Save This Honorable Court: Shaping Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court Off the Bench

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Abstract

A Supreme Court justice makes a public appearance every other day and most appearances include some form of public speech. These off-the-bench speeches promise to strengthen the Court’s legitimacy by positively shaping public perceptions of the Court. In this article, I test the impact of off-the-bench speech on public perceptions using experimental data. I employ a field experiment to measure the causal effects of a campus speech by Justice Sotomayor on law students in attendance and a separate survey experiment to understand how news coverage of the speech influenced the broader public. Individuals who attended the speech as well as those indirectly exposed to the speech through a news article felt more favorable toward the justice, were more likely to perceive law as the primary determinant of judicial decisions, felt the Court was less political, and expressed higher levels of institutional loyalty.
Introduction

There are signs of dissatisfaction with political figures and institutions in the United States. We see evidence of this in recent survey data. For example, congressional and Supreme Court job approval ratings have reached or neared all-time lows in recent years. In addition, President Trump began his recent presidential term with lower approval ratings than any other beginning president. Trust and confidence in American institutions remains dangerously low.¹

Yet, there is one institution that seems to fare better than others. Approval ratings of the Supreme Court tend to be higher than those of the other branches. Many suggest the Court has maintained a higher level of public support by staying out of the public spotlight (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Yet, at the same time, justices are quietly persistent in their public outreach. In fact, a justice of the Supreme Court makes a public appearance every other day. Far from staying away, justices embrace opportunities to interact with the public.

Indeed, political leaders can take action to shore up public support. Research shows government officials seek to counteract negative perceptions through their activities. For example, members of Congress tailor their “home style,” or manner of presenting self, in order to build trust with constituents. Building relationships with constituents provides

these members with flexibility when making voting decisions and performing their other duties. Research shows that members of Congress have adapted these home styles to societal change (Fenno 1978).

In addition, political actors seek to counteract negative perceptions in order to maintain a desired level of favorability. They may do so by shaping their own public image or improving perceptions of their institution. We know that members of the Supreme Court, for instance, care about self-presentation because it influences how favorably people view them (Baum 2009; Posner 2010). While justices choose to defend the Court (Davis 2011; Schmidt 2013), others benefit by distinguishing themselves from their institution. For example, Fenno (1978) argues that members of Congress run for Congress by running against it.

This article focuses on how justices of the Supreme Court impact public views of themselves and their institution through off-the-bench speech.\(^2\) Research is unclear as to whether justices should or should not engage in public activities; I find clear evidence that doing so brings about positive results.\(^3\) Understanding how justices shape views with off-the-bench activity is important given the frequency of judicial travel (Black, Owens and Armaly 2016) and concerns about the Court’s legitimacy (Bartels and Johnston 2013; Christenson and Glick 2015; Nelson and Gibson forthcoming).

In particular, I demonstrate the impact of off-the-bench speech using a randomized field experiment and a randomized survey experiment. For the field experiment, I randomly assigned law students with reservations to a public speech by Justice Sotomayor to take a

\(^2\)“On-the-bench” activity refers to what justices do in their official capacity, such as granting cases for review, voting, and writing opinions. “Off-the-bench” activity refers to unofficial activities, such as book tours, speeches, or interviews.

\(^3\)My purpose here is not to determine whether justices are motivated by personal reasons (to increase their favorability) or instrumental reasons (to bring about legal policy) or a mix of the two. Regardless of what mixture of motivations drive behavior, I find that off-the-bench speech brings about both personal and instrumental benefits.
survey just before or just after the event. In a separate survey experiment using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I randomly assigned a set of individuals to read a news story of the speech and compared the responses of those who read the news story with the responses of those who did not. This article is the first to employ experimental methods to measure the causal effects of off-the-bench speech on views of the Court.

In what follows, I review the Supreme Court’s need for public support and the importance of impression management to justices. I then connect these concepts to off-the-bench activity and report results from the field and survey experiments. I find that members of the Supreme Court increase personal favorability and shape public perceptions through off-the-bench speech. Furthermore, news coverage multiplies and magnifies these effects as it expands the reach of justices’ speech.

**The Supreme Court’s Need for Public Support**

The Supreme Court, like Congress and the President, makes decisions that bind other branches of government, agencies, and individuals. Unlike Congress and the President, though, the Supreme Court cannot fund or enforce its mandates. Thus, it must rely on its legitimacy for most decisions to be implemented. Legitimacy is “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper and just” (Tyler 2006, 376). A governing entity with legitimacy, then, engenders voluntary deference among its citizens. Other branches may endure with diminished legitimacy through accountability to the people vis-à-vis elections and through brute enforcement power. The Supreme Court has no such alternatives on which to rely.

The Court’s lack of institutional powers to implement decisions is more than an abstract concern. Presidents, Congress, and others have a history of resisting the Court’s declarations. In one such instance, the Supreme Court ruled against Georgia state laws extending jurisdiction and control over the Cherokee Indians in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832).
President Andrew Jackson was no fan of this ruling and neither was Georgia. After the ruling, Georgia continued to exercise control over the Cherokee Indians. President Jackson wrote to a friend, “The Supreme Court decision has fell still born, and they find they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate.”

Members of Congress have the capacity to attack the Court with court-curbing bills and legislative overrides of judicial decisions (Clark 2009). They can also, like presidents, resist or ignore decisions. For example, despite the clear ruling in *INS v. Chadha* (1983) that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional, such vetoes nevertheless continue to remain an important part of executive-congressional interactions (Fisher 1993). Prominent examples of public resistance to Supreme Court rulings followed desegregation and school prayer decisions in the South (Rosenberg 2008; McGuire 2009).

The legitimacy of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, is a strong barrier against resistance to decisions. It leads individuals to comply with decisions, even when they disagree with them. Furthermore, public support for the Court exerts pressure on other branches of government to yield to its declarations (Ura and Wohlfarth 2010). The Court’s source of legitimacy lies in its perception as a non-political institution and in a positivity bias that pervades the Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Judicial symbols, educational teachings, and media coverage of the judiciary lead others to perceive the Court in a more favorable and trusted light than other institutions.

Many suggest that the Court’s legitimacy is quite strong. Indeed, studies have found high levels of loyalty to the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998). Support for the Supreme Court is strong relative to support for other branches of government (Gibson 2007). Justices even avoid deciding cases in a counter-majoritarian fashion if it will buttress their public support and create a reservoir of good will (Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011). Based on such evidence, many agree with Gibson’s (2007) sentiment that the Supreme Court’s “institutional legitimacy may not be obdurate, but it does not seem to be caught up in the divisiveness that characterizes so much of American politics —
at least not at present” (507).

Others disagree. For example, Baum (2009, 128-131) suggests that polarization is a concern for the Supreme Court’s continuing legitimacy. Perhaps the strongest evidence regarding the limitations of Supreme Court legitimacy come from Bartels and Johnston (2013) and Christenson and Glick (2015). Using a national survey, Bartels and Johnston show that subjective ideological distance from the Supreme Court has a negative influence on the legitimacy of the Court. Results from their survey experiment show that perceived ideological disagreement with even a single decision can affect the legitimacy of the Court. In Christenson and Glick’s study, individuals exposed to a credible news story about politicized decision-making felt the Court was less legitimate.

The relationship between support for the Court and subjective ideological incongruence is likely exacerbated by the psychological effects of polarization. Lee (2009) shows that members of Congress have become polarized over issues that are objectively non-ideological. As elites and the mass public become polarized, the likelihood of seeing the Court as ideologically distant is bound to increase, leading to less legitimacy for the Court. Finally, Nelson and Gibson (forthcoming) discuss the negative consequences of the politicization of the Supreme Court. They argue it is not so much accepting that the Court is a political institution where ideology matters (legal realism), but believing that justices engage in strategic or self-interested behavior that hurts legitimacy. Thus, new contexts and questions have arisen that cast doubt on the robustness of the Court’s legitimacy.

Given these concerns over implementation of decisions and threats against legitimacy, what can members of the Supreme Court do? I suggest that justices can counteract such threats through their public interactions. In fact, justices do engage the public frequently and routinely in their travels through public speeches. If speeches alter perceptions of the Court and increase the public’s commitment to supporting Court decisions, then justices have available a potent tool to shore up public support and maintain their influence over policy.
It is also important to note that justices may care about public support for more than instrumental reasons. These speeches also provide a prime opportunity for justices to pursue their personal goals. They want to be well esteemed by others, especially those they most care about (Baum 2009). Justices likely use speech for a mixture of personal and instrumental reasons (Krewson and Owens forthcoming). Instrumentally, justices care about the standing of the Court because it affects their ability to effectuate policy decisions. Personally, speeches provide opportunities for justices to improve their public image as they interact with public audiences.

**Understanding Off-the-Bench Speech**

Scholars have explored the role of on-the-bench activities and judicial symbols in managing public perceptions. We know, for example, that justices use opinion language to manage public perceptions of the Court. When justices decide cases that go against public opinion, they use clearer opinion language to justify their decisions and persuade the public (Black et al. 2016). Justices appear to follow public opinion in most cases to store up a reservoir of good will which they cash in for cases with far-reaching political implications (Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011). In addition, justices clothe their decisions and activities with legal language and symbols in order to bolster the sentiment that law is a key aspect of the decision-making process (Epstein and Knight 1997; Baird and Gangl 2006; Gibson and Caldeira 2009).

On-the-bench activities are limited, however, in their ability to tackle the most pressing challenges of the day. They do not provide the best setting for members to develop personal relationships with the public or to encourage respect for the institution. Neither are they the best forum to reassure the public of the rule of law or to separate the partisan hostility in Congress from the bipartisanship which seems to exist in more abundance at the Supreme Court. Such efforts are better suited for off-the-bench environments where justices
can interact with audiences on their own terms.

Members frequently engage in off-the-bench activities in the forms of public speeches, book tours, and interviews. In 2016 alone, there were at least one-hundred and seventy-five such events.⁴ According to Black, Owens and Armaly (2016), the explicit purpose in just over 75 percent of trips was to give a speech. They also find that justices travel as frequently as members of Congress and that trips correlate with policy, institutional, and personal motivations. Members of the Court pay close attention to the public (Epstein and Knight 1997; O’Brien 2008).

More specifically, Black, Owens and Armaly use federal financial disclosures to determine the number of domestic reimbursed trips justices took from the years 2002-2012. They found that, as a unit, the justices made around 80 such trips per year, with a high of 105 in 2008. Justice Scalia was the most frequent traveller (17 per year) while Justice Souter rarely travelled. Most justices averaged about 10 trips a year. Justices frequently visited places in New York (146), California (118), and Illinois (52). While the numbers are high and perhaps surprising, they only scratch the surface.

Crowd-sourced data on public appearances since the end of the 2013 Supreme Court term shed more light on the frequency of off-the-bench activity.⁵ In 2014, the justices made at least 125 public appearances in the last 185 days. The total number of appearance in 2015 and 2016 were 179 and 175, respectively. To put this in perspective, a justice made a public appearance every other day. In 2017, the trend has continued, with at least 104 appearances in the first 207 days. Figure 1 plots counts of justices’ public appearance for each year during this time period.

Justice Scalia continued to be a frequent traveller in his final years on the Court, recording at least 51 appearances from the beginning of the summer recess in 2014 until his death in February of 2016. Justice Sotomayor is the most frequent traveller (116), with

⁴http://www.scotusmap.com/

⁵Data obtained from http://www.scotusmap.com/.
Figure 1: Number of public appearances by justices per year from June 30, 2014 to July 26, 2017. Data obtained from www.scotusmap.com.

Justice Ginsburg close behind (98). Most of the justices’ public appearances are in DC (155) or New York (99). While justices travel internationally as well (53), they are much more frequent domestic travellers. For example, justices travelled to California 30 times and Massachusetts 28 times, easily outnumbering the number of international travels based on those two states alone. Figure 2 plots a choropleth map of the United States showing the frequency of public appearances by state.

Schmidt (2013) categorizes off-the-bench activities into 5 categories: the personal, the interpersonal, the educational, the institutional, and the jurisprudential. He finds that justices tend to focus on the educational (justices as civic teachers) and the institutional
Supreme Court Off-the-Bench Activity (2014–2017)

Figure 2: Number of public appearances by state from June 30, 2014 to July 26, 2017. Data obtained from www.scotusmap.com.

(justices as defenders of the institution) when engaging in these activities. Davis (2011) concludes that justices focus on educating individuals, shoring up support for the Court, and making personal connections when speaking before public audiences. In addition, justices purposely shy away from political and contentious subjects.\(^6\)

\(^6\)In a recent law school visit, for example, the University of Colorado informed attendees that Justice Sotomayor would not discuss specific legal issues because “the public will lose confidence in the judiciary if Justices opine on cases or issues before they are heard at the Court.” Nor would she “express her views on the conduct and opinions of others.” In fact, the “Justice would not explain or define her opinions in any way” (https://cuboulder.qualtrics.
Justices are cognizant of the major challenges facing the Court and they use their speeches to address these challenges. In doing so, they hope to change public perceptions. Justice Sotomayor made this purpose explicit in 2012 when she said, “People think in fixing things, that there’s a magic bullet to every problem. It doesn’t work that way. We’re trying to convince. And we’re trying to convince (the public) what we’re doing is the right thing” (parenthetical clarification in original quotation).7

Expectations

Off-the-bench speech is a potentially powerful tool for managing perceptions of the Court and it is largely unstudied. Given concerns over implementation of judicial decisions and threats to legitimacy, these speeches promise to shore up support for the Court such that justices can maintain their influence over legal policy. My argument is that off-the-bench leads to both personal and instrumental benefits for the justices. More specifically, I expect justices will change levels of personal and institutional favorability, alter perceptions of the role of law and the politicization of the Court, and enhance institutional loyalty through their speeches.

Personal Favorability

Justices want to be liked by others and they engage in impression management in order to fulfill this desire (Baum 2009; Posner 2010). While justices can engage in impression management on or off the Court, off-the-bench activities likely provide the best setting to develop personal relationships and increase favorability with the public. This means that justices should use the opportunity provided by public speeches to attain this personal goal. As a consequence of their efforts, I expect individuals to rate justices more favorably when

7http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/politics/scotus-analysis/
they are exposed to off-the-bench speech.

**Institutional Favorability**

I also expect there to be positive spillover effects for the Supreme Court from off-the-bench speech. While the speech-giving justice should experience the greater increase in favorability, his or her association with the Supreme Court will lead to increased favorability toward the institution also. Psychology theory argues that a prime or stimulus can cause evaluations of another object to move closer to the prime. If the prime is relevant to the other object, we should expect an assimilation effect where the other object is evaluated similarly (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz 1996).

There are additional reasons to expect institutional favorability to increase. Members of the Supreme Court convey unity to the public. The majority of judicial decisions are indeed unanimous. Furthermore, justices regularly praise one another publicly. The Court is known for the collegiality among its members (Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck 2000). The public harmony conveyed by the justices and an assimilation effect should lead participants to hold the Court in higher regard when participants are asked to evaluate the institution as a whole. Thus, I expect individuals to rate the Supreme Court more favorably when they are exposed to off-the-bench speech.

**The Role of Law**

Scholars continue to debate the nature of the Court as a political and/or a legal institution (Richards and Kritzer 2002; Black and Owens 2009; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Christenson and Glick 2015). For their part, justices have long sought to portray their institution as a principled legal institution that is above the political fray (Davis 2011). Scholars argue that this helps the Court to maintain its legitimacy (Baird and Gangl 2006; Zink, Spriggs and Scott 2009). The public is more likely to see the Court as legitimate (and to, therefore, accept unfavorable decisions) if they view the Court as a legal and principled institution.
This is not to say that legal realism — the concept that law is often ambiguous and judges are influenced by ideology — cannot coexist with a belief that the Court is a legal and unique institution. What matters most is that individuals perceive judges as different from ordinary politicians (Nelson and Gibson forthcoming). The most straightforward way to convince the public of this is to highlight the uniquely legal aspects of the Court. For this reason, justices emphasize the importance of law to their decisions and deemphasize the importance of ideology.

Societal expectations, legal training, and the internalization of their role as judges should lead justices to emphasize the role of law in their speeches and to de-emphasize ideology. Individuals who are exposed to these speeches will perceive law as more important to judicial decision-making than ideology as a result. Thus, I expect individuals to rate legal norms and precedent as more relevant to judicial decision-making than ideology when they are exposed to off-the-bench speech.

**Politicization**

Related to the role of law is concern that members of the Court have become more political in their decision-making and behavior in recent years. One explanation for this sentiment is the increasing politicization of the confirmation process. Whereas individuals with clear ideological preferences received unanimous support in earlier years, recent and qualified individuals have been denied the opportunity to be voted on in the Senate or have faced party-line opposition (Goldman 2004; Epstein et al. 2004; Black, Madonna and Owens 2014). Chief Justice Roberts recently expressed his concern that the partisan hostility seen in the “political branches” may cause people to “think that the person who comes out of that process must similarly share that partisan view of public issues and public life.”

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Interestingly enough, patterns of decisional behavior in the Court do not indicate that the Court has become more political over time. As Baum (2009) points out, “rates of dissenting and concurring opinions and proportions of close decisions have not increased in the past decade or so” (129). In fact, the only evidence Baum can point to of politicization is in the now frequent selection of law clerks who first clerked for ideologically similar lower-court judges. As with most things, however, it is the perception of politicization that matters and justices can influence these perceptions through their speeches.

The apolitical content of off-the-bench speech, judicial symbols, and depictions of a harmonious and non-political Court environment should lead individuals to re-adjust how politicized they view the justices. Thus, I expect individuals exposed to off-the-bench speech will be less likely to see justices as having become more political over time.

**Institutional Loyalty**

Legitimacy engenders institutional loyalty or, in other words, voluntary deference to an institution’s decisions (Tyler 2006). Because the Supreme Court cannot enforce its decisions, it must rely either on voluntary deference or the support of coordinate branches of government for those decisions to have effect. One potential result of direct engagement with the public is that individuals will express more willingness to follow Supreme Court decisions voluntarily. Institutional loyalty to the Court discourages Congress and the President from attacking the Court or engaging in visible non-compliance (Clark 2009; Ura and Wohlfarth 2010). For these reasons, a justice should desire to increase institutional loyalty through off-the-bench speech. I expect individuals exposed to off-the-bench speech will express higher levels of institutional loyalty than those who are not.9

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9Institutional loyalty is not the same as institutional favorability. Institutional loyalty is a an important aspect of the Court’s legitimacy (or diffuse support) while institutional favorability is more closely related to how agreeable one finds the Court (or specific support).
Methods and Data

To test the impact of off-the-bench speech on my key expectations, I administered a field experiment to law students who planned to attend an actual speech by Justice Sotomayor and conducted a separate survey experiment providing individuals with news coverage of the speech using Amazon Mechanical Turk. To employ experiments, the researcher assigns a treatment to a randomized subset of individuals from a population. Individuals who do not receive the treatment are used as a control or comparison group. The value of an experiment is that we can conclude whether a treatment caused differences in outcomes between the treatment and control groups. In a field experiment, the researcher uses a real event as a treatment but maintains control over the assignment of individuals to the treatment. In a survey experiment, the researcher provides the treatment in the survey itself.

Field Experiment

On September 8, 2016, Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the Robert W. Kastenmeier Lecture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in front of 1,500 individuals. Earlier in the day, she met with one hundred law students. Justice Sotomayor’s approach and topics were similar in both venues. She focused on sharing her personal experiences, the role of the High Court, and the collegiality among her and her colleagues. The justice acknowledged at least one purpose in coming out to Wisconsin. She felt that many people view the Court as a “distant and unknowable institution.” But, she stated, “if I can talk to the general public about who I am, how important and passionate I am about the law, how important and passionate my colleagues are about it, even when we disagree, then maybe we can change people’s perception of the court.”

The justice came to Wisconsin for the same reason justices travel to many places: to

influence public perceptions of the Court and of themselves. These events provide a prime opportunity for field experiments. To perform the experiment, I identified all University of Wisconsin law students with a reservation to the lecture. I then randomly divided the list of names into two sets. One set, the control group, received an email with a survey link a few days before the lecture and were told they must complete the survey before noon of the day of the event. The second set of individuals, the treatment group, received an email with a survey link shortly after the event and were told they must complete the survey within a few days.

Because these individuals were randomly assigned to either group, there should be no systematic difference between the two other than the treatment of having been exposed to Justice Sotomayor's speech when taking the survey. Thus, I can compare the responses between the treatment group and the control group to isolate the causal effect of Justice Sotomayor’s visit. 69 out of the 110 individuals I assigned into the first group completed the survey. 61 out of the 110 individuals I assigned into the second group completed the survey.

The value of the field experiment is in the external validity of the treatment. Rather than exposing individuals to off-the-bench speech in a sterile and artificial environment, using a live event allows me to measure the realistic effect of attending Justice Sotomayor’s speech while still maintaining the causality standard provided by an experiment. Given the frequency of these events, it is a design that can be replicated in future work and by subsequent scholars. Field experiments help to overcome concerns regarding external validity in experiments (Druckman et al. 2011).

It is also important to note the population from which I randomly assigned individ-

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11 In order to perform the experiment, I agreed not to collect personal information about respondents. We can trust, however, that there are no systematic differences between the treatment group and control groups by virtue of random assignment. The results from the field experiment will be analyzed in tandem with those from the survey experiment. The consistency of the findings across the two experiments suggests that randomization worked.
uals into either the treatment group (those who took the survey just after the speech) or the control group (those who took the survey just before the speech). Law students are a unique sample of individuals. They have committed themselves to a career in law and have developed views of the Supreme Court, justices, and the decision-making process. Because respondents have information and firm opinions, it should be a challenge to change their views (Zaller 1992). Thus, the results likely underestimate the impact of off-the-bench speech on the general public.

**Survey Experiment**

Public speeches may be limited in reach because relatively few individuals are able to attend them. Still, local and even national news media and Court sources cover these events and provide short synopses of the content of the speeches. I employed a survey experiment using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to understand the impact of off-the-bench speech by Supreme Court justices on those who are exposed to it through newspaper coverage — a group that is likely a larger population than those who attend. The survey experiment provides at least three additional benefits. First, I replicate my original findings on a separate sample of individuals. Second, the survey experiment allows me to manipulate who appears to have given the speech. Third, I provide some individuals with a picture of the relevant justice to gauge the role of text versus image.

The primary treatment in the survey experiment is exposure to news coverage of

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12 Similarly, students at the University of Wisconsin Law School may not be representative of law students at other institutions.

13 These are important additions. Students at the University of Wisconsin Law School may be unrepresentative in their attitudes toward law and toward Justice Sotomayor. Replicating the results on an independent sample of respondents strengthens our confidence in the results from the first experiment. The survey experiment also helps us to generalize results to other justices.
off-the-bench speech before answering the survey questions. Some participants read about a
speech by Justice Sotomayor before answering survey questions regarding her and the Court.
Others read about the same speech attributed to Justice Alito before answering questions
about him and the Court. The control group did not read a speech before answering questions
about either justice and the Court. Finally, half of those reading about the speech saw an
accompanying picture of the justice. The survey design allows us to measure the impact
of news coverage on views of the Court, see how results generalize to other justices, and
compare the effects of images and newspaper text on public perceptions.

In order to increase the external validity of the survey experiment, I used the text
from a news article by Wisconsin Public Radio covering Justice Sotomayor’s visit titled,
“I’m A Justice, But Also A Human,’ Sotomayor Says At UW-Madison.”14 As indicated,
names and pronouns were manipulated in the text for some treatment groups such that
it appeared Justice Alito gave the speech. In the news text, the journalist highlights the
justice’s interactions with the audience, quotes the justice explaining the purpose of the visit
and the effect of the death of a colleague on the Court, and briefly summarizes the content
of the speech.

I obtained 952 survey respondents using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Publications in
the field’s top journals use this platform to secure survey respondents.15 Berinsky, Huber and
Lenz (2012) show how samples from the platform are more representative of the United States
population than in-person convenience samples used in much of published experimental re-

14https://www.wpr.org/im-justice-also-human-sotomayor-says-uw-madison

15Between January 1, 2017 and July 17, 2017, there were 7 articles published in American
Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, or Journal of Politics using
this platform. As in this article, most reported survey results from MTurk participants in
conjunction with data obtained from other sources (Aarøe, Petersen and Arceneaux 2017;
Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Ryan 2017; Smith et al. 2017; Bearce and Tuxhorn 2017). Two
of the articles relied solely on MTurk results (Velez and Wong 2017; Doherty et al. 2017).
search. In addition, Mullinix et al. (2015) show that survey experiments implemented using both population-based samples and MTurk revealed considerable similarity in estimates of treatment effects. Descriptive statistics regarding my respondents and more information on the survey are included in the Appendix.

Measures

To operationalize the 5 key areas in which I expect off-the-bench speech to have an impact, I created six variables based on responses to survey questions. To measure Personal Favorability, I used feeling thermometer ratings for either Justice Sotomayor or Justice Alito. The survey presented respondents with a sliding scale and asked them to place it somewhere between 0 and 100, where 0 represented feeling very cold or unfavorable toward the justice, 100 as feeling very warm or favorable toward the justice, and 50 as feeling neither favorable nor unfavorable. To measure Institutional Favorability, individuals reported feeling thermometer ratings for the Supreme Court on the same scale.

The next three variables move beyond favorability ratings to measure perceptions of the Role of Law, Politicization, and Institutional Loyalty. For Role of Law, I measured whether an individual chose law as the most likely explanation of Supreme Court judicial decisions. Respondents in the field experiment could have also chosen ideology, public opinion, or deference to colleagues. Because so few people ranked public opinion or deference to colleagues as their top choice, I provided only law and ideology as options in the survey experiment.

The next variable measured perceptions of Politicization, or the extent to which members of the Court have acted more politically over time. The survey presented individuals with a statement, “members of the Supreme Court have become more political in their behavior and decision-making in recent years,” and measured their agreement using a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The last variable measured Institutional Loyalty. Again, the survey presented individuals with a statement, “I defer to Supreme Court
decisions out of a feeling of obligation to the institution rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward,” and measured their agreement using the same scale.\textsuperscript{16} Table 1 lists the key variables and each survey question used to measure them.

To test for the causal effects of off-the-bench speech, I use Welch two-sample t-tests to compare means and equality of proportions between the treatment and control groups. For means, I compare average feeling thermometer ratings between the treatment and control groups. For proportions, I compare the equality of proportions of responses for individual categories and combined categories (e.g., I combine strong and somewhat agree or disagree categories) between the treatment and control groups.\textsuperscript{17}

I use demographic variables and measures of political preference, trust, and knowledge to ensure randomization and explore the relationships between these individual characteristics and public perceptions. To measure political preference, I asked individuals to describe their ideology and the ideologies of the justice and the Supreme Court on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from liberal to conservative. I use the absolute distance between one’s own ideology and the perceived ideology of the justice or Supreme Court as a measure of Perceived Ideological Distance. Thus, if an individual was somewhat conservative (4) and thought that the justice was somewhat liberal (2), then the distance measure would be 2.\textsuperscript{18}

To measure Trust in Government, individuals indicated their level of trust that gov-

\textsuperscript{16}The statement comes from Tyler (2006), as cited in Gibson and Nelson (2014).

\textsuperscript{17}I report the results from two-tailed tests when comparing means and proportions for both experiments. The smaller sample of students in the field experiment (< 70 per treatment and control group) means that standard errors can be quite large for those results. I will state if a p-value is above .05 when discussing substantive results from this experiment. I do not discuss results with p-values above .05 for the survey experiment, as large standard errors were not an issue there.

\textsuperscript{18}A few individuals indicated they did not know their ideology or the ideologies of the justices and Supreme Court. I exclude these individuals when estimating regressions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Favorability</td>
<td>Please rate Justice Sonia Sotomayor (Samuel Alito) using the feeling thermometer below. You can choose a number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward this person, the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate Justice Sotomayor (Alito) at the 50-degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward her (him).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Favorability</td>
<td>Please rate the Supreme Court using the feeling thermometer below. You can choose a number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward this institution, the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate the Supreme Court at the 50-degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Law</td>
<td>Rank the following statements in order of how likely they explain Supreme Court justices’ decisions, with the most likely explanation placed at the top. (field experiment) Which of the following statements is the better explanation of Supreme Court justices’ decisions? (survey experiment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: members of the Supreme Court have become more political in their behavior and decision-making in recent years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Loyalty</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I defer to Supreme Court decisions out of a feeling of obligation to the institution rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Table of variables measuring the hypothesized impact of off-the-bench speech. The left column lists the variables and the right column the questions used to operationalize the variables. Unless indicated, the same questions were asked in both experiments.
ernment will operate in the best interests of the people on a 5-point scale from strongly
distrust to strongly trust. For knowledge, I used *Self-reported Court Knowledge* on a 5-point scale from low to high and *Frequency of News Consumption* on a 4-point scale from never to frequently. To measure demographics, I asked individuals to indicate their sex (*Female*), *Ethnicity*, *Age* bracket, *Income* bracket, and *Education* level. These variables have a natural order, and I use them as continuous variables, except for sex (which is a binary variable) and ethnicity (which is a factor variable).

### Results

**Favorability**

I expect justices to increase in personal favorability through off-the-bench speech. I also expect the Supreme Court to increase in favorability based on its association with the justices. To measure favorability, I asked respondents to rate justices and the Supreme Court on a feeling thermometer scale. Figure 3 presents the differences in personal and institutional favorability between the treatment and control groups. Positive numbers mean the treatment group perceived the justice or institution more favorably than did the control group. The bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals of the difference estimates. The top 3 results are for personal favorability and the bottom 2 results for institutional favorability.

---

19 Age brackets are 18-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, and 51 or above; income brackets are less than $10000, $10000-$99999 in increments of $10000, $100000-$149999, and $150000 or more; Education levels are Nursery school to 8th grade, Some high school - no diploma, Professional degree, Trade/technical/vocational training, High school graduate - diploma or the equivalent, Some college credit - no degree, Associate degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and Doctorate degree.

20 There are no meaningful changes in the results when I treat all variables as factor variables in the regression analysis.
Figure 3: The point estimate represents the difference in feeling thermometer ratings between treatment and control groups. Positive values mean that levels of favorability were higher among the treatment group. In the field experiment, the treatment was attending Justice Sotomayor’s speech before taking the survey. In the survey experiment, it was reading news text about a speech by Justice Sotomayor or Justice Alito. The horizontal bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Clearly, off-the-bench speech can bring about a dramatic increase in personal favorability, especially through news coverage. Justice Sotomayor caused her personal favorability to be 5 points higher among law students who attended her speech than among those who had not attended. What is more, the difference in personal favorability between treatment and control groups increased 300 percent (16 points) for those who read about the event. When individuals read about the speech attributed to Justice Alito, the impact was even greater (21 points). In fact, the Justice Alito manipulation demonstrates just how powerful
off-the-bench speech can be in increasing personal favorability. The average individual felt unfavorable (48.7) toward him without having read the speech. The attitudes of those who did read the speech were quite positive (69.8).

Why do we see smaller effects in the field experiment where individuals were in Justice Sotomayor’s presence? This may be due to the already high levels of support for Sotomayor among these law students. Before she made her visit, law students who planned to attend rated her 81.1 on the feeling thermometer scale, which suggests that individuals felt quite warm or favorable toward the justice before they heard her speak. For those rating her after the visit, her average score was an 86.5. As for the survey experiment, the justices averaged a rating of 55.0 among those who did not read the speech and an average rating of 73.5 among those who did read the speech, a statistically significant difference.\(^{21}\)

The Supreme Court’s favorability was slightly higher among those in the treatment group than among those in the control group for both the field experiment (73.1 compared to 70.5) and the survey experiment (59.9 compared to 58.4), but these differences were not statistically significant ($p > .18$). As we saw with personal favorability, the broader public felt less favorable toward the institution than did law students. For both groups and in both settings the speech increased personal favorability but not institutional favorability, despite the justice having praised her colleagues in the event and in the news coverage of it.

In addition, there was no statistical difference in personal favorability levels between the treatment group presented with a picture of the justice when reading the newspaper text and a control group that only had the newspaper text ($p = .09$).\(^{22}\) This strongly suggests that the impact of the speech comes from its content rather than exposure to the basic symbol of a justice in judicial robe. It suggests that individuals in the survey experiment read the article, digested the information, and changed their views based on what they read.

\(^{21}\)The results suggest that justices can both give speeches in a friendly environment and also influence those less inclined toward them through news coverage of the events.

\(^{22}\)Result not shown in Figure 3.
Table 2: OLS regression analyses of feeling thermometer ratings. The data come from the survey experiment only. Baseline category for race/ethnicity is White.
Having found that off-the-bench speech increases personal favorability and that this effect can be spread and magnified vis-à-vis news coverage, I now turn to a regression analysis to understand the relationship respondent characteristics have to these changes in perceptions using results from the survey experiment. Table 2 contains results from ordinary least squares regressions of feeling thermometer ratings on political preference, trust, knowledge, and demographic variables. The results confirm the importance of exposure to news coverage, with strong and statistically significant positive results. This effect remains regardless of which justice was acknowledged as the speaker. Being exposed to a picture of Justice Sotomayor helps while being exposed to a picture of Justice Alito neither helped nor hurt. Again, exposure to news coverage did not lead people to feel warmer toward the Court as an institution despite Justice Sotomayor’s praising of her colleagues and the Court.

Turning to individual characteristics, those who perceive justices or the Court to be ideologically distant are less likely to feel favorable toward those individuals or the institution. The effect is strong. For example, a conservative individual who perceives Justice Sotomayor to be liberal would rate her 25 points lower than if the individual perceived her to be conservative. Does the negative impact of ideological distance overwhelm the positive effect of the speech? The answer is no. To see this, I re-estimated the statistical model on all ratings of personal favorability without distinguishing between Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito (model results in Appendix). I then predicted levels of personal favorability while holding all variables but the treatment and perceived ideological distance at their mean or modal values. Figure 4 displays these results.

As we can see, the average effect of exposure to speech on personal favorability is large enough to accommodate for the negative effects of perceived ideological distance. Furthermore, most individuals place themselves at a distance of 0, 1, or 2 units away from the justices. At this distance, the effect of speech is more powerful than the negative effects of perceived ideological distance. The competing forces of ideological perceptions and exposure to public speech should provide even stronger motivation for justices to engage in behavior
that counteracts the negative effects of perceived ideological distance.²³

Trust in government likewise matters. Those who have more trust feel warmer toward the justices or institution. Its strongest impact is on feelings toward the institution. According to the models, someone who strongly trusts that government acts in the best interests of the people will give a feeling thermometer rating of anywhere from 20 to 40 points higher than an individual who strongly distrusts government. Trust is not an abstract concern for

²³There is evidence of a limited interactive effect between ideological distance and exposure to speech (results not shown). For Justice Sotomayor, the impact of exposure is strongest when individuals perceive themselves to be more ideologically distant. For Justice Alito and all other models in the paper, there is no interactive effect between the treatment and ideology.

Figure 4: Predicted levels of personal favorability for a justice, varying perceived ideological distance and treatment effect, and holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. Confidence bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals around estimates. Statistical model for predictions in Appendix.
Figure 5: Percent who trust the government in Washington always or most of the time (1958-2017). Source: Pew Research Center

the Court. Data shows that trust in institutions has decreased dramatically since the 1960s. Figure 5 plots the trend of declining trust in government over time.

Frequency of news consumption and knowledge of the Court only have a statistical (and positive) relationship with feelings toward the institution. Demographic variables with statistical significance are gender, age, education level, and race/ethnicity. Females feel more favorable toward the institution and Justice Sotomayor, and older individuals feel more favorable toward Justice Alito. More educated individuals feel warmer toward Justice Sotomayor. Individuals who identify as Black/African American feel colder toward Justice Alito and the institution than do individuals identifying with another race or ethnicity.

Perceptions of the Court

I now turn to the impact of off-the-bench speech on three key issues: the role of law in decision-making, politicization, and institutional loyalty. Recall, again, that I compare the survey answers between the treatment and control groups to understand the causal impact of off-the-bench speech on these three key areas in which we expect the justices to
alter perceptions of the Court. Unlike the measures of favorability, here we compare the proportions of individuals who give specific categorical responses. I present the results of the survey and field experiments together.

Figure 6: Bar graphs of the number one response to the question of which statement best described judicial decision-making on the United States Supreme Court. The first row is for responses from the field experiment, where respondents attended the event, and the second row is for responses from the survey experiment, where some individuals read a news article about the event. The first column is for individuals who had not been exposed to the speech when they took the survey (control group). The second column is for responses after individuals had been exposed to the speech (treatment group).
In the field experiment, 55.3 percent of respondents who had not attended the event believed that law was the most likely explanation of judicial decisions while 71.9 of those who had attended the event chose this as their top choice. Despite the small sample size, the difference approaches statistical significance ($p < .09$) and it is substantively larger than the difference between groups in the survey experiment. Thus, Justice Sotomayor was successful in that she not only increased her personal favorability among respondents but a large number of law students perceived the judicial decision-making process as predominantly influenced by law. Those who read about the event were significantly more likely than those who did not to say law was the primary determinant of judicial decisions (68.1 percent compared to 61.4).

The effort to emphasize the role of law in judicial speeches leads others to believe law is a primary determinant of judicial decision-making. Law students, who appeared more skeptical of the role of law, were strongly influenced by the speech. The speech also had a positive and statistically significant impact on MTurk respondents more prone to seeing law as critical to judicial decision-making in the first place.

Next, were individuals exposed to off-the-bench speech less likely to see the Court as having become more political in recent years? Figure 7 displays the results. Beginning with the field experiment in the first row, the proportion of individuals who neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that members of the Supreme Court have become “more political in their behavior and decision-making in recent years” was smaller among the law students in the treatment group who had attended the speech than those in the control group, and this difference was statistically significant. Also in the field experiment, 31.1 percent of respondents in the treatment group somewhat disagreed with the statement while only 17.9 percent of those in the control group did ($p = .23$). This was the second largest difference; other differences in proportions for the field experiment were substantially smaller.

I find similar trends for participants who read about the speech. The proportion of individuals who somewhat agreed with the statement of politicization was significantly
Figure 7: Bar graphs of responses to a question about whether members of the Supreme Court have become more political over time. The first row is for responses from the field experiment, where respondents attended the event, and the second row is for responses from the survey experiment, where some individuals read a news article about the event. The first column is for individuals who had not been exposed to the speech when they took the survey. The second column is for responses after individuals had been exposed to the speech.

lower (39.6 percent compared to 47.7 percent) as a result of reading about the speech. The higher proportions of individuals in the treatment group who strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed with the statement both approached statistical significance on their own ($p < .07$). And when combined together, the proportion of these responses went from 13.2 percent of those who did not read the speech to 20.8 of those who did.

The last hypothesized effect of off-the-bench speech was on institutional loyalty. There were no differences in levels of institutional loyalty between the treatment and control groups in the field experiment. Law students defer to Supreme Court decisions out of a feeling of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward, and this is not affected much by a single visit. Law students have committed themselves to a career in law,
and justices should not expect nor even need to change these commitments.

There are reasons, however, to think commitments of the broader public are less settled and positive than those of law students. Accordingly, I found news coverage of the speech did have at least some positive and statistically significant influence on participants in the survey experiment who read news coverage about the speech. While the results are not as strong here as they were with perceptions of the role of law and of the politicization of the Court, the justices did cause significant changes in institutional loyalty.

Figure 8 displays a graph of responses regarding levels of institutional loyalty to the Court for the survey experiment. 17.0 percent of respondents in the control group somewhat disagreed with the statement of institutional loyalty, while only 11.7 percent of those who read the speech did (second lowest category). The greater proportion of those strongly agreeing with the statement in the treatment group approached statistical significance ($p = .08$), with 14.7 percent compared to 10.5 percent of the control group. Overall, 22.8 percent
of those in the control group strongly or somewhat disagreed while only 16.5 percent of those in the control group did.

The final step of the analysis is to see how political preference, trust, knowledge, and demographics are related to perceptions of the Court and institutional loyalty using results from the survey experiment. The first column of Table 3 contains results from a logistic regression model of perceiving law as the most likely explanation of judicial decision-making. The second and third columns use ordered logistic regressions to understand how the independent variables are related to perceptions of politicization and institutional loyalty, respectively, across all categories of the dependent variables.24

The results confirm that exposure to news coverage causes individuals to see law as a primary explanation of judicial decisions and to be less likely to see the Court as having become more political over time. It has no consistent effect across the ordered set of categorical responses for the question on institutional loyalty. As mentioned earlier, overall loyalty to the Court is quite high and a single speech was not as effective at shaping public perceptions in this area.

Turning to individual characteristics, those who perceive the Court as more ideologically distant from themselves are less likely to see law as a primary factor in judicial decision-making and are more likely to see the Court as politicized. Again, these two variables do not have a statistically significant influence on institutional loyalty. As other scholars have argued, perceived ideological distance is an important factor when it comes to perceptions of the Supreme Court. It does not have an effect, though, on willingness to voluntarily comply with the Court, suggesting that fundamental respect for the institution may not be conditioned on ideology.

Another important characteristics is race/ethnicity. Individuals who identify as White

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24 The results may differ slightly from those discussed above because the regression models estimate the common effect of explanatory variables across the ordered set of response categories.
Table 3: First column uses a logistic regression and the next two columns use ordered logistic regressions. The data come from the survey experiment only. Baseline category for race/ethnicity is White.
are more likely than those who identify as Black/African American to perceive law as the primary explanation of judicial decision-making. For this and the previous set of regression analyses, the views of those who identify as Black/African American are at times significantly more negative than those of other races or ethnicities. The results demonstrate that, as recently emphasized by Nelson and Gibson (forthcoming), race is a critical consideration when seeking to understand evaluations of the Court.

Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of choosing law as the most likely explanation of judicial decision-making by race. Independent variables other than race held at median or modal values. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Data comes from the survey experiment.

To see the effect of race/ethnicity more clearly, I used the statistical model from column 1 of Table 3 to predict the likelihood of choosing law as the primary determinant of decision-making for each race/ethnicity category, holding all other independent variables at their median or mode. I plot the results in Figure 9. All else equal, those who identify as
Black/African American are 20 percent less likely to say law is the primary explanation of judicial decision-making than those who identify as White. Other categories of race/ethnicity are not statistically distinguishable.

As in the earlier regression, trust continues to have a positive and strong effect on each dependent variable. An important variable for perceptions of the Court is age, which also has a statistically significant influence on each dependent variable. For the first two dependent variables, older individuals have less positive perceptions of the Court. On the other hand, older individuals express higher levels of institutional loyalty to the Court. Females are more likely to perceive justices as primarily influenced by law but gender has no significant impact on the other two dependent variables.

**Conclusion**

Justices have strong motivations to shape public perceptions of the Court. Not only are they constrained in their ability to bring about legal policy by other branches and public perceptions generally, but there are mounting concerns that the Court’s legitimacy is being undermined by ideological polarization and the development of politicized views of the Court. Indeed, justices frequently lament negative public perceptions of the Court’s role, image, and judicial decision-making process.

Justices do not sit by idly in this precarious situation. As argued by Murphy (1964), Epstein and Knight (1997), and numerous others, justices act strategically to maximize their influence over legal policy in an interdependent environment. What has gone unnoticed by scholars, however, is the degree to which justices can turn to off-the-court activities as a means of strategic action. This paper combined previous research on off-the-bench activity with a unique research design and data to reveal the potential power of the oft-used and understudied activity of off-the-bench speech.

Taken together, the paper demonstrates that off-the-bench speech not only increases
personal favorability, but it leads individuals to perceive law as highly pertinent to judicial decisions and the Court as less politicized. We also found evidence that it strengthens support for the democratic virtue of institutional loyalty. Both individuals who attended the speech and those who read about it had more positive views of the Court. Because of news coverage, justices can change perceptions of the broader public as they travel and speak in friendly environments.

The findings presented here are novel, compelling, and promising, and there is more work to do. For example, scholars should study how the variation in content of speeches influences individuals. In addition, future work ought to focus on the durability of changes in perceptions caused by off-the-bench activity. Chong and Druckman (2010) provide a research design which can measure the impact of multiple, sporadic and even conflicting messages over time. Justices spend an enormous amount of time engaging in off-the-bench activity. This article shows just how meaningful such activity can be.

The path ahead is an exciting one. This paper begins the process by addressing why and how justices persuade the public. It does so through a novel and theoretically-based design to isolate the causal impact of off-the-bench speech. By and large, justices can persuade the public in key areas of interest to them. Members of the Court expend their resources to focus on off-the-bench activity. Given this article’s findings, so ought we.
## Appendix

Table of control and treatment group characteristics in survey experiment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (scale)</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>Treatment Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean or</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Deviation</td>
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<td>Ideology (1-5)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Education level (1-10)</td>
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<td>Race: Hispanic/Latino</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race: Other</td>
<td>01.2 %</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
‘I’m A Justice, But Also A Human,’ Sotomayor (Alito) says.

— Supreme Court Justice Sonia (Samuel) Sotomayor (Alito) Reflects On Personal Life, Career In Lecture

By Laurel White

United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia (Samuel) Sotomayor (Alito) made the nation’s highest court seem much more human during her (his) remarks Thursday.

Sotomayor (Alito) delivered the annual Robert W. Kastenmeier lecture. She/He roamed the audience as she/he took questions from moderators two of her (his) former clerks who remained seated on stage.

At one point, Sotomayor (Alito) stopped to take a photo with an 8-year-old girl (boy) in the crowd.

Later, the justice accepted a small gift from an audience member.

Sotomayor (Alito) said she (he) believes many people view the Supreme Court as a “distant and unknowable institution.”

“But if I can talk to the general public about who I am, how important and passionate I am about the law, how important and passionate my colleagues are about it, even when we disagree, then maybe we can change people’s perception of the court,” she (he) said.

The justice spoke about the late Justice Antonin Scalia, saying his death in February has left “a big hole in the court.”

Sotomayor (Alito) also spoke about her (his) judicial philosophy, the mentorship she (he) received from retired justice John Paul Stevens, and her (his) belief in the importance of the court’s judges having diverse professional and personal backgrounds.
Photos used of justices:

[Two images of justices]
Ordinary Least Squares regression of Feeling Thermometer Ratings (without distinguishing between Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient Estimate</th>
<th>Standard errors in parentheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatments:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to News Coverage of Speech</td>
<td>15.72*</td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Picture of Justice</td>
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<td>(1.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Characteristics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Ideological Distance</td>
<td>-6.37*</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Government</td>
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<td>Frequency of News Consumption</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(6.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
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* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$
References


