The Impact of the Tea Party Movement
on Minority Political Interests in the U.S. Congress

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The emergence of the Tea Party movement in 2009 is widely interpreted to be one of the most significant developments in American politics since the election of Barack Obama in 2008. This designation is well deserved. Since 2010, Tea Party supporters have comprised anywhere from 20-30% of the electorate, 45-55% of Republicans (Rappoport et al. 2013), and a strong majority of active Republicans (Abramowitz 2012). But what separates the Tea Party movement from past conservative mobilizations is its representation beyond the grass roots level. Within the interest group community, several high-profile organizations such as Americans for Prosperity, Freedom Works and Tea Party Express have played an influential role in the financing and endorsement of candidates in federal and state elections. In addition, many candidates and elected officials have self-identified as Tea Party members, resulting in Tea Party caucuses in Congress and in state legislatures across the country. Although mass support for the Tea Party agenda has declined since 2010, the movement continues to represent an influential force in American politics.

Due its perceived importance in American politics, there has been considerable interest in characterizing the ideology and motivations of Tea Party supporters. Survey research has shown Tea Party supporters are significantly more likely to identify as "conservative" or "very conservative," leading some to speculate that the Tea Party movement is simply a political consequence of the more long-term trend of ideological polarization (Abramowitz 2012). Others have characterized the Tea Party movement as "essentially a libertarian strain of conservatism" (Ball 2013). This view is supported by survey research which finds that Tea Party supporters are significantly more likely to support strict limits on government power rooted in the Constitution, gun rights, and cuts in "wasteful" government spending (Abramowitz 2012; Rapoport et al. 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin 2011).

The most controversial explanation for the emergence of the Tea Party movement, however, is that the movement has been fueled by white racial resentment, which has intensified in recent years due to concerns over illegal immigration and the election of the country's first black president. This perspective on the Tea Party movement has become conventional wisdom among many voters, especially Tea Party opponents. In response to a poll conducted by the Washington Post in 2010, 30 percent of all voters, and 61 percent of those who identified as non-supporters of the Tea Party movement, believed that the movement is at least partially driven by racial prejudice (Gardner and Thompson 2010). This "racial resentment thesis" has also been supported by several studies that find a strong relationship between various measures of racial prejudice and disapproval of President Obama (Pasek et al. 2014; Payne et al. 2009; Schaffner 2011; Tesler 2013) and support for the Tea Party (Abramowitz 2012; Barreto et al. 2011; Bradberry and Jacobson 2015; Maxwell and Parent 2013; Tope, Pickett and Chiricos 2014).

In contrast to the many studies of the attitudes of Tea Party voters, we know far less about the impact of the Tea Party movement on elite behavior and ultimately, public policy. Only three studies have addressed this question and the results of these studies are mixed. And most importantly, none of these studies have examined the impact of the Tea Party on minority political interests, choosing instead to examine its impact on broader measures of roll-call voting,

such as NOMINATE scores. Thus, while we have much evidence that Tea Party supporters are more strongly opposed to minority interests than perhaps any other bloc of voters, we have yet to determine if the movement has been successfully moving policy to the right on the issues that are important to minority voters. The answer to this question is not only important to understanding the impact of the Tea Party movement, but it can also tell us a great deal regarding the ability of representative institutions to serve as a moderating influence in response to mass movements that seek to restrict minority rights.

In this paper, we address this question by examining two potential channels of movement influence on minority political interests in the U.S. Congress – elite identification as a Tea Party member and constituency support for the Tea Party movement. Consistent with previous studies of Tea Party identification on member conservatism, we find relatively modest differences in support for minority interest bills between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican representatives during the 112th House (2011-2012). Democrats are consistently more supportive of minority interests, while Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans are consistently the least supportive. The strongest and most consistent effect of the Tea Party movement appears to operate through voters, as constituency support for the Tea Party movement had a negative effect on congressional support for minority interests. Interestingly, the effect of constituency support is not uniform and depends on several important characteristics of representatives. Specifically, the effect of constituency support is strongest among Democrats, non-Tea Party Republicans, white and Hispanic members. In contrast, black members and Tea Party members are relatively unresponsive to constituency support for the Tea Party, displaying uniformly high (for black members) and uniformly low (for Tea Party members) levels of support for minority interest bills regardless of district context. Together, our results suggest that the Tea Party movement has had a significant effect on minority political interests in Congress.

Racial Resentment and Support for the Tea Party Movement

Since its emergence in 2009, critics of the Tea Party have claimed that the movement is at least partially fueled by racial resentment. The most visible evidence in support of this interpretation is offered by the behavior of activists at Tea Party rallies. Tea Party protests have become well known for the display of racist signs targeting Barack Obama, often making explicit references to his race. There have also been numerous reports of racist rhetoric directed at the President and minorities at Tea Party events. One of the most publicized incidents involved an Arkansas Tea Party leader who eventually had to resign her position after making a racist joke at a Tea Party rally in 2012.[1] A Speaker at a Tea Party anti-immigrant rally also drew national attention when he advocated for racial purity in breeding at an event near the Capitol in 2013, which was also attended by Senators Ted Cruz and Jeff Sessions.[2] This has led some political

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[1] According to the Huffington Post (June 14, 2012), which posted audio of the speech by Inge Marler, she used the joke as an ice-breaker. She eventually resigned her board position with the Ozark Tea Party as a result of the public criticism that followed. Marler reportedly said: "A black kid asks his mom, 'Mama, what's a democracy?' 'Well, son, that be when white folks work every day so us po' folks can get all our benefits.' 'But mama, don't the white folk get mad about that?' 'They sho do, son. They sho do. And that's called racism'" (Celock 2012).
[2] The speaker at the event was Ken Crow, former president of Tea Party of America. According to audio from the event, Crow said: "From those incredible blood lines of Thomas Jefferson and George Washington and John Smith. And all these great Americans, Martin Luther King. These great Americans who built this country. You came from them. And the unique thing about being from that part of the world, when you learn about breeding, you learn that

commentators to refer to movement activists as "neo-Klansman" (Jonsson 2010), and the Tea Party movement more generally as "racist madness" (Hutchinson 2013).

In addition to this anecdotal evidence, survey research has repeatedly shown that Tea Party supporters display an unusually strong level of animus toward Barack Obama and the policies that are most connected to his presidency, such as "Obamacare" and the federal "stimulus" package that was passed in 2009 (Bradberry and Jacobson 2015; Maxwell and Parent 2012). Other studies have found a strong relationship between various measures of racial resentment, racial prejudice, and whites' support for Obama in the 2008 and 2012 elections (Pasek et al. 2014; Payne et al. 2009; Schaffner 2011; Tesler 2013).

Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of the "racial resentment" explanation for the Tea Party movement comes from studies that have found a direct link between racial prejudice (variously measured) and identification with the Tea Party, even after controlling for party identification and liberal-conservative ideology. We present a simple, yet powerful illustration of this relationship in Figure 1, which is based on 2010 data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (Ansolabehere 2012). The left side of Figure 1 displays the mean racial resentment score for all respondents who identified as either "conservative" or "very conservative" (based on the standard 7-point ideological self-placement item), by the level of support for the Tea Party movement (very positive to very negative). As can be seen, the level of racial resentment is positively related to Tea Party favorability. The magnitude of the relationship is underscored by examining the difference in racial resentment between whites and blacks (all respondents), which can be seen on the right side of the figure. Among the sample of conservatives, the difference in racial resentment between the "very positive" group and the "very negative" group is actually larger than the difference in racial resentment between blacks and whites.

(Figure 1 about here)

This finding has been supported by several recent studies that rely on multivariate analysis, utilizing a variety of datasets (Abramowitz 2012; Barreto et al. 2011; Bradberry and Jacobson 2015; Maxwell and Parent 2013; Tope, Pickett and Chiricos 2014). As Tope, Pickett and Chiricos conclude regarding their analysis of Tea Party support, "the results suggest that at least to some degree, the Tea Party movement is an outlet for mobilizing and expressing racialized grievances which may have been symbolically magnified by the election of the nation's first black President" (2014, 12). This conclusion is echoed by Barreto et al., who find "Tea Party sympathizers are not mainstream conservatives, but rather, they hold a strong sense of out-group anxiety and a concern over the social and demographic changes in America" (Barreto et al. 2011, 1).

The Tea Party Movement and Congressional Behavior

While there is now considerable evidence to suggest that Tea Party voters are more conservative than non-Tea Party voters across a range of issues, including racial issues, we know

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you cannot breed Secretariat to a donkey and expect to win the Kentucky Derby. You guys have incredible DNA and don't forget it" (Zornick 2013).

very little about the effect that the Tea Party movement has had on the behavior of elites in government. To date, there have been only three published studies of the impact of the Tea Party movement on roll call voting in Congress. Gallagher and Rock (2012) found that Tea Party Republicans voted with each other 88 percent of the time in 2011, which was only slightly larger than the level of agreement (85 percent) among all Republicans. In a far more sophisticated study of roll call voting during the 112th House, Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2012) found that Tea Party Caucus members were somewhat more conservative, but this difference was not substantively large or robust to different model specifications. However, they found that constituency support for the Tea Party was positively related to member conservatism (as measured by NOMINATE scores), as well as several key votes representing Tea Party interests. Last, Ragusa and Gaspar (2016) found that representatives who joined the Tea Party caucus and who had a large volume of Tea Party activists in their districts significantly shifted their voting behavior toward a more conservative direction in the 112th House.

Although these studies have contributed to our understanding of the Tea Party movement as it has become institutionalized in Congress, these studies have focused exclusively on relatively broad measures of roll call voting that capture support and opposition to the entire range of ideologically relevant bills. Therefore, these studies may not be generalizable to the question of whether or not racial hostility within the Tea Party movement has affected support for minority interest bills in Congress. Nor do these studies examine if or how the impact of the Tea Party movement has been moderated by member characteristics, such as party identification, race and gender, that have consistently been found by many studies to be related to roll call voting behavior. To address these questions, we analyze the impact of the Tea Party movement on minority interests in Congress through two potential routes of influence. First, we examine the effect of member's identification as a Tea Party member on support for minority political interests. Second, we estimate the effect of constituency support for the Tea Party on member support for minority interests, for both Tea Party and non-Tea Party members. Finally, we examine the possible moderating effect of descriptive representation on the relationship between district support for the Tea Party and member support for minority interest bills.

Elite Identification and Support for Minority Political Interests

We first examine the effect of elite identification as a Tea Party member on minority interests by comparing roll call voting patterns of three groups of representatives—Democrats, Tea Party Republicans, and non-Tea Party Republicans—during the 112th House, immediately following the 2010 midterm election. To the extent that the same opinion cleavages we observe at the mass level (see Figure 1) are reflected in elite opinion, we should expect Tea Party Republicans to behave in a more racially conservative fashion than Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans. This leads to the first hypothesis:

> H1: The Elite Distinctiveness Hypothesis
> *Compared to non-Tea Party Republican and Democratic members, Tea Party*
> *Republicans will be more likely to oppose minority interest bills in the House.*

Although this hypothesis would seem to be the conventional wisdom, the existing literature offers theoretical reasons to expect Tea Party Republican representatives to resemble

non-Tea Party Republicans in their behavior. First, ideological differences may be difficult to observe with roll call voting data. Even if Tea Party Republican representatives are sincerely distinct from their non-Tea Party Republican colleagues, institutional rules and electoral pressures may prevent them from expressing their preferences through roll call voting. While a sizable force in the Republican Party, Tea Party Republicans in Congress still represent a minority of the party, and they do not control the leadership positions. The party leadership also has considerable control over the agenda, perhaps leading to a "biased" sample of votes that reach the floor. As a result, roll call votes may give the appearance that there is more consensus among members than otherwise exists (Carrubba et al., 2006; Clinton and Lapinski 2008). This suggests that we may find that Tea Party Republicans think in a distinctly conservative manner, but these differences are not reflected in their voting behavior in Congress.

A second theoretical reason to expect similarity between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans lies in the rules governing U.S. congressional elections, which promote convergence, rather than distinctiveness, of candidate positions (Alesina 1988; Downs 1957). While the classic Downsian model assumes that competition occurs between two parties around the median voter position of the full electorate, many empirical studies have found that the strongest evidence of ideological convergence occurs *within* parties, as candidates from the same party have strong incentives to locate near the median position *of their party* (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Grofman et al. 1990; Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Shapiro et al. 1990). This may be the case for Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans, who must compete against one another in Republican primaries. If this is the case, then we expect to observe similarity, rather than distinctiveness, between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans in their roll call voting behavior.

> *H2: The Elite Convergence Hypothesis*
> *Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans will not be distinctively different with each other in supporting minority interest bills in the House.*

The Tea Party and Constituency Pressure

Constituency support for the Tea Party movement may be related to congressional behavior for at least two reasons, both of which are rooted in the motivation of members to maximize electoral security. According to the classic delegate model of representation, members of Congress are likely to be aware of public opinion in their districts and therefore may wish to modify their behavior to align with constituency preferences (Arnold 1990; Kingdon 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963; Pitkin 1967). In addition, voter support for the Tea Party may be related to the incidence of protest and other visible forms of mobilization by movement activists that could signal to members that Tea Party issues are salient in their districts (Madestam et al. 2013). For both reasons, we expect Tea Party constituency support will be negatively related to support for minority interest bills in Congress.

> *H3: The Constituency Pressure Hypothesis*
> *Constituency support for the Tea Party movement will be negatively related to member support for minority interest bills in the House.*

While it is possible that constituency support for the Tea Party might exert a more or less uniform effect across members, there is good reason to expect that the effect will differ by elite party groups—Democrats, non-Tea Party Republicans, and Tea Party Republicans. It is generally the case that congressional members have multiple goals, such as reelection, policy, and power goals, which often conflict with one another (Fenno 1973; Smith 2007). Although representatives can sometimes develop strategies to balance these conflicts, some are willing to prioritize one goal over another. For example, representatives who hold a very strong personal position on a policy issue are more likely to put greater emphasis on their policy goals even when this could impose significant electoral costs (see Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) for a more detailed story during the Clinton presidency). To the extent that identification as a Tea Party Republican in Congress represents a significant and sincere commitment to the policy goals of the Tea Party agenda, Tea Party Republicans may prioritize their personal commitment to Tea Party values over constituency preferences, and may therefore display significantly less (or almost little) responsiveness to district opinion, compared to Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans.

> *H4: The Conditional Constituency Pressure Hypothesis (I)*
> *Compared to Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans, the relationship between constituency support for the Tea Party movement and support for minority interest bills in the House will be weaker for Tea Party Republicans.*

The Moderating Role of Descriptive Representation

A large literature has examined the effects of black descriptive representation and whether it has led to substantive benefits for the black community. In the congressional literature, the majority of these studies have examined the effect of a representative's race on roll call votes that are deemed relevant to minority interests. Although there is some inconsistency in the findings of these studies, a sizeable number find that compared to white representatives, African American members often display significantly greater levels of support for minority-interest bills, even after controlling for member ideology and district characteristics (Baker and Cook 2005; Canon 1999; Grose 2005; Whitby 1997).

To the extent that African Americans provide better substantive representation of blacks, one (often implicit) mechanism theorized to drive this relationship is an inherently stronger personal commitment by legislators to prioritize and advocate for African American issues, presumably due to the effects of group identity and group consciousness (Minta 2009). This commitment to minority issues among African American legislators should not only lead to stronger advocacy for the passage of bills that promote black interests, but it may also lead to stronger resistance to efforts to subvert black interests, even when these pressures come from constituents in their own districts. Thus, similar to our hypothesis regarding Tea Party members, we hypothesize that African American members will be less responsive than white members to Tea Party support in their districts.

> *H5: The Conditional Constituency Pressure Hypothesis (II)*
> *Compared to white members, the relationship between constituency support for the Tea Party movement and support for minority interest bills in the House will be weaker for African American members.*

Further, we hypothesize that responsiveness to Tea Party district support will be weaker among women and Latino members, compared to male and white non-Hispanic members. This may be expected if Latino and women members view the Tea Party agenda as hostile to Latino and women's interests, or if Latino and women members see some commonality of interests with African American members (Bratton and Haynie 1999).

H6: The Conditional Constituency Pressure Hypothesis (III)
Compared to white and male members, the relationship between constituency support for the Tea Party movement and support for minority interest bills in the House will be weaker for Latino and women members.

Data and Methods

Measuring Support for Minority Interests

Our dependent variable measures support for minority interest bills in the 112th House. Following past studies of minority representation and roll call voting, we utilize support scores published by the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights (LCCR) (e.g., Avery and Fine 2012; Cannon 1999; Grose 2005; Kidd and Morris 2001; Whitby 1997). The LCCR represents a coalition of different civil rights organizations across the country, with the mission to "promote and protect the civil and human rights of all persons in the United States" (LCCR, http://www.civilrights.org/about/). Each session of Congress, the LCCR identifies approximately 20 bills in the House and Senate that represent issues of concern to their membership. Each legislator then receives a score that is equivalent to the percentage of votes cast by the legislator that aligned with the position of the LCCR.

One possible objection to using the LCCR support scores as our measure of minority interest support is that many of the bills included in the calculation of the index are not explicitly connected to race *per se*. For example, for the 112th Congress, the LCCR score includes bills on the Bush tax cuts, union organizing, student loan interest rates, repeal of the Affordable Care Act, and LGBT rights in the military. The LCCR scores may therefore be measuring something very similar to traditional left-right ideology. To address this issue, we examined all of the bills included in the LCCR index for the 112th Congress and identified 7 bills that we felt were more explicitly related to race. We calculated a new support score for each representative based on these seven votes, which we call the race-explicit LCCR score.[3] In addition, we also compare our results using the two versions of the LCCR scores to results based on analyses that utilize the traditional ideology measure, DW-NOMINATE score.

Tea Party Identification and Constituency Support

We identify Tea Party Republicans based on two sources of data used in previous studies (Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel 2012; Ragusa and Gaspar 2016). First, we utilize the official Tea Party Caucus membership in the House. The Tea Party Caucus was first established and recognized in the House on July 16th, 2010. It had 27 original members, and expanded

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[3] The specific bills used for full and race-explicit LCCR scores are listed in the Appendix A.

dramatically after the 2010 midterm election, reaching 93 members after the 2012 election. However, several very conservative Republicans who were associated with Tea Party groups did not officially join the Tea Party Caucus. Therefore, in addition to Tea Party Caucus membership, we define Tea Party Republicans based on endorsements by several major national Tea Party organizations during the 2010 election.[4] Based on this data, we construct *Tea Party Republican*, which equals 1 for representatives who have been coded as Tea Party identifiers (0=otherwise). We also include *Democrat*, which equals 1 for Democrat representatives (0=otherwise). Since we do not include a variable for non-Tea Party Republicans, this becomes our baseline comparison group for the regression models we report below.

In addition to *identification* as a Tea Party member, we also include a second measure of Tea Party movement strength, which we label *Tea Party Constituency Support*. To measure this variable, we follow Bailey, Mummolo and Noel (2012) and compute the average level of Tea Party favorability in each congressional district, based on survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study for 2010 and 2012 (Ansolabehere 2010, 2012). Specifically, we rely on the item which asks respondents "What is your view of the Tea Party movement—would you say it is very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative or don't you know enough about the Tea Party movement to say?" We recoded the responses so that higher values are equivalent to greater levels of favorability, and then we computed the average value for each congressional district in both 2010 and 2012.[5] Our final measure used in the analysis is computed as the average of the 2010 and 2012 values.

Additional Variables

In addition to the variables measuring minority interests and Tea Party movement strength described above, we also include several additional independent variables commonly used in roll call voting studies to control for member characteristics and district-level factors. These include:

- *Black*: Black representatives are coded 1, white representatives are coded 0.
- *Latino*: Latino representatives are coded 1, non-Latino representatives are coded 0.
- *Female*: Female representatives are coded 1, male representatives are coded 0.
- *District Ideology*: The percentage of the vote cast for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election, for each district.
- *% Black Population*: The percentage of district population that is African American, based on the 2010 Census.
- *% Latino Population*: The percentage of district population that is Hispanic, based on the 2010 Census.
- *Electoral Competitiveness - General*: The percentage of the two-party vote received by the representative in the last general election, for each district.
- *Electoral Competitiveness - Primary*: The percentage of the vote received by the representative in the last primary election, for each district

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[4] http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/2010_Elections/vote-2010-elections-tea-party-winners-losers
[5] The average sample size across districts was approximately 120.

Censored Regression

Our dependent variable, LCCR scores, has one important limitation. While the LCCR scores show significant variation between 0 and 100, there are many members with values of 0 or 100 in our data. Among 437 representatives who had a voting record in the 112th House, 86 members (19.7%) consistently voted against the LCCR position. Conversely, 35 members (8%) consistently supported the LCCR position for every bill. Clearly, representatives with LCCR scores of 0 are racially very conservative, but this does not mean that they share the same level of underlying racial conservatism. Similarly, representatives with an LCCR score of 100 will undoubtedly differ in their levels of racial liberalism. Methodologically speaking, our dependent variable is both *right-censored* and *left-censored*, where

$$y_i^* = x_i'\beta + \epsilon_i$$

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq 0 \\ y_i^* & \text{if } 0 < y_i^* < 100 \\ 100 & \text{if } y_i^* \geq 100 \end{cases}$$

To avoid potential bias introduced by applying OLS to these data, we employ the censored regression model estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML).

We begin by estimating the coefficients for the additive model below, which allows us to test Hypotheses 1-3. Hypothesis 4 is tested by re-estimating the model after adding interactive terms for party identification (*Tea Party Republican*, *Democrat*) and *Tea Party Constituency Support*. We test Hypotheses 5 and 6 by estimating interactions for member race and gender (*Black Representative*, *Latino Representative*, *Female Representative*) and *Tea Party Constituency Support*.

$LCCR_i = \alpha + \beta_1$ *Tea Party Republican*$_i + \beta_2$ *Democrat*$_i$
$\qquad + \beta_3$ *Tea Party Constituency Support*$_i + \beta_4$ *Black Representative*$_i$
$\qquad + \beta_5$ *Latino Representative*$_i + \beta_6$ *Female Representative*$_i$
$\qquad + \beta_7$ *District Ideology*$_i + \beta_8$ *%Black Population*$_i$
$\qquad + \beta_9$ *%Latino Population*$_i + \beta_{10}$ *Electoral Competitiveness-General*$_i$
$\qquad + \beta_{11}$ *Electoral Competitiveness-Primary*$_i + \varepsilon_i$

We estimate three versions of this set of additive and interactive models, based on the three versions of the dependent variable measuring minority interest legislation – the full LCCR score, the race-explicit LCCR score, and the DW-NOMINATE score.[6]

It is also important to note that, when interaction terms are used, the marginal effect of any independent variable should be re-calculated based on a set of coefficients and standard errors (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). For example, when $y = \alpha + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_1X_2$ (X_2 is dummy), the marginal effect of X_1 given $X_2 = 1$ is calculated by

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[6] We estimate censored regression models with and without state fixed effects. The substantive results are extremely similar. As such, in Table 1, we report only the results for the models with state fixed effects.

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial x_1}\bigg]_{X_2=1} = \beta_1 + \beta_3,$$

where $se(\beta_1 + \beta_3) = \sqrt{Var(\beta_1) + Var(\beta_3) + 2Cov(\beta_1, \beta_3)}$.

Empirical Results

We begin our analysis by examining Figure 2, which displays the distribution of the three dependent variables used in the analysis by each of the party groups (Tea Party Republican, Non-Tea Party Republican, Democrat). The figure displays the distribution of DW-NOMINATE scores on the left, LCCR scores in the middle panel, and race-explicit LCCR scores on the right, which allows us to visually examine the similarities and differences in the three dependent variables. The figure reveals that the two versions of LCCR scores tend to be more polarized among the three partisan groups, as compared to DW-NOMINATE scores. However, the distribution of LCCR scores (middle panel) looks very similar to the distribution of DW-NOMINATE scores. This is not surprising given the very high correlation between the two measures (0.96). Interestingly, we can see that the race-explicit LCCR scores appear less polarized than the LCCR scores.

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 2 also allows us to examine the bivariate relationship between member's party identification and support for minority interest bills. Clearly, there is a large difference between Democrats and both groups of Republican members that is consistent across the three versions of the dependent variable. Tea Party Republicans are slightly more conservative than non-Tea Party Republicans in every case, but the differences appear to be substantively small when compared to the difference between each Republican group and Democrats.

Next, we estimate the effect of Tea Party elite identification and constituency support on minority interest support in the 112th House using the full set of control variables described above. These results are presented in Table 1. The first column of Table 1 presents results for a model in which the LCCR score is the dependent variable. Unsurprisingly, Democrats are more likely to support minority interest roll call votes than non-Tea Party and Tea Party Republicans, even after controlling for other member and district characteristics. However, we observe only a modest difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans in their opposition to minority interest bills. Specifically, the estimated difference in support for the LCCR agenda between the two groups of Republicans is merely 3.3 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.076.[7]

(Table 1 about here)

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[7] For some readers, this difference seems trivial. Obviously, it is not big, but consider that the average LCCR score for all Republicans is just 6.8 and more than 75% of Republicans have an LCCR score lower than 10. As such, the 3.3 percentage point difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican representatives may look a meaningful difference within the Republican Party. However, it does not reach to the conventional statistical significance of 0.05.

In the second column of Table 1, we report the results for a model that examines the narrower set of race-explicit LCCR bills. For this version of the dependent variable, the difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans is 9.3 percentage points and is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This 9.3 percentage point difference is three times as large as the difference seen for the broader measure of LCCR scores. This finding provides some support for Hypothesis 1 and the distinctiveness of Tea Party Republicans' opposition to bills advancing minority interests. However, the difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans is still far less than the difference between all Republicans and Democrats.

The third column of Table 1 reports results for the DW-NOMINATE version of the dependent variable. Tea Party Republicans are estimated to be significantly more conservative than non-Tea Party Republicans, even after controlling for other member and district characteristics. Because DW-NOMINATE scores are measured on a different scale than LCCR scores, it is difficult to compare the magnitude of difference between the two Republican party groups by simply examining the unstandardized coefficients in Table 1. However, if we transform the coefficients to represent standard deviation changes in the dependent variable, we find that the estimated difference of 6.49 DW-NOMINATE scores is equivalent to a .13 standard deviation difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans. For the race-specific LCCR scores, a similar transformation yields an estimated standard deviation difference of .23 between the Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans. Thus, it would appear that the difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans is approximately twice as large for race-specific issues than for the broader set of bills represented by the other two dependent variables.

In contrast to the effects of member party identification, the effects of representative race (*Black Representative*), ethnicity (*Latino Representative*) and gender (*Female Representative*) are relatively small and statistically not-significant for all but one case (the effect of *Female Representative* for the LCCR score). Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient for *Black Representative* is actually negative in the race-explicit LCCR model. This is quite the opposite of our theoretical expectation. Of course, in a bivariate relationship, black Representatives are more likely to have higher LCCR scores than non-black Representatives (88.8 vs. 39.3). However, this relationship loses explanatory power once we control for other member characteristics and district variables.[8]

Next, we examine the effect of *Tea Party Constituency Support* as an alternative mechanism for movement influence on representative behavior. The results for all three versions of the dependent variable find that constituency support has a consistently negative effect on representative support for minority interests. The value of the coefficient for this variable in the LCCR model (column 1) is -11.30. To better understand the substantive impact of Tea Party constituency support, consider the fact that the standard deviation of this variable is 0.41 (with a sample range of 1.58-3.85). This suggests that a two standard deviation increase in support for the Tea Party movement is expected to result in a decrease of approximately 10 percentage points in the LCCR score of the member representing the district. If we assume that the number of bills represented by the LCCR score is approximately 20 (as is the case for the full LCCR sample of bills), then this translates to an expected increase in opposition to the LCCR position for 2 bills (or 10%) per session. The constituency support effect is even larger in magnitude

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[8] To help understand this interesting pattern, we provide an additional analysis in Appendix B.

when we examine LCCR race-explicit bills. Needless to say, these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.

The Conditional Effect of Tea Party Constituency Support

We now turn our attention to the conditional effects of Tea Party constituency support by fitting interaction models. First, we examine the potential moderating role of a representative's party affiliation on support for minority interest bills. In Table 2, we present the marginal effects of Tea Party constituency support when a representative is a Democrat, non-Tea Party Republican, and Tea Party Republican.[9] We present the results for the two versions of the dependent variable that rely on LCCR scores. For the full set of LCCR bills (column 1), both Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans responded to Tea Party constituency support in their districts: the marginal effects are negative and statistically significant. As constituency support for the Tea Party movement increases, Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans were less likely to support minority interest bills in the House. In contrast, Tea Party Republicans did not respond to the constituency support for the Tea Party movement: the size of the marginal effect is the smallest and it is statistically not-significant.

A very different story emerges when we examine the results for the race-explicit LCCR measure (column 2). While the effect of Tea Party constituency support remains relatively unchanged for Democrats, the effect for Tea Party Republicans increases dramatically when we limit the analysis to race-explicit bills. It is now the largest among the three party groups.

Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of Tea Party Constituency support for the three different groups in graphical form. The left panel displays the marginal effects for the three groups for the original LCCR measure (column 1 of Table 2). The right panel displays the marginal effects for the race-explicit LCCR index. As can be seen, the slope for Democrats is virtually identical in each graph. However, the slopes for both Republican groups are much steeper in the race-explicit graph.

(Table 2 about here)

(Figure 3 about here)

These results have at least three important implications for our understanding of the Tea Party's impact in Congress. First, the results suggest that all three party groups have been responsive to Tea Party support in their districts. The results for Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans are especially interesting as they suggest that the Tea Party's impact may extend beyond the election of Tea Party candidates. Second, the effect of Tea Party constituency support among Tea Party Republicans is very weak for full LCCR scores, but it becomes fairly strong for race-explicit LCCR scores. This suggests that the Tea Party label can have different meanings in different contexts. Finally, taken together with the results presented in Table 1, the difference in the results across the two dependent variables suggests that opposition to minority interests has played a central role in the politics of the Tea Party movement in Congress.

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[9] We report the full set of results for this interactive specification in Appendix C.

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Our last set of results shed light on the possible moderating role of members' race, ethnicity and gender on the relationship between Tea Party constituency support and member support for minority interests. To answer this question, we estimate interactions between each of these three member characteristics and Tea Party Constituency Support. The marginal effects associated with these results are reported in Table 2, while graphical illustrations of these interactions are displayed in Figure 4. The results provide no evidence that a representative's gender conditions the constituency pressure effect. Both male and female representatives respond to Tea Party constituency support in their districts by moving to the right in a more or less parallel fashion. Similar results are found for Latino representatives. District support for the Tea Party is negatively related to support for minority interest bills for both Latino and non-Latino representatives. In addition, the magnitude of the relationship is very similar for both groups.

(Figure 4 about here)

In contrast to women and Latino representatives, black representatives are relatively unresponsive to Tea Party support in their districts. As can be seen in Figure 4, black representatives exhibit an unconditionally high level of support for minority interest bills, regardless of how constituents in their districts evaluate the Tea Party movement. For the LCCR index based on race-explicit bills, the slope of the relationship is slightly negative, but we can see in Table 2 that the effect is far from statistically significant for both the full LCCR model and the race-explicit version. This finding is consistent with Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996), who found that differences in the support of minority interest bills between black and white representatives was greatest in the South, presumably due to significantly higher levels of white racial conservatism.

Conclusion

Since its emergence in 2009, the Tea Party movement has attracted a significant amount of attention from political commentators, and more recently, social scientists. From the very beginning of the movement, its critics have accused Tea Party supporters of being "racists" and using "thinly veiled racial coding to disparage the President and mobilize white voters" (Jeffries 2013, 32). Based on survey research, social scientists have now found consistent evidence that voter support for the Tea Party movement is significantly related to measures of racial resentment and prejudice, even after controlling for partisanship, ideology, and other voter characteristics (Abramowitz 2012; Barreto et al. 2011; Bradberry and Jacobson 2015; Maxwell and Parent 2013; Tope, Pickett and Chiricos 2014). Research has also found that compared to non-Tea Party conservatives, Tea Party identifiers are considerably more likely to oppose policies that benefit minorities and other perceived "outgroups," such as affirmative action, immigration reform, and gay rights, among others (Abramowitz 2012; Barreto et al. 2011; Bradberry and Jacobson 2015; Tope, Pickett and Chiricos 2014). Given the vulnerable status of these minority groups in American politics, it is important to understand what impact, if any, the Tea Party movement has had on minority political rights and interests.

Although there has been much speculation concerning the impact of the Tea Party movement on public policy in the media, we have very few empirical studies that have examined the impact of the Tea Party on policy in a systematic fashion. And there have been no studies

that have examined the impact of the Tea Party on minority political interests. Our results suggest that the Tea Party movement has had a significant effect on the fate of minority political interests. We find that the effect of elite identification is generally small in the sense that Tea Party Republicans vote in a way that is only modestly different from non-Tea Party Republicans. One possible reason may be that the Tea Party brand has been successfully adopted by other mainstream Republicans in an effort to coopt the movement. In this sense, our findings are consistent with studies of social movement outcomes, which find that the institutionalization of a movement can often result in cooptation by political parties and other centrist interests, at the expense of the more radical aspects of the movement's agenda and actual policy change (Piven and Cloward 1971; Gamson 1990; Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

In contrast to the relatively weak effect of elite identification, we find Tea Party support at the mass (i.e. constituent) level to have a consistent and substantively important negative effect on support for minority interests in Congress. This finding is also consistent with the literature on social movement outcomes, in that it supports past findings concerning the importance of grass-roots, mass mobilization on achieving policy success (Piven and Cloward 1977; Fording 1997; McAdam 1983; Tarrow 1994).

Interestingly enough, we also find that how constituents evaluate the Tea Party movement does not play a role in a uniform way. Rather, it depends on several important characteristics of representatives themselves. While Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans do respond to the constituency opinion, Tea Partiers' opposition to minority interests does not vary over the different levels of Tea Party support among voters. In addition, black Representatives are not responsive to the constituency opinion, either. They rather express unconditionally high levels of support for minority interests in the House.

Figure 1. Mean Level of Racial Resentment by Tea Party Favorability and Race of Respondent, 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey

Note: The vertical axis represents the mean score for an index of racial resentment, which is constructed based on the average level of agreement with the following two items: (a) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (1=Strongly Agree – 5=Strongly disagree), and (b) "The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black should do the same without any special favors" (1=Strongly disagree – 5=Strongly agree).

# Figure 2. Distribution of LCCR and DW-NOMINATE Scores

Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Tea Party Constituency Support by Different Party Groups, Predicting Full and Race-Explicit LCCR Scores

Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Tea Party Constituency Support by Different Groups, Predicting Full and Race-Explicit LCCR Scores

Table 1. Support for Minority Interests in the House: Additive Models

	LCCR Score	Race-Explicit LCCR Score	DW-NOMINATE (multiplied by -100)
Representative Party Affiliation			
- Democrat	76.83*	71.74*	65.88*
	(37.92)	(21.01)	(23.58)
- Non-Tea Party Republican	--	--	--
- TP Republican	-3.31†	-9.30*	-6.49*
	(-1.78)	(-2.95)	(-2.62)
Representative Characteristics			
- Female	4.70*	3.16	2.14
	(2.68)	(1.09)	(0.89)
- Black	0.19	-7.01	6.39
	(0.06)	(-1.33)	(1.40)
- Hispanic	-1.18	-1.98	0.46
	(-0.33)	(-0.33)	(0.10)
Constituency Factor			
- Tea Party Constituency Support	-11.30*	-18.30*	-22.17*
	(-4.35)	(-4.22)	(-6.16)
- District Ideology	0.15*	0.14	-0.01
	(2.18)	(1.17)	(-0.06)
- % Black Population	-0.13†	-0.14	0.10
	(-1.67)	(-1.05)	(0.89)
- % Hispanic Population	0.02	0.14	0.19*
	(0.30)	(1.17)	(1.98)
Electoral Competitiveness			
- Previous General Election	-0.05	-0.35*	-0.13
	(-0.72)	(-3.15)	(1.43)
- Previous Primary Election	0.04	0.10†	-0.10*
	(1.13)	(1.76)	(-2.16)
(Intercept)	53.86*	92.41*	24.87
	(3.99)	(4.16)	(1.42)
N	434	434	432
$\log(\sigma)$	11.41	18.42	
Log-likelihood	-1296.31*	-1296.31*	
R^2			0.90
F-statistic			54.07*

Note: Censored regression (with state fixed effects) for two versions of LCCR score and (OLS) linear regression (with state fixed effects) for DW-NOMINATE score; Entries are coefficients with *t*-values in parenthesis; $*p < 0.05$; $†p < 0.10$

Table 2. Marginal Effect of Tea Party Constituency Support,
By Different Groups of Representatives

When Representatives are:	Model with Dependent Variable Using	
	LCCR Score	Race-Explicit LCCR Score
Representative Party Affiliation[§]		
- Democrat	-13.51*	-11.15†
	(-3.91)	(-1.95)
- Non-Tea Party Republican	-9.64†	-23.82*
	(-1.93)	(-2.89)
- TP Republican	-5.82	-30.42*
	(-0.82)	(-2.50)
Representative Gender[§§]		
- Female	-9.17*	-13.74*
	(-2.16)	(-1.98)
- Male	-12.35*	-17.63*
	(-4.38)	(-3.76)
Representative Race – Black[§§§]		
- Black	-1.12	-6.79
	(-0.20)	(-0.76)
- Non-Black	-14.01*	-19.04*
	(-4.90)	(-4.01)
Representative Race – Hispanic[§§§§]		
- Hispanic	-14.45*	19.86†
	(-2.12)	(-1.76)
- Non-Hispanic	-11.33*	-16.39*
	(-4.14)	(-3.61)

Note: [§]Re-calculated from Models 1, 5 in Appendix C; [§§]Re-calculated from Models 2, 6 in Appendix C; [§§§]Re-calculated from Models 3, 7 in Appendix C; [§§§§]Re-calculated from Models 4, 8 in Appendix C; Entries are coefficients with *t*-values in parenthesis; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.10$

ONLINE APPENDIX

for

The Impact of the Tea Party Movement
on Minority Political Interests in the U.S. Congress

Appendix A. List of LCCR Bills (112th Congress)

Race-Explicit Bills
1. Elimination of field funding for the Legal Services Corporation (Duncan Amendment to H.R. 1, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act)
2. Holder Contempt Resolution (H. Res. 711)
3. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012 (Rollback in protections for immigrant women) (H.R. 4970)
4. DOJ Lawsuits against State Immigration Laws (Black Amendment to the Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations bill for 2013)
5. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Provision of foreign language services for individuals with limited English proficiency) (H.R.5855)
6. Voting Rights - Bar on Challenging State Voter ID Laws (H.Amdt. 1075)
7. *Pigford II* Settlement Payments (King Amendment to H.R. 2112, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act)

Other Bills
1. Ryan Budget Resolution for FY2012 (H. Con.Res. 34)
2. Balanced Budget Amendment (H.J. Res. 2)
3. Sequester Replacement Reconciliation (H.R. 5652)
4. Extension of Bush Tax Cuts (H.R. 8)
5. Funding for American Community Survey Funding (Webster Amendment to H.R. 5326, the Commerce, State, Justice Appropriations Bill for FY 2013)
6. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Restructuring (H.R. 1315)
7. Gainful Employment Requirement for Post-Secondary Education Programs (Kline Amendment to H.R. 1, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act)
8. Interest Rate Reduction Act (H.R. 4628)
9. FY 2011 Planned Parenthood Funding Reduction (Pence Amendment to H.R. 1, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act)
10. Repeal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R.6079)
11. Defense of Marriage Act & Military Personnel[t1] (King Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY 2012)
12. Fair Elections (LaTourette Amendment to H.R. 658, the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act)
13. Eliminating Prevailing Wage Requirements (H.R. 5856)

Appendix B. Further Analysis on Descriptive Representation Hypothesis

It is clear that black representatives are more likely to support for minority interest bills in the House. The comparison of average LCCR scores shows:

	LCCR Score	Race-Explicit LCCR Score
Black Representatives	88.78	81.68
Non-black Representatives	39.31	41.97
t-statistic	7.29	6.17

However, all but one black representatives are Democrats. Comparing black and non-black representatives only for Democrats shows a slightly different story:

|	LCCR Score	Race-Explicit LCCR Score
Black Democratic Representatives	90.99	83.46
Non-black Democratic Representatives	89.70	87.74
t-statistic	0.59	-1.89

As such, when we run the multivariate regression with party and black variables in the same equation (see Table 1), the black dummy captures the black effect *only among* Democrats. In order to demonstrate this in a different angle, we additionally fit the models with a new categorical variable, which is 0 for non-Tea Party Republicans, 1 for Tea Party Republican, 2 for non-black Democrats, and 3 for black Democrats. The results are:

	LCCR Score	Race-Explicit LCCR Score
Non-Tea Party Republican	--	--
Tea Party Republican	-3.30† (-1.76)	9.45* (-2.97)
Non-black Democrat	76.83* (37.83)	71.82* (20.96)
Black Democrat	77.12* (19.43)	64.16* (9.84)
Female	4.68* (2.66)	3.24 (1.11)
Hispanic	-1.18 (-0.33)	-2.02 (-0.34)
Tea Party Constituency Support	-11.33* (-4.35)	-18.17* (-4.17)
District Ideology	0.15* (2.18)	0.14 (1.17)
% Black Population	-0.14† (-1.65)	-0.13 (-0.94)
% Hispanic Population	0.02 (0.30)	0.14 (1.17)
Previous General Election - Competitiveness	-0.05 (-0.73)	-0.35* (-3.10)
Previous Primary Election - Competitiveness	0.04 (1.13)	0.10† (1.74)
(Intercept)	54.00* (3.98)	91.75* (4.11)
N	434	434
$\log(\sigma)$	11.43	18.46
Log-likelihood	-1292.95*	-1246.83

Note: Censored Regression with state fixed effects; Entries are coefficients with t-values in parenthesis; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.10$

In both models, the differences between non-black and black Democrats are statistically not-significant ($t = 1.11$ and 1.39 respectively).

Last, we fit the interaction models between the new party-race category variable and the Tea Party constituency support variable, and plot the predicted values in a similar fashion as in the main text. It turns out that only black Democrats are the group who does not respond to the Tea Party constituency support (t = -0.31 and -0.49), which we have already observed.

LCCR score	Race-Explicit LCCR score

Appendix C. Full Results from Interaction Models

	LCCR Score			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Representative Party Affiliation				
- Democrat	88.15*	77.44*	76.67*	77.46*
	(4.82)	(37.75)	(37.17)	(37.66)
- Non-Tea Party Republican	--	--	--	--
- TP Republican	-15.86	-3.76*	-3.62*	-3.77*
	(-0.63)	(-2.00)	(-1.94)	(-2.01)
Representative Race				
- Female	3.77*	-4.79	3.52*	3.75*
	(2.11)	(-0.41)	(1.98)	(2.10)
- Black	-3.77	-3.57	-34.28*	-3.69
	(-1.12)	(-1.05)	(-2.41)	(-1.08)
- Hispanic	0.76	0.47	0.38	9.23
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.47)
Constituency Factor				
- Tea Party Constituency Support	-9.64†	-12.35*	-14.01*	-11.33*
	(-1.93)	(-4.38)	(-4.90)	(-4.14)
- District Ideology	0.19*	0.17*	0.17*	0.18*
	(2.65)	(2.45)	(2.43)	(2.60)
- % Black Population	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05
	(-0.87)	(-0.89)	(-0.96)	(-0.81)
- % Hispanic Population	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(-0.08)	(-0.05)	(-0.03)	(-0.07)
Electoral Competitiveness				
- Previous General Election	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03	-0.06
	(-1.23)	(-0.79)	(-0.47)	(-0.96)
- Previous Primary Election	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.47)
Interactions				
- Democrat * Tea Party Support	-3.87			
	(-0.62)			
- TP Republican * Tea Party Support	3.82			
	(0.47)			
- Female * Tea Party Support		3.17		
		(0.74)		
- Black * Tea Party Support			12.89*	
			(2.20)	
- Hispanic * Tea Party Support				-3.13
				(-0.45)
(Intercept)	31.45*	37.62*	41.87*	34.93*
	(1.96)	(3.12)	(3.47)	(2.94)
log(σ)	2.55*	2.55*	2.54*	2.55*
	(60.95)	(61.00)	(60.91)	(61.02)
N	434	434	434	434
Log-likelihood	-1342.40	-1342.65	-1340.51	-1342.82

Note: Censored Regression; Entries are coefficients with *t*-values in parenthesis; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.10$

| | Race-Explicit LCCR Score | | | |
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Representative Party Affiliation				
- Democrat	34.65	70.47*	69.71*	70.49*
	(1.15)	(20.69)	(20.29)	(3.41)
- Non-Tea Party Republican	--	--	--	--
- TP Republican	9.37	-11.62*	-11.50*	-11.66*
	(0.22)	(-3.67)	(-3.64)	(-3.68)
Representative Race				
- Female	2.67	-7.94	2.31	2.53
	(0.91)	(-0.41)	(0.79)	(0.86)
- Black	-11.34*	-10.62†	-39.91†	-10.80†
	(-2.07)	(-1.92)	(-1.72)	(-1.96)
- Hispanic	0.74	1.84	1.74	11.53
	(0.12)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.35)
Constituency Factor				
- Tea Party Constituency Support	-23.82*	-17.63*	-19.04*	-16.39*
	(-2.89)	(-3.76)	(-4.01)	(-3.61)
- District Ideology	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.13
	(0.98)	(0.98)	(0.97)	(1.09)
- % Black Population	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.30)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.17)
- % Hispanic Population	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.69)
Electoral Competitiveness				
- Previous General Election	-0.26†	-0.36*	-0.34*	-0.37*
	(-1.92)	(-3.12)	(-2.94)	(-3.25)
- Previous Primary Election	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.90)	(1.12)	(1.07)	(1.10)
Interactions				
- Democrat * Tea Party Support	12.67			
	(1.22)			
- TP Republican * Tea Party Support	-6.60			
	(-0.48)			
- Female * Tea Party Support		3.89		
		(0.55)		
- Black * Tea Party Support			12.25	
			(1.28)	
- Hispanic * Tea Party Support				-3.47
				(-0.30)
(Intercept)	89.67*	76.23*	79.82*	72.93*
	(3.39)	(3.79)	(3.96)	(3.69)
log(σ)	3.02*	3.02*	3.02*	3.03*
	(63.30)	(63.36)	(63.30)	(63.37)
N	434	434	434	434
Log-likelihood	-1294.80	-1296.02	-1295.35	1296.13

Note: Censored Regression; Entries are coefficients with *t*-values in parenthesis; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.10$