of party structures.

What does this elaborated and adjusted world suggest about the opening hypotheses for the ideological contribution of structural differences during this second period? None of these original hypotheses are fully and mechanically, yet all have

something to contribute. Outside the South, volunteer parties were indeed pulling leftward by comparison to organized parties in every partisan category. It was just that this was a pull toward the ideological extremes among Democrats but toward moderation among Republicans. Within the South, however, the process of coming into ideological alignment with national patterns saw the region conforming to the non-Southern patterns of the *previous* period, where organized parties were still stood to the left of their volunteer counterparts. Lastly, beneath both developments, the underlying shift away from organized and toward volunteer parties was always magnifying the overall ideological shift between periods.

The Modern World: Preferences and Structures

There was inevitably a successor to this second period as well. This is the era in which we all currently live, the modern world, captured here through the years from 1990-2008.¹⁶ It was this period that eventually spawned a revised vision of the impact of party structure—actually two such visions—thereby producing a conflict in scholarly interpretation that impels some serious current research:

- In the old world, the period from 1950 through 1968, the representational impacts of the distinction between organized and volunteer parties were, if not alive and well, certainly not difficult to tease out.
- In the middle period, the years from 1970 through 1988, the balance among these party types shifted substantially in favor of volunteer parties, and their representational impacts declined in most regards, while actually reversing in some.

¹⁶An extension of the Claggett and Shafer data through 2012, and ultimately through 2016, is under way but currently not complete. Which may mean that it opens yet another era in the impact—and study—of party structure?

- The modern period, from 1990 onward, is said, very inconsistently, to be the period a) when this distinction *as traditionally defined* lost all its power, but b) when active partisans figured out how to restore their control over nominations to public office and over the policy-making conducted there.

Figure 3

The obvious preliminary to addressing either contemporary proposition—much less their joint contradiction or consistency—is to reproduce the modern world in the same fashion as its two preceding eras. So Figure 3 again begins with the overall contour of partisan preferences. This time, the two rank and files are themselves more polarized than in the past, though much of this increased polarization is due to a substantial shift among Republican identifiers. (Compare Figures 3.A & 3.B) There is an even larger increase in ideological polarization among the activists, though this receives an even greater contribution from Republicans. Democratic activists do shift farther to the left; it is just that Republican activists shift even farther to the right.

This national pattern is almost perfectly—identically—replicated in the non-South: polarization throughout, but a greater contribution from Republicans across the two ranks and files and an even greater contribution from the same party across the activist strata. (Compare Figures 3.C and 3.A) Yet for a student of these distributions, the real import of the fact that the non-South is now almost identical to the national picture means that *the South must now be almost identical to the national picture as well*—which of course it is. (Compare Figures 3.D & 3.A) Both Democratic and Republican activists are additionally polarized in the South, imparting the shadow of a

regional difference. But a shadow is all it is. Otherwise, the great regional deviation of the immediate postwar years is simply gone.

Figure 4

Once more, that sets up the possibility of analyzing the difference between organized and volunteer parties within this larger picture. Comparing the nation as a whole across time, what stands out is the power of a growing partisan polarization. Figure 4 assembles the four partisan populations for organized versus volunteer parties in the immediate postwar period and the modern world. What jumps out of this picture is the regularity of its partisan alignment in the modern world (Figure 4.B) versus its postwar predecessor (Figure 4.A). Joined to the sense of regional convergence that emerges in the modern world (in Figure 3), the power of polarization might suggest that the room for further impact from state party structures is constricted.

That would, however, be to overlook the distinctions between organized and volunteer parties that live on in the modern world, distinctions that are not even self-evidently reduced from an earlier era. One way to see this is to compare the *ideological distance* between activists and their putative rank and file for both parties in the modern world, dividing them between organized and volunteer models. (Thus comparing Figures B.1 & B.2) What surfaces here is that the activists, both Democratic *and* Republican, are farther from their respective rank and files among volunteer as opposed to organized parties.

Figure 5

Moreover, Figure 5 makes it possible to look for the same effect within regions. When this is done, two aspects of this remaining impact for party structure stand out.

One of these is explicitly regional: the distance between activists and their rank and file within both parties is now greater in the South than in the rest of the country. (Compare Figures 5.A & 5.B) What was once a story of the South doing something *other than* the rest of the nation is now a story of the South doing a more intensive version of the national pattern. But the other main point is the one visible for the nation as a whole, before these regions are separated. (Compare Figures 5.A.1 with 5.B.1 & 5.A.2 with 5.B.2) Namely, for both parties—and now in both regions—activists are farther away from their rank and files within volunteer as opposed to organized political parties.

What should the analyst make of these comparisons in their totality? The power of partisan polarization across time has meant that the difference between organized and volunteer parties no longer sustains partisan alignments by region that are different in kind. On the other hand, familiar structural distinctions, with volunteer party activists pulling away from their rank and files by comparison with their opposite numbers in organized parties, continue on into the modern world, and continue to be straightforwardly visible. One inescapable implication—and probably the best one to emphasize at this point in the analysis—is that what the analyst can make of comparisons limited entirely to the policy domain of social welfare, as central as these have been to the modern American party system, should probably been held in abeyance until other major policy domains have been considered.

Civil Rights

Social Welfare has long been understood to be the bedrock domain for policy preferences in the party system of the contemporary U.S., a system beginning with the

Great Depression and the New Deal.¹⁷ Seen from the modern end, this ‘New Deal party system’ has been fraying for a very long time. Seen from its origins, there is some new work which suggests that the system did not really *arrive* in anything like a lasting form until the first postwar presidential election (in 1948) confirmed its institutionalized character.¹⁸ Yet it was certainly in place by the point at which we have continuing data to track its evolution. Indeed, it was sufficiently established as a contour of electoral politics that the authors of *The American Voter* could treat the presidential election of 1952 as a “deviating election”, in part because that contest did not produce the ultimate result that welfare preferences would have predicted.¹⁹

On the other hand, our first period for analyzing the impact of party structure on representation and responsiveness in the United States, 1950-1968, would be demarcated in important ways by the addition of a newly consequential—and newly demanding—policy realm, namely civil rights.²⁰ The 1950s were the decade of an emergent protest movement in this policy domain. They were the decade of the greatest Supreme Court decision on civil rights in modern American history, in *Brown v. Board*. And they were

¹⁷For social welfare within politics in the large, Michael Barone, *OUR COUNTRY: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: Free Press, 1990), Chapters 6-14; for social welfare and the party system, Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, *TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), Chapters 1 & 2; and for social welfare and partisan attachments, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *THE AMERICAN VOTER*, abr.ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1964), Chapters 2 & 7.

¹⁸Helmut Norpoth, Andrew H. Sidman, and Clara H. Suong, “Polls and Elections: The New Deal Realignment in Real Time”, *PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY* 43(2013), 146-160; Eric Schickler and Devin Caughey, “Public Opinion, Organized Labor, and the Limits of New Deal Liberalism, 1930-1945”, *STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* 25(2011), 162-189.

¹⁹Campbell et al., *THE AMERICAN VOTER*, 274-279, and especially as elaborated in Angus Campbell, “A Classification of the Presidential Elections”, Chapter 4 in Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER* (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

²⁰The other newly emergent and electorally powerful issue was foreign affairs, courtesy of the Cold War and the centrality of American political institutions within it, about which, much more in Chapter Four.

marked by the first major legislation on civil rights since Reconstruction. The 1960s would then see civil rights protest explode. They would see Court decisions ramify. And they would produce the truly landmark legislation in this domain, most especially in the form of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, altering the American political landscape in some key regards.²¹

The items contributing to the civil rights index again vary with the array of substantively relevant questions that are asked in a gradually changing ANES. Yet they were selected to fall within a single explicit definition of the policy realm, and refining this is even easier for civil rights than for social welfare:

Civil rights could be given an abstract formulation, making it in effect a sub-domain of civil liberties. Yet civil rights in the postwar period has been most centrally a matter of race policy for black Americans, so that in the search for an issue structure, it seemed essential to retain *racial concerns* as the essence of a policy definition.²²

Within the resulting array, certain ‘marker’ items, even more generally accepted as belonging to the rights domain, provide the same sort of assurance as they did with welfare policy, that a slowly changing measure still captures the same basic concern.

Among these markers for the civil rights measure are:

Some people feel that if black people are not getting fair treatment in jobs, the government in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the federal government’s business.

Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government’s business.²³

²¹Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Justin Peck, “Building Toward Major Policy Change: Congressional Action on Civil Rights, 1941-1950); Hugh Davis Graham, *THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael J. Klarman. *FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: The Supreme Court in the Struggle for Racial Equality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²²Claggett and Shafer, *THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MIND*, 5.

²³*Ibid.*, 81.

The Old World: Partisan Alignments

It should probably not seem surprising that partisan alignment for the voting public was far weaker in the domain of civil rights than in the domain of social welfare. (Figure 5) Voters had been moved centrally by welfare concerns since at least 1930, while the driving concerns for civil rights were only gaining traction in the early postwar years. More to the practical point, the *parties*, and most especially their active members, had assumed clear positions on social welfare, ideologically distinctive if still moderate by the standards of what was to come. Those positions were not just less clear but actually mottled and confusing for the same two parties on civil rights.²⁴

Figure 5

A picture of the policy preferences of partisan populations in the nation as a whole did show the same general alignment for the two policy domains—left to right from Democratic activists to the Democratic rank and file to the Republican rank and file to Republican activists. So civil rights did not ultimately *cross-cut* social welfare as a policy domain. It was just that it offered a far weaker version of the pattern. Literally every one of the four great partisan populations was more moderate in its policy preferences on civil rights than on social welfare when aggregated for the nation as a whole. Though regional differences could still be sharp, as could the impact of organized versus volunteer parties, so that individual populations within geographic regions or party types could still be more extreme on civil rights than on social welfare.

²⁴Edward G. Carmines & James L. Stimson, *ISSUE EVOLUTION: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 6, “Modeling Change in Mass Identification”, most especially at Figure 6.4, 150.

In any case, the non-South then ‘adjusted’ this overall national pattern in major respects. (Figure 4.C) Both Democratic populations edged liberal compared to their national portrait on civil rights, with Democratic activists moving clearly to the left of their rank and file. Both Republican populations were even more liberal than *their* national portraits, however, such that rank and file Republicans now became the true moderates on civil rights. On the other hand, a great deal of these evident distinctions was more or less a direct reflection of the effect of removing Southern partisans from the national picture. For the South was indeed strikingly out of line with that picture, even more so than in the domain of social welfare. (Figure 4.D)

In this contrary alignment, every one of the four partisan populations in the South was clearly conservative. Rank and file Democrats had been ever so weakly liberal on social welfare; no Southern population was anywhere close to that on civil rights. Indeed, every one of the four was more conservative on civil rights than on social welfare, just as every one of the four was more conservative than their non-Southern counterparts. On the one hand, rank and file Republicans were again as close to moderate as the South could provide. On the other, the gap among the two Democratic populations, South versus non-South, was immense. (Compare Figures 4.C & 4.D) One further result was that the war over civil rights within the active parties was led by non-Southern Democrats on the left but Southern Democrats on the right—Southern Republican leadership still being numerically derisory—with the non-Southern Republicans, both activists and their rank and file, as the swing populations.

The Old World: Party Structures

With civil rights, however, an effort to unpack the role of organized versus volunteer parties within this overall alignment requires a quick detour through the earlier political history of the civil rights domain, precisely because it made the internal Democratic and Republican stories so different *by party* in this first postwar period, our ‘old world’ of partisan alignment. Since the Civil War, Republicans had been the party of civil rights, though priority for the issue had been declining gradually but ineluctably in party circles, while the priority of social welfare had risen. Since the Civil War and conversely, the Democrats had been the party of non-intervention on this issue, though that was changing rapidly during the mid-twentieth century—in the non-South but not the South—exaggerating a regional split inside the party while simultaneously confusing voters nationwide about actual party positions.

Table 4

So with civil rights, the addition of a further distinction between organized and volunteer parties was to tell a story that most definitely did not mimic the counterpart version on social welfare. (Table 4) The difference was most striking in the non-South this time, among Democrats, where civil rights and social welfare operated in fundamentally opposite fashions among organized versus volunteer political parties. (Table 4.A) Recall that on social welfare, organized party activists pulled their states toward the national program, and hence to the left, while volunteer party activists were effectively indifferent, sitting ever so modestly to the *right* of their rank and file. (Table 4.A.2) That situation was actually reversed on civil rights. (Table 4.A.1) Here, *volunteer* party activists pulled clearly off toward what was becoming the national position of the Democratic Party, and hence to the left, while organized party activists

were the ones who were now comparatively indifferent, resting content with the preferences of their rank and file. This meant that for the nation as a whole, organized Democratic Party activists were the left on social welfare, but volunteer Democratic Party activists were the left on civil rights.

The non-Southern story among Republicans was less internally differentiated by party structure but every bit as different by issue area, social welfare versus civil rights. (Table 4.A) Republican activists were more conservative than their rank and files on both issues. And both Republican populations were more conservative in volunteer as opposed to organized party states. Yet these differences were simply dwarfed by the great difference in *issue impact* inside the Republican Party. Every one of these Republican populations—as distinguished by level of activism and by party structure—was far more conservative on social welfare, genuinely moderate on civil rights. Existing distinctions by level of activism and type of political party simply paled by comparison to this uniform moderation.

None of that could serve as a summary portrait of the South in the same period, though some of the same *relationships* could be teased out of a set of regional policy preferences that were anchored in far different ideological territory. (Table 4.B) The story of the established one-party South was by definition a Southern Democratic story, so that its distant Republican echo could be dispatched quickly. Activist Republicans were too rare to support a further division between Republican activists by party type, and within the Republican rank and file, itself a small operative minority confined to a handful of (largely Appalachian) strongholds, there was little difference between party types on *either* social welfare or civil rights.

On the other side of the partisan aisle, however, differences by party structure remained noteworthy. Yet these were additionally different for civil rights as opposed to social welfare. (Table 4.B) Recall that on social welfare, Southern Democratic activists from organized parties had been ever so modestly more conservative than their own rank and file, while Southern Democratic activists from volunteer parties had been clearly more conservative than theirs. (Table 4.B.2) On civil rights, the same general outline remained, but in a grossly exaggerated fashion. (Table 4.B.1) Now, Southern Democratic activists in organized party states were essentially in line with their rank and files, while Southern Democratic activists in volunteer party states were wildly off to the right of theirs. These latter were clearly the most conservative populations in either party type in either region on either issue.

To say the same thing differently, then, on civil rights in both the non-South and the South, organized party activists merely reflected the policy preferences of their rank and files, while volunteer party activists pulled strongly toward the ideological extremes. It was just that these rank and files were already anchored in sharply different ideological territory, non-South versus South, so that their respective activists were pulling leftward in one geographic region but rightward in the other. On social welfare by contrast, organized party activists in both regions had pulled toward a national consensus on welfare programs, while volunteer party activists had resisted that pull. Both were thus pulling leftward among organized parties, rightward among volunteer parties, even though they began (and ended up) in ideologically different territory.

One other way to say the same thing is that organized parties were more attached to the existing national party program, while volunteer parties were more responsive to a

newly emergent issue, again inside both parties. Yet regionalism retained an important mediating effect on this common behavior. Organized parties among the Democrats were contributing an actively liberalizing influence on social welfare in both the non-South and the South, while volunteer parties were pulling to the left (another actively liberalizing influence) on civil rights in the non-South but to the right (an actively conservatizing influence) in the South. And Republican parties were showing much less impact from civil rights at all, as a growing conservatism rooted in social welfare was moderated by an older support for civil rights initiatives.

The Reformed World: Partisan Alignments

In an examination of the impact of party structure on democratic representation, the defining characteristic of our middle period, 1970-1988, was the triumph of the reforms associated with one side in the long war over structure and behavior. But associated with that change, partially driven by it but partially autonomous, was the further evolution of partisan preferences in the policy domain of civil rights. Now, the two partisan rank and files were considerably farther apart in their policy preferences, Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right. (Compare Figures 6.A & 6.B) There could no longer by any doubt that this policy domain had acquired a partisan alignment crudely parallel to that found originally on social welfare. At the same time, Democratic activists had plunged off to the left, while Republican activists had hardly moved at all. So polarization in the active parties was entirely a Democratic phenomenon.

Figure 6

Several other aspects of the civil rights story come into view if this change in the partisan alignment of racial policy is compared to change in the partisan alignment of

welfare policy at the same time. (Compare Figures 6.A & 6.B with 2.A & 2.B) Recall that the main shift between periods in the latter had involved a movement leftward among Democratic activists, away from the ideological center, coupled with a roughly equivalent movement *leftward* among Republican activists, back toward the center, while the two rank and files had remained essentially static. For civil rights, by contrast, the two rank and files had moved considerably farther apart—this was, after all, what confirmed the partisan alignment of this second dimension of policy preference—while Democratic activists had not just made a considerably larger move leftward on civil rights. They were now actually farther left on civil rights than on social welfare, while Republican activists had their ideological focus elsewhere, remaining considerably farther right on social welfare as opposed to civil rights.

Yet if that was the dominant national narrative on civil rights for this successor period, the narrative did not imply that regional differences had disappeared for civil rights, as in fact they had for social welfare. (Compare Figures 6.C & 6.D with 2.C & 2.D) In the reformed world of civil rights as in the old world, the Democratic Party told one story and the Republican party another, though both stories were hugely conditioned by political region—or more accurately here, by the degree of political *change* within regions:

- With simple partisanship as the window, the Democrats had now reached a roughly parallel alignment between the two regions, non-South and South, while the Republicans were now ideologically divided, being moderately conservative in the non-South but strongly conservative in the South. (Figures 6.C & 6.D)

- With political region as the window instead, the South was now distinguished by having become the more polarized region, with a greater ideological distance not just between its party activists but also between their respective rank and files. Greater conservative movement of the two Republican populations was the main driver for this difference. (Again Figures 6.C & 6.D)
- With the old world as the window, the main change in the non-South was a bit of fresh polarization, while the South was simply transformed, with Democratic activists moving phenomenally leftward (-.68), their rank and file moving solidly leftward (-.35), and the Republican rank and file moving simultaneously rightward (+.11), leaving only activist Republicans to moderate a bit (-.16).
- With the individual partisan populations by region as the window, finally, what stood out was a) the galloping liberalism of Democratic activists, epitomized in the South—a shift of -.13 in the non-South versus -.68 in the South, and b) the appearance of two different Republican parties, modestly conservative in the non-South (+.16 & +.19) but seriously conservative in the South (+.32 & +.30).

The Reformed World: Party Structures

That was a changed world for party structures to mediate, so perhaps it should not be surprising that they in turn shifted in their mediating role. (Table 5) In any case, the story of regional evolution in policy alignments on civil rights now crossed with the remaining distinctions between organized and volunteer parties in a major—and different—way. Recall that in the non-South, the old world had featured organized parties whose Democratic activists were essentially in sync with their rank and file on civil rights, while volunteer parties had featured Democratic activists pulling aggressively

away from their rank and file to the left, and where the Republican story had been one of comparatively undifferentiated moderation among both party types. (Table 5.A.2) Yet in the non-South of a reformed world, this picture had become additionally complex.

Table 5

In the remaining organized party states, both the Republican and the Democratic rank and files had actually shifted rightward, while the counterpart rank and files in volunteer states had changed much less. (Table 5.A.1) Among Democrats, organized party activists were now pulling to the left of their rank and files, as befitted organized parties in a world where civil rights had become part of the national party program. Yet the previous tendency of volunteer activists to do so even more was now confirmed and extended. Among Republicans, activists in the organized states were now pulling away from their rank and file in the opposite (conservative) direction, likewise befitting a world where civil rights had acquired an alignment parallel to that on social welfare, while activists in the volunteer states continued their previous moderation.

In the South, the internal story had become stunningly different. Recall that in the South, the previous one-party world had featured Democratic activists in organized party states who were essentially in sync with their rank and files, while Democratic activists in volunteer party states were wildly off to the right of theirs. (Table 5.B.2) In that peculiar sense, both regions had been doing the same thing: organized party activists marking time on civil rights while volunteer party activists plunged ahead. It was just that they had been plunging leftward in the non-South, rightward in the South. Yet in the South of a reformed world, this picture had not just become more complex. It had been transformed.

At the heart of this transformation was an ideological shift. (Table 5.B.1) All four Democratic populations—organized and volunteer, activist and rank and file—had moved solidly leftward, amazingly so in some cases, while the Republican rank and file, both organized and volunteer, had moved rightward. It is too risky to compare organized and volunteer activists among Republicans with those from an older world where they were simply too scarce, but it is worth noting that in the reformed world, these Republican activists (now newly measurable) were slightly *less* conservative on civil rights than their own rank and files.

Nevertheless, the larger story still lived inside the Southern Democratic Party, and this internal Democratic story remained heavily colored by the difference between organized and volunteer parties. In a world in which racial liberalism had become a national Democratic program, even the volunteer parties were now pulling left of their rank and file, though organized parties were doing so with remarkable abandon. Seen from one side, Democratic activists ended up much farther left of their rank and files in organized parties (-.48) than in volunteer counterparts (-.14). Though seen from the other side, it was volunteer activists who had moved farther (-.93) compared to their organized counterparts (-.72).

In a different sense, then, organized and volunteer parties were doing different things in the South and the non-South. Outside the South, organized parties were holding the focus of party politics on social welfare and slowing the rise of civil rights. As a result, while both activist populations were liberal, those in volunteer parties were half-again as liberal as those in organized parties. Yet in the South, it was the organized parties that were disproportionately pulling the region into alignment with the national

picture. Both populations were now liberal, and activists in the volunteer parties were hardly resisting, but activists in the organized parties were now more than twice as liberal on civil rights.

So the overall regional picture no longer bespoke two different political worlds. Where the full partisan alignments on civil rights for the non-South versus the South in the old world had been essentially different *in kind*, they had now come into general alignment, differing only in degree. (Compare Figures 6.C & 6.D) Though once again as with social welfare, this regional story should be recast as one of the South (re)joining the nation, rather than one of the non-South moving in a southerly direction. On the other hand, and now even more than with social welfare, interpreting this critical Southern shift did require some consideration not just of the change in policy preferences within the two key Democratic populations of a one-party region but again of the shift in the social composition of both.

The New South Revisited

The lead question for this entire project always comes back to some variant of “How does party structure shape the partisan alignment of public preferences, and hence ultimately the nature of democratic responsiveness?” For most purposes, the answer is by itself an important element of the intermediary character of American politics, whatever this alignment is and wherever it comes from. That is, after all, the main reason scholars attend to political intermediaries in the first place. Yet change in this partisan alignment can come from at least *three* major sources, and sometimes—and with civil rights more than any other policy domain—that fact requires a side-trip in the pursuit of the impact of party structures:

- First, people can change their preferences. This may be because experience teaches them differently about a stable issue in the course of time, or it may be because previously secondary issues become highly salient in a different period. Chapter Four will present two very different examples of the latter, in the domains of cultural values and foreign affairs.
- Second, people can maintain their preferences but change the associated partisan attachments. Here, individuals can shift allegiances from one party to the other or, within parties, they can shift to a more or a less active role. Chapter Three has already attended to this for social welfare and its changing alignments within the American South, a side-trip that is even more necessary for civil rights.
- And third, the simple passage of time perforce alters the pool of those available for any given form of alignment. Here, the temporal distance between 1950 and 2010 guarantees that a very large share of the earliest samples will have died out by the end and, conversely, that a very large share of recent samples can have neither experience nor memory of the earliest years.

These considerations about alternative roots—the potential alternative engines—of political change led to an inquiry into the changing social composition of partisan populations in the American South for the domain of social welfare in the reformed period, at Table 2. The fact of an even larger change in partisan alignments for the South in this same period in the domain of civil rights suggests a return to this particular side-trip, and Table 6 provides it. Table 6.A merely repeats the story of Southern alignments by party structure in our middle period, 1970-1988. Table 6.C brings back the same story from the old world, 1950-1968, now for non-black Southerners only. But Table 6.B is

the key added feature, asking what partisan alignments would have looked like in the reformed South if there had not simultaneously been a major new enfranchisement of Southern blacks, that is, for non-blacks only.²⁵

Table 6

So it now becomes possible to ask, for the single greatest change in partisan alignments for the entire postwar period, the one involving the American South between the early postwar years and the reform period: Which elements of the change could be found within the existing Southern electorate of the old world, and which elements were instead due to a sharp change in the social composition of that electorate between periods? To dispense quickly with Southern Republicans: there is little difference within the Republican rank and file between the non-black South and the whole South in the reformed period, 1970-1988, as well as little difference between the non-black South in the old world and this reformed period. Removing black Republicans from the sample makes non-black partisans look slightly more conservative within both organized and volunteer parties, but the difference is minor.

So there is no reason to believe that a changing social composition was having a serious effect within the Southern Republican Party between these two periods. The Democratic Party story, however, was quite different, with major elements of changing social composition courtesy of black enfranchisement, as well as major elements of changing partisan alignment among those who were *previously* enfranchised:

- For non-black Southern Democrats between these two periods, there is a consistent movement leftward on civil rights in all four partisan populations: activists

²⁵For black enfranchisement as a central focus in its own right, Richard M. Valelly, *THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

and their rank and file in both organized and volunteer party types. This shift is, however, concentrated among Democratic activists, where the change is impressive indeed. Activists in organized Southern parties move from solidly conservative to moderately liberal on civil rights, and if activists from volunteer parties do not get that far, remaining just to the right of the national average, they move an even larger distance leftward (from +.69 to +.04).

- For all Southern Democrats versus this non-black sample in the reformed period, there are likewise substantial differences. Adding black Southerners back into the sample moves the Democratic rank and file from solidly conservative on civil rights to very modestly liberal. And adding black Southerners to the body of Democratic activists moves them from ever so slightly conservative to solidly liberal in volunteer parties and from modestly liberal to wildly liberal in their organized counterparts.

To say the same thing differently: there is no need to be concerned with changing social composition between temporal periods within the Southern Republican Party. Partisan populations with both party types are essentially consistent with or without the small corpus of black Republicans. Within the Southern Democratic Party, on the other hand, there are major contributions both from changing alignments among previously enfranchised voters and a changing composition of the party courtesy of the newly enfranchised. For the Democratic rank and file, the major effect on aggregate preferences comes from adding newly voting Southern blacks. The non-black rank and file moves very little between periods. But for Democratic activists, the larger effect on aggregate preferences instead comes from change *inside* the non-black populations. Activists are still more liberal in both organized and volunteer parties when newly

enfranchised blacks are added to these totals, but the larger shift comes with those populations as they were already defined in the old world.²⁶

The Modern World: Demise of Another Old Distinction?

The policy domain of civil rights had been moving toward partisan symmetry in a shaky fashion by the reformed period. (Figure 7.A) The two partisan rank and files were clearly distinct, Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right. Yet while the same could be said as a generality about their respective active parties, the truth was that Republican activists were only ever so slightly to their right of their rank and file, while Democratic activists had plunged well off to the left of theirs. If they were still closer to their rank and file than were the *Republican* activists, they were not all that much closer. By comparison, the alignment of partisan populations on social welfare in the reformed period was much more directly symmetric. (Figure 7.B) Republican activists remained more extreme than their Democratic opponents, as they had long been, but this was not an ideological positioning that modified overall symmetry in the way that activist behavior on civil rights did.

Figure 7

The modern world then brought civil rights into the same sort of symmetric alignment. (Figure 7.C) The two rank and files were themselves considerably farther apart than they had been during the reformed period. And the same could be said of their two active parties, though in order for party activists to move toward ideological symmetry,

²⁶For social welfare and changes in partisan alignment across time, it was also helpful to compare not just the existing alignments for each period, but a third set of figures that recalculated ideological positions in the old world as if these had been shaped by the distribution of organized and volunteer parties that characterized the reformed period. For civil rights, however, largely because the partisan populations were minimally aligned with racial policy preferences in the old world, this recalculation has no consequential effects.

either Democratic activists had had to move left or Republican activists had had to move right. In fact, both happened, though a larger movement by Republican activists was key. (Figure 7.D) In fact, the result was actually sufficient to cause civil rights to surpass social welfare as a model of partisan polarization. Though one older difference between the two policy domains did continue into the modern world: Republican activists were still farther from the national average on social welfare, while Democratic activists continued to be farther from the national average on civil rights.

Figure 8

The modern world then went even farther in eliminating the differences in partisan preferences between political regions *within* the domain of civil rights. In the earliest period, these distinctions were truly differences in kind. The non-South was a rough approximation of the partisan alignment characterizing the nation as a whole on both civil rights and social welfare. (Figure 8.A) Yet the South was doing something completely different, showing a rough uniformity among all four partisan populations in opposition to civil rights reform, a uniformity that was at its most striking by including the entire (regionally dominant) *Democratic Party*. (Figure 8.B)

This difference in kind was what was converted to a simple difference in degrees of approximation to the national pattern during the reformed period. (Figures 6.C & 6.D) What the modern world did, then, was to come close to annihilating those differences. Both the non-South and the South moved into an alignment that was seriously polarized and roughly symmetric in both regions. (Figures 8.C & 8.D) The fact that the South was now slightly *more* polarized for both the rank and file and for their party activists only put the punctuation mark to this convergence among nation, non-South, and South.

Figure 9


Lastly, and perhaps most impressive of all, if the modern period had made regional differences truly residual, it had also gone a long way toward eradicating differences between party types within regions. To the point where the really striking story of convergence involved the two great alternative models of party structure. (Figure 9) These had still been doing quite different things as between the parties in the civil rights domain during the reformed period. (Table 5.A.1 & 5.B.1) But now, in both great political regions, alignment of the four partisan populations was increasingly similar for both organized and volunteer parties. What had been a strong tendency in the previous period for volunteer parties to lead the push toward civil rights—to the left in the non-South, to the right in the South—had simply disappeared in the modern era.

Instead, what struck the eye in the four pictures of Figure 9 is not their marginal distinctions but their generalized conformity to a single template. Though one notable impact of party structure did remain, in fact within both non-South and South, so that this effect was clearly structural rather than regional. To wit: in both great political regions for both political parties, activists were farther from their rank and files in volunteer as opposed to organized parties. (Compare Figures 9.A & 9.C with Figures 9.B & 9.D) While this difference, too, was but a shadow in the domain of social welfare, it had survived more clearly in the domain of civil rights. Yet in the end, for civil rights as for social welfare, the triumph of the volunteer model in the middle period appeared to have been followed in the modern world by the erasure of most major differences in their contribution to democratic representation.


Figure 1

**Policy Alignments, 1950-1968:
Social Welfare Preferences by Partisan Population**

A. The Nation as a Whole



B. The Non-South



C. The South




Table 1

**Policy Alignments, 1950-1968:
Organized versus Volunteer Parties**

	<u>A. Nation</u>		<u>B. Non-South</u>		<u>C. South</u>	
	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>
Democratic Activists	-.21	-.13	-.31	-.19	+.06	+.27
Democratic R & F	-.19	-.15	-.27	-.20	-.06	+.03
Republican R & F	+.16	+.26	+.16	+.27	+.18	+.15
Republican Activists	+.39	+.48	+.37	+.49	*	*

*Ns for Republican activists are tiny for the category as a whole. When they are further subdivided into organized and volunteer, they become derisory—and hence unreliable--during this period.

Figure 2

**Policy Alignments, 1970-1988:
Social Welfare Preferences by Partisan Population**




Table 2

**Real Changes, 1950-1968 to 1970-1988:
The South, Organized versus Volunteer Parties**

A. Ideological Impacts of a Changing Social Composition

	1. All South <u>1970-1988</u>		2. Whites Only <u>1970-1988</u>		3. Whites Only <u>1950-1968</u>	
	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>
Democratic Activists	-.30	-.24	+.01	-.11	+.08	+.27
Democratic R & F	-.23	-.18	+.01	+.01	-.01	+.08
Republican R & F	+.26	+.21	+.29	+.24	+.24	+.43
Republican Activists	+.35	+.43	+.35	+.46	*	*

B. Further Changes in Social Composition Itself

	1. All South <u>1970-1988</u>	2. Whites Only <u>1970-1988</u>	3. Whites Only <u>1950-1968</u>
Democratic Activists	9%	8%	9%
Democratic R & F	55%	49%	68%
Republican R & F	29%	35%	17%
Republican Activists	7%	9%	6%

Table 3

**Real Changes, 1950-1968 to 1970-1988:
The Nation as a Whole**

	A. 1970-1988 <u>As It Was</u>	B. 1950-1968 <u>As 1970-1988</u>	C. 1950-1968 <u>As It Was</u>
Democratic Activists	-.27	-.15	-.18
Democratic R & F	-.21	-.16	-.17
Republican R & F	+.21	+.26	+.21
Republican Activists	+.34	+.48	+.44

Table 4

**Policy Alignments, 1970-1988,
Organized versus Volunteer Parties**

	<u>A. Nation</u>		<u>B. Non-South</u>		<u>C. South</u>	
	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>
Democratic Activists	-.29	-.26	-.27	-.27	-.30	-.24
Democratic R & F	-.21	-.21	-.17	-.21	-.23	-.18
Republican R & F	+.27	+.20	+.32	+.20	+.26	+.21
Republican Activists	+.41	+.34	+.44	+.33	+.35	+.43

Figure 3

**Policy Alignments, 1990-2008:
Social Welfare Preferences by Partisan Population**





Figure 4


**Death of an Old Distinction, 1990-2008?
Ideological Polarization but not Structural Difference**

A. The Old Order, 1950-1968

1. Organized Parties




2. Volunteer Parties



B. The New World, 1990-2008

1. Organized Parties



2. Volunteer Parties




Figure 5

**Partisan Populations and Issue Alignment
on Social Welfare and Civil Rights, 1950-1968**




Table 4

**Organized versus Volunteer Parties
on Social Welfare versus Civil Rights, 1950-1968**

A. The Non-South

	<u>1. Civil Rights</u>		<u>2. Social Welfare</u>		
	Org	Vol	Org	Vol	
DAc	-.22	-.27	-.31	-.13	DAc
DRF	-.23	-.16	-.27	-.15	DRF
RRF	+.02	+.07	+.16	+.26	RRF
RAc	+.10	+.17	+.37	+.48	RAc


B. The South

	<u>1. Civil Rights</u>		<u>2. Social Welfare</u>		
	Org	Vol	Org	Vol	
DAc	+.18	+.69	+.06	+.27	DAc
DRF	+.22	+.37	-.06	+.03	DRF
RRF	+.21	+.16	+.18	+.15	RRF
RAc	*	*	*	*	RAc


Figure 6

**Policy Alignments, 1970-1988:
Civil Rights Preferences by Partisan Population**


**A. The Reformed World:
the Nation as a Whole**



**B. The Old World:
the Nation as a Whole**



**C. The Reformed World:
the Non-South**



**D. The Reformed World:
the South**




Table 5

**Policy Alignments on Civil Rights:
Organized versus Volunteer Parties, 1970-1988 & 1950-1968**

A. The Non-South

	<u>1. The Reformed World</u>		<u>2. The Old World</u>		
	Org	Vol	Org	Vol	
DAc	-.23	-.42	-.22	-.27	DAc
DRF	-.10	-.17	-.23	-.16	DRF
RRF	+.23	+.15	+.02	+.07	RRF
RAc	+.38	+.18	+.10	+.17	RAc

B. The South

	<u>1. The Reformed World</u>		<u>2. The Old World</u>		
	Org	Vol	Org	Vol	
DAc	-.54	-.24	+.18	+.69	DAc
DRF	-.06	-.10	+.22	+.37	DRF
RRF	+.36	+.30	+.21	+.16	RRF
RAc	+.29	+.28	*	*	RAc

Table 6
Real Changes on Civil Rights,
1950-1968 to 1970-1988: The South

	A. All South		B. Whites Only		C. Whites Only	
	<u>1970-1988</u>		<u>1970-1988</u>		<u>1950-1968</u>	
	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>	<u>Org</u>	<u>Vol</u>
Democratic Activists	-.54	-.24	-.17	+.04	+.26	+.69
Democratic R & F	-.06	-.10	+.26	+.25	+.32	+.51
Republican R & F	+.36	+.30	+.39	+.36	+.28	+.35
Republican Activists	+.29	+.28	+.29	+.32	*	*

Table 7


**Real Changes on Civil Rights:
The Nation as a Whole, 1950-1968 to 1970-1988**

	A. 1950-1968 <u>As It Was</u>	B. 1950-1968 <u>As 1970-1988</u>	C. 1970-1988 <u>As It Was</u>
Democratic Activists	-.11	-.12	-.38
Democratic R & F	-.05	-.06	-.13
Republican R & F	+.07	+.08	+.19
Republican Activists	+.18	+.18	+.21


Figure 7

**Partisan Populations and Policy Alignments
in the Nation as a Whole**


**A. Civil Rights in the Nation,
1970-1988**



**B. Social Welfare in the Nation,
1970-1988**



**C. Civil Rights in the Nation,
1990-2008**



**D. Social Welfare in the Nation,
1990-2008**




Figure 8

**Policy Alignments in the Old World and the New:
Civil Rights by Political Region**





Figure 9

**Death of an Old Distinction, 1990-2008?
Organized versus Volunteer Parties, Non-South versus South**

A. The Non-South



B. The South

