Group Consciousness and Affect:
A Framework for Assessing Multiracial Identity

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Introduction

Historically, racial designation in the U.S. was legally demarcated, bereft of individual agency and limited to singular and separate groups (Williams 2006; Snipp 2003; Nobles 2000). But over generations, mixed-race births have soared and the number of Americans with multiracial identities has risen exponentially. Multiple-race identifiers are now the fastest-growing racial demographic in the U.S., having surged at a rate 17 times that of the single-race population (Davenport 2017). This is a remarkable increase, given that individuals of White/minority backgrounds were traditionally confined to identifying with their minority race (Davis 2001). According to census projections, multiracial identities will triple in size over the coming decades (Pew 2015).

The emerging multiracial population encapsulates the dynamic and variable nature of contemporary racial identities. As the set of racial categories has expanded, their implications have evolved. Given the rapid rise and widespread adoption of multiracial identities, it is necessary to understand their significance for intergroup relations and the U.S. racial order. This is particularly important in light of the fact that subjective racial identities strongly predict partisanship, political behavior, and policy positions (Lee 2008; Huddy 2003). Some scholars have theorized that the availability of multiple-race labels will tend to weaken minority group allegiances and facilitate an intentional distancing from one’s monoracial minority background (Hochschild and Weaver 2010; Shelby 2005). But precisely how multiracial identities map on to perceptions of racial group attachments and affect remains unclear.

Here, we ask: What do multiple-race labels disclose about group loyalties, feelings of closeness, and racial biases? Are people who adopt a multiple-race label consciously (or unconsciously)

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1Throughout, we use the terms “multiracial” and “multiple-race” interchangeably.
distinguishing themselves from one of their constituent racial backgrounds? We answer these questions by examining the identities and racial affect of the two largest multiple-race groups in the U.S., White-Black and White-Asian identifiers.\(^2\) We compare the attitudinal profile of White-Asian and White-Black multiracials with the respective profiles of the monoracial groups from which they derive (Whites, Blacks, and Asians), and specifically examine disparities in the strength of group attachments and affect between groups. We hypothesize that multiracials’ social identities follow one of three paradigms: a Minority Solidarity Model, wherein multiracials view themselves primarily as members of their monoracial minority race; a Hegemonic Model, in which multiracials identify more strongly as White; and an Emerging Identity Model, in which multiracials are socially and culturally distinct from either of their component racial backgrounds.

To test these hypotheses, we leverage the largest national survey of multiple-race U.S. adults to date. This survey, which includes 1200 White-Black and White-Asian respondents, as well as 500 Whites, 500 Blacks, and 500 Asians, enables us to systematically evaluate the group consciousness and attitudes of specific multiracial subgroups.\(^3\) As a result, this is the first large-scale empirical study to assess the linked fate, racial stereotypes, and covert racial biases of multiple-race adults in the United States. We evaluate covert racial attitudes with traditional survey scales including racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and we find that our results hold when we administer an additional, widely-used social psychological measure of unconscious racial bias, the race Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Fazio and Olson 2003; Greenwald et al. 2009).

This unique survey distinguishes our study from previous scholarship on multiracial identity, which

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\(^2\) Together these two groups comprised 46 percent of the entire U.S. multiple-race population in 2015 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2016).

\(^3\) Given particularly high intermarriage rates among Americans of East Asian descent (e.g., Japan, Korea, China; see Pew 2012), our Asian and White-Asian samples are comprised of respondents from East Asian countries.
have lacked the data necessary to examine how multiracial labels correspond to individuals’ racial consciousness and sense of group ties.\(^4\)

Our approach enables an assessment of a lingering gap between multiracials’ *identification*—how they openly express their race to others, such as in surveys—and their *identity*—their internal sense of self. Results reveal that self-identification with multiple racial groups does not reflect equal levels of attachment to those constituent groups. Overall, we find support for our Minority Solidarity Model, showing that White-Asian and White-Black multiracials generally align themselves more with their Asian and Black backgrounds, respectively. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for political behavior.

**Categorizing Racial Identification**

Race is a flexible, contextual, and constructed social category (Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Omi and Winant 1994). As such, racial terminology may be delineated in many different ways.\(^5\) In this paper, we follow the lead of federal government agencies, most notably the U.S. Census Bureau, and use the method of self-identification. We classify individuals who self-identify with more than one race as “multiracial” and those who identify with a single race as “monoracial.”

We focus here on multiracials who label themselves White-Asian or White-Black. While race-mixing is also prevalent among American Indians, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders, and Latino

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\(^{4}\)This limitation is due in part to the challenges related to studying the mixed-race population (Fryer et al. 2012; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008). Previous studies have generally relied on samples of fewer than 100 multiracial respondents from particular subgroups (e.g., Masuoka 2011; Harris and Sim 2002; though see Davenport (2016a,b)).

\(^{5}\)For example, some survey organizations (e.g., Pew Research Center 2015) and social science researchers (e.g., Davenport 2017; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Khanna 2011; Allen, Garriott, Reyes and Hsieh 2013; Wardle 1992; Nishimura 1995) define as “biracial” individuals who report their parents or grandparents to be of different races.
Americans, we exclude these groups for a number of reasons. Although American Indians and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders have high rates of multiple-race identification (above 50% in 2015), they comprise extremely small percentages of the overall U.S. population (.8% and .2%, respectively), making it very challenging to sample an adequate number of respondents from these groups in national surveys. Intermarriage is also common among Latino Americans, 1-in-4 of whom intermarry (Wang 2015). But because U.S. federal policy defines Hispanic/Latino as an ethnicity separate from race, it is impossible to distinguish between people who consider themselves to be mixed-race (e.g., White-Latino) from those who identify racially as White and ethnically as Latino with these standard questions. Given ongoing debates regarding whether Hispanic/Latino should be classified as a racial identity, an ethnic identity, or both (Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez 2015), we do not assess this population here.

**Race and Racial Options in the U.S.**

Racial group membership is widely seen as socially and culturally defined, but also constrained by heritage; that is, one’s racial identity options are limited to the race(s) of their ancestors (Brubaker 2009; Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Omi and Winant 1994). People who have parents of the same racial background are viewed as having a single race in their repertoire of social identities, whereas those with parents of different backgrounds may be seen as having multiple identity choices. Yet self-identities are not bound to parentage; having parents of different races is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for identifying as multiracial (Harris and Sim 2002; Davis 2001).

Prior scholarship has shown that several factors predict whether or not someone will identify as multiracial. Overall, children born to Black/White couples are less likely than are children born to Asian/White couples to be identified as White by their parents (Qian 2004). In addition,
Black/White parents are more likely to identify their children as multiracial (than as a single race) if the White parent is an immigrant or well-educated, or if they live in an area where there are more mixed-race people (Roth 2005). In terms of individuals’ self-identification, traits including being female, nonreligious, living outside of the South, and residing in neighborhoods with more minorities are, all else equal, predictive of a multiracial identification; individuals born to Black/White parents are also more likely to identify as multiracial if their mother is White than if their mother is Black (Davenport 2016). Additional parental characteristics matter as well: having highly-involved mothers is predictive of a multiracial identification, as opposed to a single-race one (Bratter and Heard 2009), and having a mixed-race parent decreases the probability of identifying as multiracial, relative to having parents of two different single-races (Bratter 2007). Other notable predictors of identity for people of mixed-race include appearance and cultural exposure (Khanna 2004).

Models of Racial Identity

By labeling themselves as representing more than one race, individuals are consciously deciding to assert their subjective membership in different groups. But while self-identification as multiracial reflects an “opting in” to plural racial categories, it does not automatically reflect an equal sense of attachment to those races. People who label themselves as White-Asian, for instance, may feel more strongly connected to their Asian identity.

In conceptualizing the group attachments of multiracial identifiers, we draw upon behavioral theories in social psychology. Most notably, Social Identity Theory (SIT) maintains that individuals’ personal affiliation with particular social groups powerfully shapes their attitudes and behaviors (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Hardie 1992). Group identifiers view
society and their position within society in a manner that is compatible with their group’s conventions, principles, and beliefs. Individuals become part of a group when they incorporate within themselves a feeling of common social identity (Turner 1982; Turner and Reynolds 2001).

Identification with a social category is also a crucial determinant of whether an individual will use that category to define herself (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1997; Turner 1999). According to Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), a complement to Social Identity Theory, when people categorize themselves as part of a larger group, they center their attitudes and actions on the expectations and objectives of this ingroup (Turner et al. 1987; Turner et al. 1994). Per SCT, as social identities become salient, people take on the opinions and behaviors of fellow ingroup members and dissociate themselves from outgroup members (Turner et al. 1994).

We argue that in light of their dual racial labels, multiracial individuals have an element of freedom in negotiating their identities—though the extent to which they are free to choose is constrained by their component racial backgrounds and how they are externally ascribed. Because their identification includes both minority (Asian or Black) and majority (White) racial ancestry, we hypothesize that multiracials’ racial attitudes follow one of three racial identity paradigms, which we discuss in depth below.

Minority Solidarity Model

White racial identity has historically been narrowly defined in U.S. law and society. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the exclusivity of Whiteness—and, consequently, the inclusivity of Blackness and Asianness—was upheld in a number of landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The boundaries of Whiteness were built and buttressed through the implementation of exacting racial legislation, including citizenship laws that limited naturalization to Whites and anti-miscegenation
laws that banned marriages between Whites and minorities (Haney-Lopez 2006; Davis 2001). In addition, the principle of hypodescent—known colloquially as the one-drop rule—categorized mixed-race Black children as singularly Black. In 1930, hypodescent became official census policy for children of White-Asian unions as well (Bureau of the Census 1930).

Laws thus repeatedly reinforced the distinct minority status of people of African and Asian ancestry. Although hypodescent no longer legally delineates racial classification, recent scholarship points to the rule’s longevity when it comes to structuring contemporary group membership. Research has shown that White-Asian and White-Black biracial targets are more likely to be categorized as “minority” than as White (Ho, Roberts and Gelman 2015; Ho et al. 2011; Halberstadt, Sherman and Sherman 2011; Peery and Bodenhausen 2008). People are especially likely to classify White-Black biracials as Black when they feel compelled to preserve the status quo (Ho et al. 2013; Krosch et al. 2013) and negative implicit attitudes towards Blacks are transferred onto White-Black biracial individuals (Chen and Ratliff 2015).

We contend that external classification with their minority race may in turn influence multiracials’ greater consciousness of their minority background. Given exclusionary racial laws and the legacy of hypodescent, White-Asians and White-Blacks see themselves as more socially tied to their minority background, than to Whites. We posit that in light of their racial minority heritage, White-Asian and White-Black multiracials largely view “White” as a category that is closed-off to them. In comparing themselves to Whites, multiracials perceive themselves as dissimilar.

6For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of racially segregated public facilities, and also reaffirmed the non-Whiteness of the case’s plaintiff, Homer Plessy, who was of seven-eighths European descent. The non-Whiteness of Asians was sustained in Takao Ozawa v. United States (1922) and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923), which denied immigrants of Asian descent the right to become naturalized U.S. citizens.
Because multiracials cannot or do not wish to seek entry into the dominant White population, their non-Whiteness becomes salient, strengthening the contrast with Whites and their attachment to their minority race. We call this the Minority Solidarity Model. In keeping with traditional norms such as the one-drop rule, our Minority Solidarity Model predicts that as members of a minority racial population, multiracial Americans are more strongly attached to their minority community:

H1: On measures of racial identity and attachment, multiracials will be closer to their minority background than to Whites, and also express racial attitudes that are most aligned with their minority race.

Hegemonic Model

Although the category “White” has traditionally omitted individuals who were not of exclusively European ancestry, there is some evidence that whiteness is expanding to include groups that were once classified as non-White. Specifically, the blurring of racial lines that coincides with increased rates of intermarriage and mixed-race births may lead to a broadening of whiteness that incorporates White/non-White multiracials (Gans 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2002). Studies have shown that while White identification among individuals of Asian-White and Black-White parentage is uncommon, it is not unattainable; the ability of a mixed-race person to be accepted as or to perceive acceptance as White necessitates that they can be ascribed as White, and the degree to which they may do this is tied to their socioeconomic status, religion, and appearance (Davenport 2017).

An alternative to the Minority Solidarity Model, our Hegemonic Model posits that multiracials perceive themselves as more strongly connected to their dominant majority group—White—than
to their racial minority community. SIT contends that individuals for whom membership in a low-status group is permeable may “escape” their status deprivation by affiliating with a different, higher-status group [Berry 2005; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981]. The model predicts that multiracials view themselves as more closely tied to their privileged White background, and may perceive identification as White-Asian or White-Black as a socially acceptable way of relinquishing membership in their lower-status, minority group without entirely rebuffing racial norms.

Indeed, economic prosperity has an upwardly-mobile, “whitening” effect on racial labeling for mixed-race individuals [Davenport 2016b], findings that may be attributed to what Loveman and Muniz (2007) characterize as “boundary crossing”: social status, acquired through education and affluence, enables people of mixed-race to traverse racial boundaries and be classified as whiter by others. Our Hegemonic Model of identity posits that multiple-race identifiers will more strongly align their opinions with Whites in part because affiliating with and sharing the attitudes of Whites is a way to enhance their social status:

H2: Multiracials identify more strongly with Whites than with their minority race, and assert racial attitudes that are most aligned with Whites.

**Emerging Identity Model**

Another possibility is that multiple-race labels reflect a racial consciousness that deviates significantly from either of an individual’s constituent monoracial backgrounds. We call this framework

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7Several studies have found support for this strategy of upwardly mobile identity [Jackson et al. 1996; Taylor et al. 1987, Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam 1990; Huddy 2001].

8This model can also be traced to the early theorizing of Marx and Gramsci on the self-perpetuating nature of social hierarchies (e.g. Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo 2002), and to empirical work on the role of pre-adult socialization processes in maintaining system legitimacy (e.g. Easton and Dennis 1969).
the Emerging Identity Model. Central to this model is the notion that multiracial Americans are distinguished, socially and culturally, from both of their component races; although multiracials naturally reside in two different social realms, they are not entirely embraced by either. In categorizing themselves with multiple races, individuals assert a feeling of belonging to a non-traditional or hybrid racial group. Identification with this group reflects the particular experiences associated with having a mixed-race background, such as straddling ethnic boundaries and negotiating others’ cultural expectations in a racialized society.

The Emerging Identity Model is rooted in distinctiveness theory of self-perception, which conjectures that if an individual is distinctive on a particular trait, that trait becomes a spontaneously salient component of the individual’s self-concept (McGuire and Padawer-Singer 1976). Distinctiveness theory attributes our self-consciousness to the fact that we differ from others in some way, and that we perceive ourselves in terms of these distinguishing qualities (McGuire et al. 1978). Our Emerging Identity Model also comports with the marginal man hypothesis, which posits that “racial hybrids” sit on a fraught color line and are thus ever mindful of their connection to multiple cultures (Fryer et al. 2012; Park 1928; Stonequist 1935; Smith 1934):

H3: Multiracials are distinct from both Whites and their minority race, and their group attachments and racial attitudes diverge significantly from both of these groups.

Racial Subgroup Differences in Identity

We also expect identity to manifest itself differently between White-Black and White-Asian multiracials. While there is a long history of Asians in the U.S. being legally classified as non-White, laws regarding the categorization of Blacks have been far more absolute (Davis 2001; Spickard 1989; Loewen 1971). For Black Americans, the collective experience of deprivation and oppression
is a critical component of identity and consciousness. Relative to other racial groups, the strength and stability of Black solidarity is exceptional, based as it is on the legacy of slavery, segregation, and discrimination (White, Laird and Allen 2014; Shelby 2002). A fundamental element of Black political behavior and attitudes is linked fate—the extent to which an individual believes that the social status of their group is tied to their own individual achievements and welfare (McClain et al. 2009; Dawson 1994).

Like African Americans, Asian Americans encounter discrimination and exclusion on the basis of their minority status (Kuo, Malhotra and M6 2017; Ramakrishnan et al. 2009). But Asians do not share Blacks’ oppressive history of enslavement and Jim Crow segregation. As a panethnic group, Asians are far more incorporated into the U.S. mainstream; they are more likely to intermarry with Whites and live in racially integrated neighborhoods, and are also better-off socioeconomically, comprising the highest-income and best-educated racial group in the country (Krogstad and Lopez 2014; Pew 2012). Partly because the Asian American population is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse, Asians are less inclined than Blacks to subscribe to a racially-based sense of group linked fate (Lien 2010; Wong 2006; Bobo and Johnson 2000).

Thus while Black Americans and Asian Americans are both culturally differentiated from Whites, White-Black and White-Asian multiracials do not have the same degree of flexibility when it comes to their identities. Legally, hypodescent was applied more stringently to individuals of Black heritage, and studies have found that the threshold for being categorized as White is higher for biracial White-Black faces than for biracial White-Asian faces (Ho et al. 2011). Whiteness is more attainable for White-Asians, who share Whites’ socioeconomic successes (Zhou 2004). In light of the dissimilar racial trajectories of Blacks and Asians in the U.S., we expect that multiracial White-Blacks and White-Asians will differ significantly in the strength of their racial
identities. Since Blackness has been a much bigger determinant of an individual’s life chances than have ties to other racial and ethnic minority groups, White-Blacks should express relatively stronger minority group attachments than White-Asians:

H4: All else being equal, White-Black multiracials will identify more strongly as Black, than White-Asian multiracials will identify as Asian.

Data and Methods

Surveying Multiracial Respondents

Given the youthfulness of the U.S. multiple-race population—roughly half of identifiers are under the age of 18 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2016)—sampling a sufficient number of these respondents in political surveys presents a major challenge. We overcome the scarcity problem inherent in random digit dialing studies by oversampling multiracials from the massive Internet panel maintained by YouGov, an international market research firm that specializes in online polling. YouGov has pioneered the development of web-based panels as instruments for social scientific research. YouGov uses a matching methodology for delivering online samples that mirror target adult populations on key demographic attributes. Their approach mimics a random probability sample by taking as the population a large “pool” (panel) of respondents who have agreed to participate in Internet surveys conducted by the survey organization. To ensure that the respondents in the panel are as diverse as possible, they are recruited by multiple means, mostly through different forms of online advertising, but also by telephone-to-web and mail-to-web recruitment. The YouGov U.S. panel includes more than one million participants, making it possible to recruit
over one thousand multiple-race adult respondents.

We conducted our survey in February-April 2015. In sampling multiple-race respondents for this study, YouGov first identified every member of their panel who had checked multiple boxes in response to the race question, which reads: “Which group(s) best describes your race/ethnicity? (If you are of mixed-heritage please choose all that apply.)” The available options were White/Caucasian, Black, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, and Native American. Those who marked their race as Asian then had an additional ethnic origin follow-up question. All respondents who indicated their race as White and Black, or White and Asian (and were of East Asian origin) were then invited to participate in the survey. We characterize these individuals as White-Black and White-Asian multiracials.

Our analyses compare the identities and attitudes of these two multiracial groups to their constituent component monoracial identity groups: individuals who marked their race as (only) White, Black, or Asian. In total, our sample includes 720 White-Blacks, 509 White-Asians, 500 Whites, 500 Blacks, and 500 Asians.

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9For a broader overview of online research panels, see Vavreck and Iyengar (2011).

10To ensure greater comparability among multiracial and monoracial respondents of Asian descent, we distinguish between East Asians (e.g., Japanese, Korean, and Chinese) and South Asians (e.g., Indian and Pakistani) because of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences between individuals from the two regions that may be endogenous to racial identity and political attitudes. We exclude South Asians from our sample because they have significantly lower rates of intermarriage than East Asians; for example, among those who married between 2008-2010, 55% of Japanese Americans, 32% of Korean Americans, and 26% of Chinese Americans married interracially, compared to just 12% of Indian Americans (Pew 2012).

11Throughout, we alternately refer to White-Blacks as “multiracial Blacks” and White-Asians as “multiracial Asians.”
Measuring Racial Identity

Since group consciousness and social identity are multifaceted concepts, there is no single standard way to measure them (Huddy 2013; Sanchez 2006). Some social scientists have assessed identity with items estimating identity salience (Turner et al. 1987; McGuire et al. 1978), as well as the sense of belonging to a group, positive feelings for the in-group and negative feelings for the out-group, and the salience of group membership (Cameron 2004). Others have measured racial group consciousness through feelings of closeness to in-group members (Miller et al. 1981), the belief in linked fate (Dawson 1994), and perceptions of group discrimination (McClain et al. 2009).

In our study, we deploy three different indicators to assess respondents’ subjective identification with three racial groups – Whites, Asians, and Blacks:

(1) Our first measure of identity derives from Dawson’s (1994) conception of linked fate—the degree to which individuals perceive their lives as tied to those of other racial group members. White-Black and Black respondents indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement, “as things get better for African-Americans in general, things get better for me.” We directed a parallel question to our Asian and White-Asian respondents (“as things get better for Asian Americans in general...”). Both White-Blacks and White-Asians were also asked about their linked fate with Whites (“as things get better for White Americans in general...”) (linked fate).

(2) We assess the degree to which individuals perceive closeness to different racial groups (“how close do you feel to [Whites/Blacks/Asians]”), with responses ranging from “not at all close” to “very close” (closeness).

(3) Our final indicator of identity examines the salience of race to individuals’ sense of self. Respondents rated the importance of several attributes, both nonracial and racial, “to your sense
of personal identity.” The nonracial traits included gender, age, religion, political beliefs, and occupation. To assess the relative salience of race for each respondent, we took the average importance (scored on a 0-1 metric) they attributed to the nonracial attributes and subtracted it from the salience of race. Positive scores indicate that race is assigned more importance than non-racial attributes (salience).

Measuring Racial Attitudes

We include several items that gauge overt and covert racial attitudes. In the case of overt affect for racial groups, we asked respondents to rate the applicability of a series of positive and negative traits to Blacks, Asians, and Whites. Positive traits included “high achievers in school,” “value work over pleasure,” and “self-reliant.” Negative traits included “lack moral values,” “involved in drugs and gangs,” and “insist on special privileges.” We rescaled the trait ratings to range from 0-1 (where 1 is applicability of the trait), averaged across the positive and negative ratings, and then took the difference in the two averages. Positive scores indicate greater applicability of positive over negative traits to the group in question, i.e. more favorable stereotypes (stereotyping).

Because overt racial attitudes as expressed in self-report measures can be vulnerable to self-monitoring bias (Dasgupta et al. 2000), we also include two indicators of covert racial attitudes, which are less susceptible to such effects. The first indicator is the standard four-item racial resentment scale, a subtle measure of prejudice that gauges the degree to which people believe Blacks do not work hard enough to overcome obstacles and that they take things they have not earned (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with statements that Blacks were lacking in work ethic, or conversely, held back by discriminatory practices. We rescored the items to range from 0 to 1 and calculated the average across items; the
higher the score, the more racially resentful the individual (*resentment*).

While racial resentment is a popular and widely-used measure of covert racial bias (e.g., Wilson and Brewer 2013, Tesler and Sears 2010, Huddy and Feldman 2009), it tends to conflate racial prejudice with political ideology (Carmines, Sniderman and Easter 2011). So as an additional measure, we include a prominent social psychological barometer of implicit racial bias, the Implicit Association Test (IAT). A notable benefit of the IAT is that it is not subject to cognitive control or masking; even IAT participants who express egalitarian beliefs and are informed that the test measures objectionable racial opinions find it hard to regulate their bias (Kim and Greenwald 1998). Because responses to the IAT are not subject to conscious control, they are seen as instinctive and involuntary (Greenwald and Banaji 1995).

The IAT bypasses the asking of questions entirely, instead assessing the speed with which individuals associate racial categories, such as Black and White, with words representing good and bad. Since ingrained associations are more accessible, they can be made faster and with fewer errors. Based on this insight, the IAT compares the time taken to respond to pairings of White+Good and Black+Bad with the opposite pairings such as Black+Good and White+Bad. Implicit racial bias is assessed by subtracting the response times for “stereotype consistent” pairings (e.g., Black+Bad and White+Good) from the response times for “stereotype incompatible” pairings (e.g., Black+Good and White+Bad). Positive scores on the IAT represent faster associations when Black is paired with Bad and White with Good (compared to the inverse), while negative values represent faster sorting when Black is paired with Good and White is paired with

\[12\text{For example, people who obtain high scores on the resentment measure believe in the greater efficacy of individual effort over governmental intervention—beliefs also associated with political conservatism (Sniderman and Carmines 1997).}\]
Bad. Hence, positive IAT scores represent ingrained or implicit bias against Blacks. An effect size, or “$D$ score,” that ranges from -2 to 2 is calculated for each participant based on this difference (for additional details on scoring, see Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji 2003).

The IAT is not without its critics. However, the IAT has repeatedly been shown to be a valid measure of bias (Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji 2005) and on socially sensitive topics, such as race, the IAT has higher predictive validity than self-report measures (Greenwald et al. 2009). Given the IAT’s extensive use in social psychology studies on race (Huddy and Feldman 2009; Wittenbrink and Schwarz 2007), we administer it here as a supplementary predictor of racial attitudes.

The full version of the IAT takes more than fifteen minutes to complete. Here, we rely on the Brief IAT (the BIAT), which consists of fewer trials and can be completed in less than ten minutes (Nosek et al. 2014). As in the full version, the $D$ score in the BIAT focuses on the association between positive and negative words and the target racial categories. We use two

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13Such critics have questioned whether the test really assesses unconscious racism (Blanton and Jaccard 2008; Amodio and Devine 2006). At issue is whether IAT responses are affected by environment and reflect learned cultural associations, rather than prejudice specifically (Blanton and Jaccard 2008). There is also debate over the reliability and stability of implicit attitudes over time (Burdein, Lodge and Taber 2006; Fazio and Olson 2003).

14Validation tests of the IAT typically compare IAT scores with behavioral indicators of discrimination. For example, Dovidio et al. (2002) find that Whites’ implicit attitudes predicted their non-verbal behavior toward Blacks in a classroom task setting, while survey measures only predicted their verbal behavior. Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2006) find that anti-Black implicit attitudes of White freshmen who had been randomly assigned a Black roommate predicted the stability and duration of the roommate relationships. Rooth (2010) finds that implicit measures of anti-Muslim stereotypes among Swedish hiring managers predicted the decision to interview Swedes over Arab and Muslim job applicants.

15For further details on the BIAT scoring procedure, see Sriram and Greenwald (2009).

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different BIATs: the standard version measuring implicit bias toward Blacks (the White-Black BIAT), and a second that substitutes Asians for Blacks (the White-Asian BIAT). The scoring protocol is identical across the two BIATs, with positive scores representing anti-minority bias and negative scores representing implicit bias against Whites.

In summary, we employ multiple measures of two sets of racial attitudes—overt and covert—in order to estimate individuals’ affinity towards different racial groups. This diverse and integrative measurement approach enables a robust assessment of racial affect. In all cases, we evaluate the precise attitudinal gap or identity distance between multiracials on the one hand, and the monoracial groups that define them on the other.

Analysis and Results

Our dependent variables of interest are racial identity (relative salience of race, linked fate, and racial group closeness); and racial affect (racial group stereotypes, racial resentment, and IAT responses). For our results, we present frequency distributions and weighted means on identity and affect for each of the five racial groups: White-Blacks, White-Asians, Whites, Blacks, and Asians. In order to isolate the predictive effect of race, specifically, on our dependent variables, we also estimate OLS regression models that account for respondent age, education, gender, income, and region. So in addition to presenting top-level differences in opinion between the five racial groups, we also present percentage point differences between groups that remain after adjusting for sociodemographic differences.

16In the White-Asian BIAT, the target group categories are represented by faces of Asian and White males (the identical White faces used in the White-Black BIAT), while the positive and negative words remain the same.

17Full regression tables are available in the Appendix.
Racial Identity

Table 1 displays the percentage of respondents within each racial category who agree that race is important to their personal identity, report a sense of racial group linked fate or express high levels of closeness to the three monoracial groups. As shown, race is a far more salient identity for multiracials, Blacks, and Asians, than it is for Whites. White-Blacks and White-Asians are approximately 25 percentage points more likely than Whites to report that their racial identity is salient. Importantly, multiracials feel similarly close to each of their reference groups, yet express a stronger sense of linked fate with their minority race than with Whites.

Since these racial groups differ in terms of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Davenport 2017), their racial group differences in opinion may not be entirely due to race. That is, race may not be the only pertinent feature of their identity; for example, their education and region may also be shaping their attitudes. In order to isolate the effect of race, we present group differences that are derived from a multivariate regression model.

Relative Salience of Racial Identity

Figure 1 presents the effect of race on the salience of racial identity after statistically accounting for demographic differences. It shows that multiracials are indeed more likely than Whites to see race as relatively important to their sense of identity. We also find that, all else being equal, White-Blacks are just as likely as Blacks to believe race is important, while White-Asians locate themselves between Whites and Asians on this issue.
Racial Linked Fate

Findings on the relative salience of race indicate that White-Blacks and White-Asians are more likely than Whites to think of themselves in racial terms. But these results alone cannot speak to whether those racial identities are singularly White, singularly minority, or distinctly multiracial. Regression findings on multiracials’ sense of linked fate, shown in Figure 2, shed light on this question. As Panel (a) indicates, both White-Blacks and White-Asians are less likely than Whites to believe that their fate as individuals is contingent on the treatment of other Whites. But Panel (b) shows that White-Blacks are as likely as Blacks to see their fates as linked with Blacks, and Panel (c) shows that White-Asians express similar levels of Asian group linked fate as Asians.

To get a sense of the relative strength of these identities, we compare the predicted probability of a multiracial respondent “somewhat” or “strongly” agreeing that their fate is linked to each of their component groups. The results prove quite one-sided: multiracials’ sense of linked fate is much stronger with their minority race than with Whites. White-Asians are highly likely to express linked fate with Asians (predicted probability of strong or some linked fate = 0.60), much more so than they are to express linked fate with Whites (predicted probability = 0.37). The difference between these perceived ties is even greater for White-Blacks, who are twice as likely to see their fates as tied to Blacks (predicted probability = 0.77) as they are to see their fates as tied to Whites (predicted probability = 0.37).

Figure 2 about here

Racial Group Closeness

These patterns hold when we consider perceived closeness to different racial groups, in Figure 3. Because all groups were asked about closeness to Whites, Blacks, and Asians, we can compare
multiracials to their monoracial minority counterparts. While both White-Blacks and White-Asians were more likely to express feelings of closeness to Whites than were Blacks and Asians—an unsurprising finding, given multiracials’ self-identification as part-White—it is crucial to note that multiracials do not overlap with Whites when it comes to closeness to Whites. Instead, multiracials place themselves much closer to the non-White element of their lineage. In fact, multiracials are indistinguishable from their component minority background when it comes to their sense of minority group closeness; White-Blacks are statistically as likely as Blacks to report feeling close to Blacks, and a similar pattern is revealed between White-Asians and Asians.

Extrapolating across these three indicators of identity, it is clear that White-Blacks distinguish themselves from Whites and identify more as Blacks. This pattern also applies, albeit not quite as strongly, to White-Asians, who see themselves as relatively more Asian than White. Taken together, these results are consistent with the Minority Solidarity Model: when considering their racial identity, multiracials side with their minority heritage. In a society with a long tradition of racial inequality, these multiracial groups avoid identifying with the racial majority.

Racial Affect

Mean group differences in the overt and covert racial affect measures appear in Table 2. The location of the five groups generally mirrors their positioning on the identity dimensions, with multiracials expressing racial attitudes akin to their constituent minority race. An exception is White-Blacks’ IAT responses, which fall between Whites and Blacks; without accounting for covariates, White-Blacks’ D score is .14 points lower than that of Whites (a highly significant
difference), and .09 points higher than Blacks (also a highly significant difference). We examine this finding in greater depth in the regression analyses below.

Overt Racial Affect: Racial Stereotypes

With respect to racial stereotypes, White respondents are found to espouse the most positive stereotypes of Whites as a group, as shown in the regression estimates in Figure 4, Panel (a). Although Asians hold slightly positive views of Whites overall, multiracials and Blacks are ambivalent as to whether Whites as a group have generally positive or negative traits.

Regarding Black stereotypes, Figure 4, Panel (b) shows that White-Asians, Whites, and Asians all associate Blacks with negative rather than positive traits (regression-adjusted stereotype means $\mu$ between -.13 and -.12). In sharp contrast, White-Blacks hold favorable stereotypes of Blacks ($\mu_{adj} = .07$) at a level comparable to those held by Black respondents ($\mu_{adj} = .06$). Notably, White-Blacks’ stereotypes of Blacks are more positive than their stereotypes of Whites. Overall, these stereotype ratings indicate that in their evaluations of Whites and Blacks, White-Blacks cannot be distinguished from their Black counterparts. In comparison to the generally unflattering stereotype of Blacks, and in keeping with prior research (see Masuoka and Junn 2013), Figure 4, Panel (c) shows that everyone considers Asians a “model minority,” and that in-group affect is highest among Asians ($\mu_{adj} = .46$).

Covert Racial Affect: Racial Resentment and Implicit Associations

Compared to the stereotype questions, racial resentment represents a less malevolent view of Blacks. Rather than asking respondents to associate low academic achievement, immorality, and
criminality with Blacks, the questions constituting the resentment index are limited to Blacks’ commitment to the work ethic and self-help. Expressing resentment therefore requires less “difficulty” than expressing a harsh stereotype. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 5, Panel (a), White-Asians, along with Whites and Asians, articulate high levels of racial resentment (regression-adjusted mean racial resentment score \( \mu_{adj} = .52 \)). On the other side of the racial divide, Blacks and White-Blacks express half to two-thirds the level of anti-Black resentment as Whites.

Finally, we turn to implicit racial biases, as measured in the Black-White and Asian-White IATs. Recall that \( D \) scores greater than the midpoint of 0 represent anti-minority bias (i.e., faster associations of Black or Asian with “bad” and White with “good” pairings). Figure 5, Panel (b) shows that White-Asians express positive implicit attitudes toward Asians, a finding consistent with their self-reported views of Asians. We see a bit of a different finding for White-Black respondents. As the regression estimates in Figure 5, Panel (c) reveal, White-Blacks fall closer to Whites on implicit racial bias than on any of the other indicators of racial identity and affect towards Whites or Blacks. As evidenced by the responses to racial group closeness, stereotyping, and resentment, there are conscious considerations that prompt White-Blacks to respond more as Blacks than as Whites. But when these conscious considerations are suppressed, as in the case of the IAT, White-Blacks reveal divided loyalties.

[Figure 5 about here]

Thus White-Blacks and White-Asians show opposing patterns in their group alignment on indicators of covert racial affect. White-Blacks fall between Blacks and Whites on racial resentment and implicit attitudes, while White-Asians respond as Asians on both of these measures. That White-Blacks’ implicit racial attitudes lie between those of Whites and Blacks implies that they
view both Whites and Blacks as being part of their ingroup. Individuals assess their in-groups more positively than their out-groups \cite{Ashburn-Nardo2003}; that White-Blacks evaluate both of their component races similarly in the IAT suggests that they do not consciously prefer one racial group over the other.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

We have provided the first large-scale evidence on the racial identities and affect of multiple-race identifiers, focusing on the two biggest groups in the population: White-Blacks and White-Asians. At the outset, we put forth three competing paradigms of multiracial identity: the Minority Solidarity Model, the Hegemonic Model, and the Emerging Identity Model. All told, our results provide no support whatsoever for the Hegemonic Model—that multiracials are analogous to Whites on measures of self-identification and racial group affect. Instead, our findings indicate support primarily for the Minority Solidarity Model: multiracials view themselves as racially distinct from Whites, staking out an identity that is similar to their monoracial minority race.

Despite labeling themselves as part-White, White-Black and White-Asian Americans both perceive themselves as non-White and view their component minority background more positively than they view Whites. On matters of racial identity and attachment, multiracials largely remain indistinguishable from their monoracial minority affiliation. Notably, multiracial Asians are akin to monoracial Asians in their expressed closeness to other Asians, their levels of racial stereotyping and racial resentment, and their implicit racial associations. Thus both consciously and subconsciously, multiracial Asians tend to see themselves as Asians.

The pattern of minority solidarity is also pronounced for White-Blacks. On explicitly racial indicators of identity and group affect (relative salience of race linked fate to Blacks, closeness to
Blacks, and White and Black stereotypes), White-Blacks look much like Blacks. Overall, White-Blacks express a high degree of Black minority consciousness. Aside from monoracial Blacks, multiracial Blacks are the only racial group to hold generally positive stereotypes of African Americans; in fact, White-Blacks view Blacks more positively than they do Whites.

When conscious processing of attitudes is not possible and race becomes more of an instinctive identity than a considered one, such as on racial resentment and in the IAT, White-Blacks show themselves to be somewhat “whiter” than Blacks. The greater affinity of White-Blacks with Whites at the level of implicit attitudes can be attributed to a few factors. First, IAT scores may disclose more about an individual’s culture and surroundings, and less about their personal prejudices. That is, bias against Blacks as expressed in the IAT does not necessarily signify anti-Black animus or discrimination. It may instead be the byproduct of continual reminders that Whiteness is more revered in American society (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles and Monteith 2003) and reflect that the respondent lives in a society in which Blacks are treated as secondary to Whites (Karpinski and Hilton 2001). Relatedly, less favorable implicit associations toward Blacks may be due to repeated contact with anti-Black stereotypic images (Devine 1989). Because White-Black multiracials live in less racially segregated areas than Blacks (Davenport 2016), White-Blacks have, on average fewer interpersonal interactions with Blacks and may be more likely to internalize negative latent images of Blacks. In contrast, White-Asians’ relatively more positive views of Asians may be because they are held in higher esteem than Whites in the American racial structure.

There are other differences in multiracials’ attitudes that are tied to their particular racial

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18 This is supported by research showing that many Blacks significantly favor Whites at the implicit level (Livingston 2002; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002).
composition. Compared to White-Blacks, White-Asians express relatively greater closeness and linked fate to Whites, less linked fate to their minority background, and markedly higher levels of anti-Black stereotyping and racial resentment. Thus in addition to finding support for H1 (the Minority Solidarity Model), we also find support for H4, that White-Blacks identify more strongly as racial minorities than do White-Asians.

That White-Asians are closer (than White-Blacks) to Whites on multiple dimensions of identity and affect is unsurprising, since racial boundaries are more porous for Asians than for Blacks. For example, Asians are much more likely to intermarry with Whites than are Blacks (Livingston and Brown 2017), and relative to multiracial Blacks, multiracial Asians have greater freedom to socially identify as White (Lee and Bean 2010; Xie and Goyette 1997). This provides further evidence that despite the assertion of a label that encapsulates both their White and their Black identities, Whiteness remains more out of reach for multiracials of Black backgrounds.

Our study highlights paths for additional research. Racial identities are, to a degree, adaptable and circumstantial, particularly for individuals of mixed-race backgrounds, who have multiple racial categories with which they may feasibly identify. The context in which someone is asked their race can influence how they identify; for example, adolescents are more likely to identify as multiracial at school than at home (Harris and Sim 2002). Because the findings presented in this paper are tied to individuals’ identification at one point in time, we cannot assess the degree to which these identities fluctuate and whether any fluctuations correspond to shifts in strength of group attachments or affect. Yet while racial identities are fluid, they are not arbitrary: research has shown that the vast majority of mixed-race adolescents—88 percent—identify themselves consistently in different contexts (Harris and Sim 2002), and analyses of decennial census data found that just 6 percent of people reported a different race/ethnicity in 2010 than they did in
2000 (Liebler et al. 2017). We have no reason to suspect that our measure of identity is any less reliable than those employed in these studies. Still, it could be worthwhile to examine precisely how multiracial identities might be primed in different scenarios and under certain conditions.

In addition, past work has shown that since the racial group membership of multiracials is more ambiguous than that of monoracials—due to physical features such as skin tone, hair texture, and eye shape/color—multiracials have greater flexibility in how they are classified (Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008; Khanna 2011). It is possible that multiracials who are “whiter” in appearance experience lower levels of racial prejudice, are less likely to be categorized as minorities, and subsequently perceive weaker minority group attachments than their multiracial peers who look more like prototypical racial minorities. Whether this is the case, and how such variation in appearance shapes multiracials’ linked fate and racial affect, are empirical issues worth examining.

Since 2000, the number of Americans identifying as White-Black and White-Asian has soared by more than 3 million (Davenport 2017). Such exceptional growth raises a number of compelling questions about the strength of the racial divide in American society, with significant implications for the political process. Our findings indicate that White-Black and White-Asian Americans see themselves as racial minorities. Since racial minority groups have historically gravitated to the Democratic Party, this suggests that the growing size of the multiracial population will eventually disadvantage Republicans. But some scholars (Shelby 2005) contend that the embracing of multiracial labels signals a political distancing from traditional minority communities, begetting less engagement with matters pertinent to Blacks and Asians as a group, and hence lower levels of support for racial policies relevant to these groups.

Whether multiracial identification translates specifically to weaker minority political attachments is a question beyond the scope of this paper, but an essential topic for further study.
Political scientists have documented that party affiliation in the U.S. is increasingly associated with multiple and overlapping social categories, including race, gender, religion, and urban-rural residence (Mummolo and Nall 2017; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). The convergence of racial, gender, class, and partisan identity open up a new set of research questions concerning the intersection of different social and political identities.

A final note on the context of our survey. Coming in the aftermath of the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement, and an avalanche of news reports focusing on police violence targeted at minorities, it is possible that the identity distance between multiracials and Whites may have widened in this relatively charged environment. If anything, however, the elevated salience of race relations appears to be a persistent rather than a short-term trend. As the 2016 presidential election season and the ensuing presidency of Donald Trump have demonstrated, this country is as focused as ever on questions on race.
References


Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana and Mark Hugo Lopez. 2015. “Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity, or Both?” *Pew Research Center Social and Demographic Trends*.


# Tables

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Table 1: Racial Identity by Racial Background. *Note:* Percentages reflect responses that race is “Fairly important” or “Very important” to one’s personal identity; agreement that one’s fate is linked to different racial groups; and responses of “Fairly close” or “Very close” to different racial groups on closeness.
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Table 2: Racial Affect by Racial Background. Values represent weighted group means. Negative stereotype values indicate less favorable views toward the named racial group; negative D scores indicate more positive implicit biases towards Blacks or Asians.
Figures

Figure 1: Effects of Race on Relative Salience of Racial Identity to Personal Identity. *Note:* Estimates are derived from the OLS regression in Table A-1. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater relative salience of race to respondent’s personal identity. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 2: Linked Fate to Major Racial Groups. Note: Estimates are derived from the ordered logistic regression in Table A-2. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived linked fate to the target group.
Figure 3: Closeness to Major Racial Groups. Estimates are derived from ordered logistic regression in Table A-3. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived closeness to the target group.
Figure 4: Overt Racial Affect. Note: Estimates are derived from the OLS regression in Table A-4. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more positive stereotypes of the target group.
Figure 5: Covert Racial Affect. Note: Estimates are derived from the OLS regression in Table A-5. Higher values reflect more negative attitudes toward the relevant minority group: higher values on racial resentment indicate more negative views toward Blacks, while higher values on the White-Asian and White-Black IAT indicate more negative views toward Asians and Blacks, respectively.
Appendix
Table A-1: Relative Salience of Race to Personal Identity Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. Note: Values shown are OLS estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals.

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| R²                      | 0.13           |
| Adj. R²                 | 0.13           |
| Num. obs.               | 2421           |
| RMSE                    | 0.30           |

* 0 outside the confidence interval
Table A-2: Perceptions of Linked Fate to Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. Note: Values shown are ordered logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals.
### Table A-3: Perceptions of Closeness to Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians.

Note: Values shown are ordered logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals.

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<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.02 [-0.04; 0.00]</td>
<td>0.07 [0.04; 0.10]*</td>
<td>0.01 [-0.01; 0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]</td>
<td>-0.00 [-0.01; 0.00]</td>
<td>0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.01 [-0.01; 0.04]</td>
<td>-0.00 [-0.03; 0.03]</td>
<td>0.01 [-0.02; 0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Black</td>
<td>-0.11 [-0.14; -0.07]*</td>
<td>0.21 [0.16; 0.25]*</td>
<td>0.02 [-0.02; 0.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Asian</td>
<td>-0.07 [-0.11; -0.03]*</td>
<td>-0.01 [-0.06; 0.04]</td>
<td>0.10 [0.06; 0.14]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.13 [-0.16; -0.09]*</td>
<td>0.20 [0.15; 0.24]*</td>
<td>-0.09 [-0.13; -0.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-0.08 [-0.12; -0.04]*</td>
<td>-0.02 [-0.06; 0.03]</td>
<td>0.02 [-0.02; 0.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>2456</td>
<td>2452</td>
<td>2467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSE</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0 outside the confidence interval

Table A-4: Explicit Affect Toward Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. Note: Values shown are OLS point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table A-5: Implicit Affect Toward Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are OLS point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Resentment</th>
<th>White-Black D-score</th>
<th>White-Asian D-score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.52 [0.48; 0.57]*</td>
<td>0.18 [0.07; 0.29]*</td>
<td>0.14 [0.02; 0.26]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00 [0.00; 0.00]*</td>
<td>-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]</td>
<td>-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>-0.04 [-0.06; -0.01]*</td>
<td>0.02 [-0.04; 0.07]</td>
<td>-0.05 [-0.11; 0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Grad</td>
<td>-0.11 [-0.14; -0.08]*</td>
<td>0.05 [-0.01; 0.12]</td>
<td>0.01 [-0.06; 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.04 [-0.06; -0.02]*</td>
<td>-0.04 [-0.09; 0.01]</td>
<td>0.00 [-0.05; 0.05]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00 [0.00; 0.01]*</td>
<td>-0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]</td>
<td>0.01 [0.01; 0.02]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.06 [0.04; 0.08]*</td>
<td>0.06 [0.01; 0.11]*</td>
<td>0.03 [-0.03; 0.09]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Black</td>
<td>-0.21 [-0.24; -0.18]*</td>
<td>-0.13 [-0.20; -0.07]*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Asian</td>
<td>-0.05 [-0.08; -0.01]*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.21 [-0.27; -0.14]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.28 [-0.31; -0.25]*</td>
<td>-0.23 [-0.30; -0.16]*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-0.03 [-0.07; 0.00]</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.24 [-0.31; -0.18]*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0 outside the confidence interval

R² | 0.20 | 0.04 | 0.07
Adj. R² | 0.20 | 0.04 | 0.06
Num. obs. | 2558 | 1110 | 1001
RMSE | 0.26 | 0.42 | 0.40