

1 Introduction

Looking only at numbers, women, making up 51% of the US population, but less than 20% of members of Congress, are the "most underrepresented group in Congress" (McCurdy (2001), p. 37). Given such a dire result from looking solely at descriptive representation, the question arises whether women are adequately being represented in a *substantive manner*. Is it possible for women's interests to be represented without having their demographic numbers replicated in the share of representatives? Who speaks and acts for women in the legislative context, and which form do these claims and actions take? These questions inform this project, and the answers to them will tell us more about the content, form, and process of women's representation in the U.S. Congress.

This chapter will explore who the speakers/actors are in Congress, and which factors influence their propensity to speak/act on behalf of women. As the review of existing scholarship in chapter 1 has suggested, much has been written about women's interests and women's representation. Yet there is a disconnect between theoretical and empirical scholarship (see Cammisa and Reingold (2004), Celis et al. (2008), and Celis and Childs (2012), for example, for a critique of existing research and suggestions for future direction), and the preemptive definition of women's interests has led to a narrow focus in much of the empirical scholarship and a continuous struggle with respect to the definition of "women's interests" (see Swers (1998), Crowley (2004), Bratton and Haynie (1999) and Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2009) for examples of studies that are aware of and attempt to address the problems associated with existing conceptualizations of women's interests while still remaining within the traditional framework, and Celis and Erzeel (2015) and Lloren (2015) for recent examples of a broadening of focus and an incorporation of nuances). In this chapter, I approach the question of women's interests and women's representation in Congress from the perspective of the representatives. That is to say, I try to determine who makes claims on behalf of women, and whether these claims are then followed up by actions.

Based on the theory developed in chapter 1, it makes sense to expect women to be

more likely to engage in representative acts on behalf of women than men (H1), to expect Democrats to be more likely to do so than Republicans (H2), and to expect the kinds of representative acts to differ, depending on whether they are done by men and women, and Democrats and Republicans, respectively (H3). Using the original data for the 111th-113th Congress (described in chapter 2 in detail), I look at three types of representative activities: campaign ads, floor speeches, and bill sponsorship. These activities differ in many ways:

- Floor speeches and ads could be characterized as *claims*, while bill sponsorship is a representative *act*
- Floor speeches and bill sponsorship are *intra-congressional* activities, taking place within the institutional context of Congress, while campaign ads occur *during election time* and *on the campaign trail*.
- Campaign ads are *clearly targeted at constituents* as an audience, while floor speeches could be either aimed at the *public, fellow members of Congress, or other elites*, such as the members of the media (Fenno (1989), Maltzman and Sigelman (1996)).
- The audience for *bills that pass* and become laws is clearly the public, yet what of those bills that are introduced but *fail*?
 1. They could be purely symbolic signals to a core constituency, signals to fellow members of the same party, signals to members of the opposing party, or a serious attempt at representing certain interests (Schiller (1995), Brunner (2012)).
 2. Members of Congress might even introduce some bills with the expectation that they will fail, yet it is hard to know which bills those are.

On the one hand, then, even this elementary approach to substantive representation retains substantial complexity - and interpretive challenge - as underlined in all of the preceding. On the other hand, the very diversity of this array of representational activities should help in discerning which members of Congress are most likely to speak/act for women,

which factors influence their representative behavior, and whether claims and actions go together. A more nuanced look at representational activity, combined with an open approach to content (meaning no pre-defined notion as to what women's interests are, but rather an examination of legislators' own conceptualizations of the term), enables us to understand who speaks/acts for women in Congress, under which conditions they do so, and (in chapter four) what the content of these representational activities is. Knowing who speaks for women, who acts for them, and what form these claims and actions take gives us insight into the representation of sub-groups within the constituency that can help us better understand the process of political representation in the US.

Looking at representational behavior of men and women, and comparing the extent of women-focused activities both groups engage in, as well as the types of representational activities they choose, provides us with one way to gauge the impact of descriptive representation (Pitkin (1967)) and its interaction with substantive representational activity. Furthermore, the indicator of home state receptiveness to women in political office (described in greater detail in chapter 2) serves as another way to measure the impact of descriptive representation when it comes to representing women and their interests: does the presence of female political actors influence the behavior of legislators, and if so, does it influence men and women, and Democrats and Republicans, to the same extent and in the same ways? Disentangling the role of partisanship and gender will go a long way to revealing representational patterns. This chapter is a first attempt at this, by connecting types of representational activities to subgroups of legislators, and by exploring which factors correlate with an increase in legislative activity on behalf of women.

2 Speakers and Actors in Congress

A first step towards answering these questions is to look at the percentage of members of Congress who engage in representational activity on behalf of women. Figure 1 (below)

depicts the percentage of legislators in both houses of Congress who engaged in at least one representational activity (giving a floor speech, sponsoring a bill, or airing an ad) specifically targeted at women. In other words, every representative or senator who engaged in one of these activities at least once in the time period under study is counted as actively seeking to speak or act for women. Frequency and percentage of representational claims and actions is not taken into account at this point, but will be in the analysis to follow later.




Figure 1: Who Speaks for Women? - Speeches, Bills, & Ads

As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 1, between fifty-five and one hundred percent of all members of Congress speak or act on behalf of women at least once during the time period under study (2009 through 2014). While this can not yet tell us anything about how important women’s interests are to individual legislators, it can (and does) show us that women’s representation is on the radar for most legislators - men and women, Democrats and Republicans. At the same time, all these divisions matter: Democrats versus Republicans, men versus women, and Senators versus Representatives.

Democrats are more likely to engage in women-targeted representational activity than Republicans. Women are, likewise, more likely to do so than men, though note that the differences between men and women of each party are much more pronounced than the difference between parties, especially in the House, suggesting that gender is a more important

indicator of representational activity focused on women than party is.

Lastly, Senators are more likely to engage in women-targeted representational activity than Representatives, to the point where one hundred percent of female senators act or speak on behalf of women and their interests at least once. At the other extreme, male Republicans in the House are the least likely to speak or act with a specific focus on women and their interests, but even here, more than half of them does.

Figures 2 - 4 break these representational activities down by type, allowing us to compare the prevalence of each form of representational activity among members of Congress. Here, the graph for floor speeches looks a lot like the overall graph¹.




Figure 2: Who Speaks for Women? - Speeches Only

While the differences between male Democrats and male Republicans have stayed the same or even increased when moving from overall representative behavior to floor speeches in particular, the actions of female members of both parties look more or less identical in both chambers, with female senators uniformly engaging in floor speeches on behalf of women, and women in the House being almost as likely to do so.

Bill sponsorship looks similar overall, with a few notable differences. Again, the intra-

¹At this point, it is important to note that those representatives who, for example, both speak about women on the floor and sponsor a bill targeted at the representation of women's interests, will be included in both the graphs depicting floor speeches and the graph depicting bill sponsorship.

party differences are much more pronounced than the inter-party ones, and again women in the senate are basically indistinguishable based on partisanship, when it comes to bill sponsorship specifically aimed at representing women. For female members of the House and male members of the Senate, however, inter-party differences are now much more noticeable than with respect to floor speeches. In other words, partisanship does play a larger role, and does tell us more about likely behavior when it comes to sponsoring actual bills than when it comes to giving a speech on the floor. Differences in claims on half of women thus can be explained by gender, but to tell the story of differences in representative actions (in this case bill sponsorship), we need to look at both partisanship and gender combined.




Figure 3: Who Speaks for Women? - Bills Only

Both bill sponsorship and floor speeches could be characterized as intra-congressional behavior. While there may be differences between them as far as audiences are concerned (see discussion below), they both take place within the institutional context of congress. There is reason to believe that bill sponsorship, with its role in the congressional agenda-setting process, plays an important part in the representational process, especially for the intersection between substantive and descriptive representation (Bratton and Haynie (1999)). It could thus be argued that it is not surprising to see similar overall patterns, with slight but important variations. Campaign ads, however, are a very different and distinct type of

representational activity. They are confined to the context of elections, thus having both a clearly defined timeframe as well as a much more easily identifiable audience, namely a candidate's electorate. Figure 4 shows representational behavior on behalf of women when it comes to airing campaign ads, and we can see several clear differences.




Figure 4: Who Speaks for Women? - Ads Only

Firstly, campaign ads are much less frequently used to claim/act on behalf of women than either floor speeches or bill sponsorship. They are used with the highest frequency by female Republicans in the House, and even in that group, less than forty percent air ads specifically targeted at women. Secondly, the gender and partisan trends are much less obvious when it comes to ads. In the Senate, for example, Republican men are more likely to have aired an ad targeted at women than Republican women, though less likely than Democratic women. In the House, Republican women are the most likely to have engaged in this behavior: in fact, they are most likely to do so among all groups in both chambers. In other words, the effect of gender and party is additionally conditioned by the impact of chamber membership.

After having looked at who speaks and acts, it is also worth noting who does not, which group is most silent and/or absent from the process and pattern of women's representation. Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of the number legislators in each subgroup whose percentage of bills/floor speeches coded as representing women is zero. What becomes obvious is both a

party and a gender gap, with the gender gap being much more pronounced. There is also a chamber gap, but this gap can be mostly explained by differences in chamber size. The overall pattern, however, is similar for both bills and speeches, in both the House and the Senate: almost no women, Democrats or Republicans, remain silent on women’s representation, while significant numbers of men (especially, but not only Republican men) do.




Figure 5: Those Who Don't

This first glance at who engages in representational activities on behalf of women tells us several important things: For one, both men and women, and both Democrats and Repub-

licans, display claims and actions signaling an interest in representing women specifically. While there are differences, and while (as suggested by H1 and H2) women and Democrats are more likely to do so than men and Republicans, respectively, these representational activities are fairly common across genders, parties, and chambers. Secondly, different kinds of representational activities display different patterns. Gender, party, and chamber effects seem to matter to different extents, and to interact in different ways, when it comes to a legislator's likelihood to make a speech, sponsor a bill/resolution, or air an ad targeted at women.

The following sections will explore these differences in greater depth. Using multivariate regression, I will take a closer look at which factors correlate with which kinds of representational activity, and which patterns emerge regarding a legislator's propensity to engage in certain kinds of representational activity aimed at women. Demographic, contextual, and institutional factors are all likely to play a role, and, based on the patterns observed above, they will likely matter in different ways and to different extents for the distinct forms of representational activity. As a first step, I will look at each representational activity and the factors affecting each one individually, before moving on to draw connections and highlight similarities and differences between them. The results for the regressions underlying this discussion can be seen in Tables 2&7. Dependent variables are expressed as percentages, ranging from 0 to 1.

3 House

Beginning with the House and not surprisingly, there is a moderately strong correlation between floor speech activity and bill sponsorship on behalf of women. Both of these types of representational behavior are intra-congressional. Both could even be focused on the same topics and issues. Legislators may very well speak out on behalf of bills they have sponsored, but this also shows us that such a connection cannot explain the whole picture:

The correlation is not nearly strong enough to warrant such an interpretation.

Table 1: Correlations Between Representational Activities

Correlations - House	Percent Floor Speeches	Percent Bills	Percent Campaign Ads
Percent Floor Speeches	1.0	0.57	0.19
Percent Bills	0.57	1.0	0.13
Percent Campaign Ads	0.19	0.13	1.0

Moving beyond correlations, the regression results for the different types of representational activity tell us more about which factors influence which kind of representation, where they differ and where they look identical.

The variables, data and methods are described in depth in Chapter 2, but I will provide a brief summary here, for clarity and context. For each chamber, I ran twelve individual OLS regression models: For each of the four separate dependent variables, I included a regression for the entire chamber, one for male Representatives/Senators and one for female Representatives/Senators. The dependent variables are *Campaign Ads Mentioning Women*, *Bills Mentioning Women*, *Floor Speeches Mentioning Women*, and a cumulative variable for all representative activities by a member of Congress, named *Overall Percentage*. All four are percentages (women-focused representational activities divided by total representational activities of each kind), for each member of Congress.

Gender (coded 1 for women and 0 for men) and *Party* (coded 1 for Democrats and 2 for Republicans) are, of course, included as two of the main independent variables. *Receptiveness to Women* is meant to capture a state's receptiveness or friendliness to women in political positions of power. It was created through factor analysis², based on a variety of state-level political indicators, such as number of female governors and strength of female delegation to the state legislature. The resulting scale, ranking all fifty states, does not simply reflect ideology or political culture, but rather adds a unique element not captured by other factors.

Tea Party and *Progressive Caucus* are included to measure the degree of "extremism"

²A detailed explanation of the factor analysis can be found in Chapter 2

or "ideological purity" of a member of Congress³, while *Year First Elected* simply seeks to capture potential cohort- or seniority-effects. Lastly, *Opponents' Ads* is coded in a fashion similar to the dependent variables: as the percentage of ads aired by all of a Representative's/Senator's opponents that are focused on women and their representation.

Table 2: House

House	Campaign Ads Mentioning Women			Bills Mentioning Women		
Variable	Coefficient			Coefficient		
		Just Men	Just Women		Just Men	Just Women
Gender	.04*** (.02)	—	—	.03*** (.004)	—	—
Party	-.04*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	-.06 (.06)	-.006* (.003)	-.006** (.003)	-.01 (.02)
Year First Elected	.001* (.0007)	.001** (.0006)	.0009 (.002)	-.0005*** (.0001)	-.0004*** (.0001)	-.001* (.0008)
Receptiveness to Women	-.0004 (.0005)	-.002 (.004)	.006 (.02)	.002* (.001)	.001* (.0008)	.003 (.004)
Tea Party	.006 (.02)	.003 (.02)	.03 (.09)	.003 (.005)	.002 (.004)	.01 (.03)
Progressive Caucus	-.02 (.02)	-.004 (.02)	-.07 (.05)	.01*** (.004)	.004 (.004)	.03** (.01)
Opponents' Ads	.03*** (.006)	.03*** (.006)	.04* (.02)	.0009 (.001)	.001 (.001)	-.0004 (.007)
Gender x Receptiveness to Women	.004 (.02)	—	—	-.0002 (.004)	—	—
House	Floor Speeches Mentioning Women			Overall Percentage		
Variable	Coefficient			Coefficient		
		Just Men	Just Women		Just Men	Just Women
Gender	.03*** (.002)	—	—	.03*** (.004)	—	—
Party	-.006*** (.002)	-.006*** (.001)	-.008 (.009)	-.01*** (.004)	-.01*** (.004)	-.02 (.02)
Year First Elected	.00004 (.00008)	.00003 (.00006)	.00006 (.0005)	.0002 (.0002)	.0002 (.0002)	-.0001 (.0008)
Receptiveness to Women	-.0006 (.0006)	-.0005 (.0004)	.001 (.003)	.0002 (.002)	-.0002 (.001)	.003 (.005)
Tea Party	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	-.004 (.01)	.002 (.005)	.001 (.005)	.009 (.03)
Progressive Caucus	.01*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.02*** (.008)	.0005 (.005)	.002 (.005)	-.004 (.01)
Opponents' Ads	.0008 (.0007)	.0006 (.0006)	.003 (.004)	.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.002)	.01* (.007)
Gender x Receptiveness to Women	-.003 (.002)	—	—	.0002 (.004)	—	—

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

A first glance at this result, broadly, tells us two things: Firstly, some factors, such as

³For the tea party caucus, information on membership was collected from an archived version of the caucus' official website (<https://web.archive.org/web/20121212040121/https://teapartycaucus-bachmann.house.gov/membership>) as well as from information gathered by the Pew Research Center (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/20/house-freedom-caucus-what-is-it-and-whos-in-it/>); information on membership in the Progressive Caucus was collected from the caucus' official website (<https://cpc-grijalva.house.gov/caucus-members/>) as well as Ballotpedia (for the 113th Congress). Additionally, for both caucuses, I researched individual Members of Congress listed in articles about both groups; Senators are not official members of either caucus, so previous affiliation while in the House was used for Senators if applicable

gender and party, are always a part of the story. Secondly, beyond a few dominant factors, the picture looks quite different for speeches, bills, and ads, and a look at only one (or only an aggregate measure) erases many of these differentiating nuances. A closer look will help make sense of some of these differences and similarities.

3.1 Campaign Ads

Campaign ads are a very distinct kind of representational activity. They occur in the context of an election, so it is clear that the candidate is speaking to a clearly defined audience, namely his or her electorate, current or potential. Ads are unique among the representational activities studied here, for precisely these reasons: the timeframe in which they are used is explicitly confined, and the audience much more easily identified than for floor speeches or bills.

When it comes to representing women and women's interests, Table 2 suggests that ads are influenced by both gender and party, but in interesting ways. While both men and women, and both Democrats and Republicans, use (or refrain from using) campaign ads targeted at women, Figure 4 showed that being a Republican woman made you more likely to air ads focused on women. But now, we can see from Table 2 that being a Republican by itself makes you less likely. The fact that Republican women are most likely, but that the results show a greater likelihood for Democrats over all to reference women in their ads, tells us the importance of sheer numbers for this picture. Looking back to Figure 4, we see that Democrats of both sexes are almost equally likely to air ads targeted at women, while Republican men are much less likely than their female co-partisans.

So the story of of party and gender is two-fold: Firstly, Democrats are more likely to engage in this kind of representational activity on behalf of women, but this is not due to the inaction of Republican women. In fact, they are the most active: it is just that there are relatively few of them. Secondly, the gender dynamic is much more pronounced in the Republican party, making it clear that gender and party interact in distinct ways when it

comes to the representation of women. Indeed, when we break the data set into separate sub-sets for men and women, the effect of partisanship disappears for female legislators, further supporting the pattern described above.

Additionally, men and women (at least in the House) appear to be influenced in their decision to produce and create such an ad by different factors. Men in the House are more likely to have aired ads focused on women if they have been elected to Congress more recently. In other words, the statistically detectable influences on male representatives appear to be demographic or contextual. If we want to predict what makes them more (or less) likely to air an add specifically speaking (or implicitly appealing) to their female constituents, we need to look at who they are or which contexts they operate in.

Not surprisingly, opponents' ads also influence the propensity of a legislator to air ads focused on women's interests. While it is currently not possible to say with certainty which causes which, that is to say, it is unclear if the opponents' ads came first or if they are a reaction to the legislator's ads, it is clear that they influence each other. This could be interpreted as a variation on "issue uptake" (Sulkin (2005)), where candidates take note of, and react to, the message and primary issues of their opponents.

3.2 Floor Speeches

Floor speeches are a very different kind of representational activity. They appear in a different context than ads, and the audience is arguably different as well. One could argue that floor speeches are not at all focused on constituents. Legislators may be speaking to party elites, interest groups, or their peers in Congress, but very few "people on the street" will be paying attention to floor speeches. Of course, an exception could be a candidate's use of a particular floor speech during their campaign, in order to further stress the work they have done with respect to a specific issue, but it is safe to assume that only a very small percentage of floor speeches is given with that explicit goal in mind.

On the other hand, previous scholarship looking at the Senate debate over televising its

proceedings (Fenno (1989)) has suggested that floor speeches may be constituent-focused after all. In this case, the correlation between male members of the House's propensity to speak on behalf of women and to air ads focused at women, which was observed above with respect to campaign ads and makes another appearance here, would be much more in line with expectations. Members of the House might use campaign ads to highlight their interest in and commitment to women's representation in their appeal for election, and they could use representational claims in the form of floor speeches to reassure their constituents that they are in fact focusing on the groups and issues they highlighted during their campaign.

Floor speech activity does seem to depend on a member of congress' party affiliation and gender. As one might expect based on the results for campaign ads, being a Democrat makes one more likely to deliver a floor speech on behalf of women, and so does being a woman. The direction of the relationship between both gender and party with women-focused floor speeches is in line with the findings of a good part of previous research on the topic, and clearly supports H1 and H2. As above, the relationship between representational activity on behalf of women and Democratic party affiliation does not appear to hold for female legislators. A look at Figure 2 explains why: nearly one hundred percent of all female members of the House gave at least one floor speech referencing women's interests. Again, the party divide is mostly confined to men, with Democratic legislators more likely to appeal to women explicitly than Republican ones.

Interestingly, the other factor influencing a legislator's likelihood to engage in representational activity on behalf of women is their membership in the Progressive Caucus. While Tea Party-affiliation does not impact a legislator's likelihood to explicitly reference women (negatively or positively), ideological "extremism" or "purism" seems to be a factor on the Democratic side, with those further to the left more inclined to appeal to women and their interests during their floor speeches. It is possible that the Progressive Caucus is driving some of the overall relationship between floor speeches and partisanship, which makes the high activity level of Republican women even more noteworthy. While we cannot yet say

much about the kinds of issues being represented by Democratic and Republican women, respectively, when they appeal directly to women, we can say that both groups of legislators appear almost equally likely to do so, while the party gap is much wider for their male colleagues. To put it differently, it appears that it is not Republicans who are less likely to talk about women and their interests, it is male Republicans. Female Republicans look much more like Democrats when it comes to their frequency of speaking about women's interests, though substantively, they may turn out to look quite different (as in fact they do (Chapter 4)).

3.3 Bill Sponsorship

Bill sponsorship shares certain characteristics with floor speeches, such as the intra-congressional nature of the activity, and this assumption of similarity seems justified when we take a look at the factors influencing each activity. Similar to what was observed above, bill sponsorship appears to be correlated with both gender and party. Indeed, we see the now-familiar gender and party pattern: Democrats are more likely to sponsor bills specifically aimed at the representation of women's interests than Republicans, and women are more likely to do so than men. Again, gender seems to trump party, as women overall are much more likely to sponsor these bills: Once more, we observe no party impact among women. Both Democratic and Republican women are more frequent sponsors of bills relating to women's interests than male legislators of either party (see Figure 3).

The other main factors predicting bill sponsorship in the House are Progressive Caucus membership, seniority/cohort and receptiveness to women. As speeches and bills are comparable kinds of activity, it is not too surprising to see that caucus membership affects both, and in similar ways: the members of the progressive caucus are more likely to sponsor bills and give speeches on behalf of women. For both representational activities, the effect is noticeable for both men and women, but it is stronger among female representatives. Seniority/cohort positively impacts likelihood to air women-focused ads, but depresses bill

sponsorship. In other words, those who have been elected earlier are more likely to sponsor bills on behalf of women, but less likely to specifically target women in their campaign ads. Receptiveness to women, lastly, matters for bill sponsorship, but not for ads and speeches. Legislators from more receptive states are more likely to sponsor bills that mention women.

The connection between bill sponsorship and receptiveness to women deserves a more thorough examination. While the data at hand cannot tell us much about the causes of this negative relationship - bills sponsored on behalf of women go down as a state's receptiveness to women in public office goes up - it is possible that legislators from "low receptiveness"-states see more of a need for woman-focused legislation, and are thus more likely to sponsor this kind of bills or resolutions. Legislators from states where many women have been elected to public office might see less of a need to specifically further women's interests in their legislative agendas. While only the floor speech behavior of male legislators seemed to be influenced by a state's receptiveness to women in political office, this is not true for bill sponsorship.

While those (male) legislators elected to the House more recently were more likely to reference women and their interests in their campaign ads, legislators (both men and women) who have been in the House longer are more likely to do so in the bills they sponsor. This may be only a result of the increased power and influence that is attained in the House by virtue of seniority. However, this reversal of the direction certainly highlights the importance of looking at several types of representational activity, rather than just one kind or an aggregate, when trying to understand the political representation of women.

As was mentioned above, one of the theories supporting the influence of opponents' ads on the legislative behavior of members of Congress is that of "issue uptake" (Sulkin (2005)). However, even though candidates seemed to be impacting their opponents (and/or vice versa) when it came to campaign ads, opponents' ads referencing women and their interests does not impact bill sponsorship.

3.4 Overall Representational Activity

Lastly, one should look at each legislator's overall propensity to speak or act on behalf of women. The variable of interest is Overall Percentage, which expresses each legislator's average percentage, by adding their percentages for ads, speeches, and bills directed at women and dividing this composite percentage by three, thereby indexing representative behavior overall. Since this variable is made up of the three types of activities discussed above, it makes sense that factors influencing each one individually might also affect the composite indicator. Indeed, gender, party, opponents' ads, and, to a lesser degree, year of first election impact overall representational activity for both chambers.

For the House, we can again observe a division between men and women. While the propensity of male representatives to engage in representational activity on behalf of women seems to be dependent on their partisanship as well as the number of ads aired by their opponents that were aimed specifically at women, women's activities appear to be driven mostly by the airing of ads by their opponents. Knowing what we know about the picture presented with respect to floor speeches and bill sponsorship, where opponents' ads did not matter at all, it becomes obvious that aggregate measures of representational activity obscure many important distinctions. The contradictory effects of seniority/cohort, for example, are wiped out in the aggregate picture, and the role played by greater ideological extremity on the Democratic side also disappears.

Overall, gender does impact representational activity, with women being more likely than men to speak and act specifically on behalf of women, but a closer look at the individual types of representational activity tells us that this is far from the only influential variable. To put it differently, general trends may be obscuring differences between different types of activities, and non-linear correlations may prevent trends from becoming obvious when looking only at a legislator's overall representational activity, without attention to different types.

To take things one step further, the next tables (Tables 3 - 5) compare the three individual

kinds of representational activity across time, by looking at each congress in the data set individually. This will be helpful in trying to determine whether factors that change over time, such as party control of the House, impact representational behavior of women and, if so, in what way.

Looking at campaign ads, a few interesting variations become noticeable. First of all, the complex relationship between gender and partisanship returns in yet another form. Seen this way, it appears that the gender effect is especially pronounced in the 111th Congress, where it is basically able to wash out the party effect. This is most likely an effect of Republican women, who, as shown above, are the most active group of legislators (relative to their numbers in Congress) when it comes to sponsoring women-focused ads.

Table 3: Campaign Ads By Congress (House)

Campaign Ads Mentioning Women	111th Congress (2009-2010)	112th Congress (2011-2012)	113th Congress (2013-2014)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender	.03** (.01)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Party	.003 (.01)	-.04*** (.01)	-.06*** (.02)
Year First Elected	.0007 (.0005)	.001** (.0007)	.0009 (.0008)
Receptiveness to Women	-.003 (.004)	.002 (.005)	.006 (.006)
Tea Party	.03* (.02)	-.02 (.02)	.004 (.02)
Progressive Caucus	-.02 (.01)	-.03* (.02)	-.05** (.02)
Opponents' Ads	.02*** (.009)	.02*** (.009)	.05*** (.01)
Gender x Receptiveness to Women	.006 (.01)	.003 (.02)	.006 (.02)

* = $p < 0.1$, ** = $p < 0.05$, *** = $p < 0.01$

Therefore, the first thing to note is that, while Gender and Party both play a significant role once again, Gender matters when Democrats control the House (111th Congress) while Party matters under Republican control (112th & 113th Congress), suggesting that even these two most influential factors do not exist in a vacuum.

On the other hand, opponents' ads, perhaps not surprisingly, play a big and consistent role in all three congresses. That makes sense, given the overall results and the intuitively strong connection one would expect to find between rival campaigns, but the picking up of target groups, not just policy areas, by competing candidates is nonetheless an important

point. In other words, candidates appear to be responsive not only to the policy foci of their opponents, but also to their target audiences.

One reason to look at the three congresses separately, as opposed to combining all of them as was done earlier, is to determine the impact of party control of the chamber on representative behavior directed at women. Except for the impact of party control of the chamber on the effect of gender and party, the most obvious difference becomes apparent when looking at the Tea Party and Progressive Caucus, respectively. Given that control of the House went from Democratic (111th Congress) to Republican (112th and 113th Congress), it seems that the more ideologically extreme members are more likely to react to "hostile" control of the chamber when it comes to respect to women-focused representative activities.

Table 4: Bill Sponsorship By Congress (House)

Bills Mentioning Women	111th Congress (2009-2010)	112th Congress (2011-2012)	113th Congress (2013-2014)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender	.03*** (.005)	.03*** (.004)	.07*** (.009)
Party	-.01*** (.005)	.001 (.004)	-.007 (.008)
Year First Elected	-.0005** (.0002)	-.0006*** (.0002)	-.0008** (.0004)
Receptiveness to Women	.0009 (.002)	.0003 (.001)	.004* (.002)
Tea Party	.007 (.006)	.002 (.005)	.00008 (.01)
Progressive Caucus	.006 (.005)	.01*** (.005)	.02** (.01)
Opponents' Ads	-.004 (.004)	.001 (.002)	-.001 (.004)
Gender x Receptiveness to Women	-.002 (.005)	.01*** (.004)	-.02** (.008)

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

This same pattern (more ideologically extreme members showing greater activity in "hostile" environments than their more moderate co-partisans) is also evident when we look at bill sponsorship, with the Progressive Caucus being more active when their party is not controlling the chamber. One interpretation of this would be ideological versus pragmatic decisions on the part of members of the minority party. The more moderate members of the Democratic party, for example, might be more interested in getting legislation passed, so when the climate in the House is hostile to their policy preferences, they might be inclined to shy away from possibly contentious and (in that context) purely symbolic bill sponsorship

and rather focus on policy areas that are either more promising or more central to their own policy agendas. More ideological legislators, however, might still introduce bills even when there is almost no chance of them being passed.

As far as the effect of gender and party on bill sponsorship patterns goes, party control again plays an important role, but here the patterns differ from those observed for campaign ads. Whereas for ads, gender was only a statistically significant factor under Democratic control, it is now so in all three Congresses, regardless of party control. For party, the pattern is exactly reversed: for campaign ads, party mattered in Republican-controlled Congresses, for bills it matters under Democratic control. This further highlights the importance of looking at individual variables in conjunction with contextual factors in order to see the full picture.

A related but distinctive pattern appears with respect to floor speeches. In fact, looking at floor speeches sponsorship, we again see Tea Party as a significant variable for predicting behavior in the 111th Congress, but not in the later ones, which was not the case for bill sponsorship, but was for ads. The effect of membership in the Progressive Caucus seems less influenced by change in party control, though it is slightly larger for the 112th and 113th, when Republicans were in control of the House.

Table 5: Floor Speeches By Congress (House)

Floor Speeches Mentioning Women	111th Congress (2009-2010)	112th Congress (2011-2012)	113th Congress (2013-2014)
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender	.03*** (.003)	.03*** (.003)	.04*** (.003)
Party	-.002 (.002)	-.01*** (.003)	-.006** (.003)
Year First Elected	-.00009 (.0001)	.00002 (.0001)	.0001 (.0001)
Receptiveness to Women	-.0005 (.0007)	-.001 (.001)	-.00004 (.0008)
Tea Party	.005* (.003)	.0002 (.004)	-.0007 (.003)
Progressive Caucus	.009*** (.003)	.02*** (.004)	.01*** (.003)
Opponents' Ads	.0008 (.002)	.0002 (.002)	.0002 (.001)
Gender x Receptiveness to Women	-.003 (.002)	.002 (.003)	-.005** (.003)

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

As with bill sponsorship and campaign ads, gender and party again play a distinctive

role, conditioned by party control of the House. As for bills, gender affects bill sponsorship in all three Congresses. Party, however, now only plays a role when Republicans control the chamber (the opposite was the case for bill sponsorship, where party mattered only under Democratic control).

Taken together, the picture emerging from separating out the three individual congresses is mainly one of similarity and continuity. Most of the variables that matter in one congressional setting will also matter in the others, regardless of party control. Gender and party display a noteworthy variations, which is most likely due to the behavior and strength, as far as numbers are concerned, of Republican women in the House.

One interesting and noteworthy point regarding the importance of party control, however, is the behavior of the more ideologically extreme factions within the two parties. Operating in a chamber that is controlled by the opposing party seems to cause membership in and identification with the "purist" wing of the party to play a bigger role, possibly because a hostile environment and thus decreased likelihood of a policy success are less important for those motivated by ideology rather than productivity.

4 Senate

A brief look at correlations between the dependent variables in the Senate setting suggest the same general patterns for both bodies, though with Senate behavior less tightly correlated. Correlations between floor speeches and bills remain the highest (.33 for the Senate and .57 for the House). Those for campaign ads and bills remain the lowest (.10 for the Senate, and .13 for the House).

Table 6: Correlations Between Representational Activities

Correlations - Senate	Percent Floor Speeches	Percent Bills	Percent Campaign Ads
Percent Floor Speeches	1.0	0.33	0.15
Percent Bills	0.33	1.0	0.10
Percent Campaign Ads	0.15	0.10	1.0

As in the House, so in the Senate: floor speech and bill sponsorship behavior both occur within Congress, and might often deal with the same policy or bill. Campaign ads differ significantly, though if a member of Congress discusses women and their interests in their ads, the move to also talking about them in floor speeches is smaller than the next step: the one that leads to the introduction of legislation.

Table 7: Senate

Senate Variable	Campaign Ads Mentioning Women			Bills Mentioning Women		
	Coefficient	Just Men	Just Women	Coefficient	Just Men	Just Women
Gender	.08*** (.03)	—	—	.02*** (.005)	—	—
Party	-.04* (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.12* (.11)	-.01*** (.004)	-.01*** (.004)	-.02 (.01)
Year First Elected	-.0008 (.0008)	-.0007 (.0006)	-.001 (.005)	.00001 (.0001)	.0001 (.0001)	-.001** (.0006)
Receptiveness to Women	-.004 (.008)	-.002 (.005)	.01 (.03)	-.0009 (.001)	-.0004 (.001)	-.003 (.004)
Tea Party	.006 (.03)	-.009 (.02)	omitted	.0009 (.006)	-.001 (.005)	omitted
Progressive Caucus	-.08* (.05)	-.05 (.05)	-.14 (.18)	-.003 (.009)	-.0008 (.01)	.01 (.02)
Opponents' Ads	.01*** (.005)	.01*** (.003)	.0009 (.03)	-.0002 (.0008)	-1.39e-06 (.0007)	-.0005 (.004)
Gender x Descriptive Representation	-.02 (.03)	—	—	-.002 (.005)	—	—

Senate Variable	Floor Speeches Mentioning Women			Overall Percentage		
	Coefficient	Just Men	Just Women	Coefficient	Just Men	Just Women
Gender	.03*** (.004)	—	—	.03*** (.007)	—	—
Party	-.007* (.004)	-.007*** (.002)	-.006 (.01)	-.02*** (.006)	-.008* (.005)	-.05* (.03)
Year First Elected	-.00001 (.0001)	.00004 (.00009)	-.0008 (.0006)	.0002 (.0002)	-.0001 (.0002)	-.0008 (.001)
Receptiveness to Women	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.0008)	-.004 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	-.0008 (.002)	.001 (.009)
Tea Party	.002 (.005)	.0004 (.004)	omitted	.002 (.009)	-.003 (.007)	omitted
Progressive Caucus	.04*** (.008)	-.003 (.007)	.11*** (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.007 (.04)
Opponents' Ads	.002*** (.0007)	.002*** (.0005)	-.001 (.004)	.004*** (.001)	.004*** (.0009)	-.0002 (.008)
Gender x Receptiveness	.0004 (.004)	—	—	-.006 (.007)	—	—

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

4.1 Campaign Ads

As was observed for the House, campaign ads are impacted by the gender and party ID of the legislator, with women and Democrats respectively being more likely to address women and their interests explicitly. In this respect, the story in the Senate is fully congruent with that

in the House. A noteworthy difference, however, is the intersection between partisanship and gender. Once again, the group that deserves the most attention are Republican women.

As could be seen in Figure 4, while Republican women were the most active group regarding campaign ads targeted at women (relative to their numbers in Congress), the opposite is true for female Republican senators. Indeed, this difference is highlighted by the results in Table 7, where being a Republican significantly reduces a legislator's likelihood of airing women-focused campaign ads - but only for female Republicans. While results by gender are a bit less reliable for the Senate because of the smaller sample size, this deviation from the House nonetheless deserves attention, because it gives us, again, an indication about the role played by political ideology. While membership in the Tea Party faction of the Republican party did not significantly influence campaign ads overall in the House, the Senate results seem to suggest that being a female Republican moderate makes one less likely to engage in this kind of representational activity⁴.

As expected, opponents' ads consistently play a role, both for the House and the Senate. There is a small negative effect for women-focused campaign ads for members of the Progressive Caucus⁵, which is consistent with the results for the House, as discussed in Table 3. Overall, members of the Progressive Caucus, who are more likely to give floor speeches and introduce bills targeted at women, are less likely to air women-centered campaign ads, a trend that seems to hold true for both chambers.

⁴No female Senators were affiliated with the Tea Party, thus the significance achieved by party for female Senators (with being Republican decreasing the likelihood of having aired women-focused ads) in fact only captures less extreme (or more moderate) female Republicans.

⁵The only official member of the Progressive Caucus from the Senate is Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT), who, because of his status as an independent, is not included in this analysis; however, to have at least an imperfect measure of a Democratic equivalent of the Tea Party for the Senate, I coded former members of the House who belonged to the Progressive Caucus during their time in the lower chamber, as if they were still members in the Senate; in that way, it is more a measure of previous membership in the Progressive Caucus

4.2 Floor Speeches

The pattern for gender and party looks the same for the Senate as it did for the House - women and Democrats are more likely to speak on behalf of women than men and Republicans, respectively. Interestingly, the pattern also holds whereby partisanship matters more for men than for women. Remembering the pattern observed in Figure 2, this fits well with what we already knew about this type of representational behavior: both Republican and Democratic women in the Senate speak on behalf of women with equal frequency - in fact, one hundred percent of them do.

Progressive caucus association⁶ increases a legislator's likelihood to speak on behalf of women, much as it did for members of the House of Representative. This positive association between Progressive Caucus affiliation and floor speech activity is interesting, given the opposite seemed to be the case for campaign ads. However, the campaign ad results fit nicely with those observed for ads in the House when the data was broken down by individual congress (see Table 3). For the Senate, floor speech activity is also correlated with the existence of opponents' ads focused on women, which was not the case for the House. In a way, the connection between the two activities could be seen as another indication of "issue uptake" (Sulkin (2005)), with senators reacting to issues introduced or emphasized by their opponents during the campaign by incorporating them into their legislative behavior.

4.3 Bill Sponsorship

Floor speech and campaign ads patterns look remarkably similar for the Senate and the House, even though there are important differences, as discussed above. For the last type of representational activity, however, the House and the Senate differ more significantly.

While bill sponsorship in the House was driven by gender, party (for male representatives), receptiveness to women, seniority/cohort, and membership in the progressive caucus,

⁶The only Senator who is officially associated with the Progressive Caucus is Bernard Sanders (I), and he is not part of the data set; however, I have included senators who belonged to the progressive caucus during their time in the House of Representatives

the picture in the Senate is quite different. Here, only gender, party, and cohort/seniority (for female senators) are driving factors.

Gender and party affiliation display the pattern that we have seen repeatedly, for other kinds of representational activity as well as for the House. Overall, being female and being a Democrat makes legislators more likely to engage in representational activity on behalf of women. This still obscures some of the more nuanced relationships, such as the stark differences between male and female Republicans observed above (see Figure 3), but the results strongly support H1 and H2. At the same time, they also stress the fact that, while women and Democrats might be more focused on the political representation of women than men and Republicans, it clearly is not the case that **only** women and Democrats do. In fact, the results for both the House and the Senate show a deeply varied picture with regard to representational activity on behalf of women.

Seniority played a role in the House as well, but the effect was not limited to women, as it is in the Senate. Again, those who have been in the Senate longer are more likely to sponsor bills on behalf of women than those who have been elected more recently⁷. Even though the results for ads and floor speeches are not significant for the Senate, the direction of the suggested relationship is reversed for the coefficients in both cases, as was the case in the House. This might mean that bill sponsorship is influenced by behavioral norms in Congress that make newer members less likely to engage in this activity overall, not just when it comes to the representation of women.

4.4 Overall Representational Activity

Again, gender, party, and number of opponents' ads dominate the overall picture of factors influencing representational activity on behalf of women. This is almost identical to the results for the House. On the other hand, as could be seen in the House by looking at ads, speeches, and bills individually, this not only obscures important nuances within the Senate,

⁷The variable is coded as the year in which the legislator was first elected to Congress, so a negative relationship means fewer bills sponsored for those elected in later years

it also hides important differences between the Senate and the House. Overall representational activity might give us an idea of which factors the different representational claims and actions have in common, which effects are the strongest, and which effects consistently run in the same direction, but only focusing on the overall trends would make us miss the highly complex patterns that become obvious when looking at the individual activities in the House and the Senate.

Despite this overarching similarity between the House and the Senate when looking at composite representational activity, it is again the women of both chambers that differ slightly. When looking at only the female members of the House, opponents' ads achieves statistical significance, with those women whose opponents sponsor more ads on behalf of women being more active representatives of women's interests themselves. In the Senate, the only statistically significant variable for female Senators is seniority, working in the same way as it did for bill sponsorship. This again highlights differences between the chambers and suggests that institutional factors, such as the difference in culture between the House and Senate, might interact with variables such as gender to produce varying patterns for the two chambers.

4.5 Constituency Differences or Institutional Differences?

Another factor explaining the differences between the House and the Senate might be the size of the constituency. In other words, Senators, who represent whole states, might behave differently, engage in different kinds of activities, and pay attention to different groups within their electorate than members of the House, who generally have smaller and less heterogeneous districts and constituencies. One way to explore whether the different behavior patterns are caused by institutional differences rather than differences in constituency composition is by comparing the Senate results to those states with two or fewer congressional districts.

Table 8: House - Two Districts or Fewer

House (2 Districts or Fewer)	Campaign Ads Mentioning Women	Bills Mentioning Women
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender	-.16* (.1)	.006 (.01)
Party	-.18* (.09)	-.01 (.01)
Year First Elected	.005 (.004)	-.0005 (.0006)
Receptiveness to Women	-.06* (.04)	.004 (.005)
Tea Party	.02 (.14)	-.0004 (.02)
Progressive Caucus	-.08 (.11)	-.02 (.02)
Opponents' Ads	.04* (.03)	-.003 (.004)
Gender x Descriptive Representation	-.008 (.12)	.008 (.02)

House (2 Districts or Fewer)	Floor Speeches Mentioning Women	Overall Percentage
Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient
Gender	.02** (.01)	-.03 (.03)
Party	-.03** (.01)	-.05** (.02)
Year First Elected	.00006 (.0005)	.001 (.001)
Receptiveness to Women	-.005 (.004)	-.02* (.009)
Tea Party	.03* (.01)	.01 (.04)
Progressive Caucus	-.009 (.01)	-.03 (.03)
Opponents' Ads	.006* (.003)	.01* (.007)
Gender x Receptiveness	-.008 (.01)	-.002 (.03)

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

The pattern for gender and party again looks very similar to that observed in the House as a whole, as well as the Senate, which increases the credibility of these results even more. However, there is one important exception from the now well-known pattern. In states with two or fewer House districts, men are more likely to air campaign ads targeted at women than their female counterparts. This deviation from what was observed in all other contexts further stresses the importance of paying attention to detail and nuance without weakening the relationship described above.

Apart from the similarity regarding the effect of gender and party, the results for this subset of members of the House show both similarities as well as differences both with the House as a whole as well as with the Senate. The pattern for opponents' ads, for example,

looks remarkably similar to that observed in the Senate and the House, while seniority plays no role at all here and receptiveness to women plays a very different one than in either of the (full) chambers.

While these results are in no way definitive - ideally, one would compare these states' House delegations to the same set of states in the Senate, but this would produce a Senate sample so small that the resulting relationships would be entirely unreliable - they do tell us that neither institution nor constituency fully explain the patterns and relationships. On the one hand, were it solely institutional, the subset of states should look very similar to the House overall, and while there are noticeable and important similarities, there are also enough differences to highlight that institutional setting does not explain everything. On the other hand, if the patterns were due to constituency and district effects, the patterns should look at least very similar, if not almost identical, to those observed in the Senate. While there are some patterns that resemble those in the Senate (but that is also true for the House and Senate as a whole), there are enough clear and pronounced differences to conclude that, while constituency and district size/composition might play a role, they are not the exclusive, or even the dominant, factor.

5 Republican Women in the Senate: A Look at a Potential Outlier

As has been mentioned above, the conclusions we can draw with respect to female senators, especially Republican female senators, are limited due to the small sample size. What could potentially further impact results for Republican women is the fact that they are, at least during the time period under study, a remarkably moderate group⁸. No female

⁸The female Republican senators in the data set are Olympia Snowe (R-ME), Susan Collins (R-ME), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX). They were first elected to Congress between 1979 and 2013, and come from three red states (AK, NE, TX), one swing state (NH) and one blue state (ME); the relatively moderate ideology of five of the six Republican women in the Senate (only Deb Fischer identifies as a "staunch conservative") can likewise not be explained


Republican senators identify with the Tea Party, and a good number of them have a decidedly moderate voting record on many issues. In order to determine whether this really makes female Republican senators behave qualitatively differently from others, this section will compare their representative behavior to that of their male colleagues, as well as to that of female Republicans in the House. While these comparisons will not, of course, increase the statistical significance of the results, they should be able to tell us whether their status as moderate/non-Tea Party-affiliated senators makes them fundamentally different from their respective co-partisans as far as representative activities on behalf of women are concerned.

5.1 Comparing Ads, Bills & Speeches

As can be seen in Figure 6, there does not appear to be a noticeable difference in representational patterns on behalf of women between Republican women in the Senate and other Republicans. The outlier (Lisa Murkowski) is not unusual or further removed from the majority of her colleagues than the outliers among either male Republican senators or Republican women in the House.


For all three groups, the line remains more or less flat, which is what the regression results showed as well. In all three cases, a subset of legislators is much more focused on the explicit representation of women, but the difference between the outliers and the majority is actually the smallest for female Republican senators, when compared to male Republicans in the Senate or female Republicans in the House.

by a cohort effect: all three women elected before 2000 are moderates, as are two of the three elected after 2000; similarly, two of the three women from red states (Murkowski and Hutchison) are ideological moderates.



(a) Female Republicans (Senate)

(b) Male Republicans (Senate))




(c) Female Republicans (House)

Figure 6: Ads, by Year First Elected)

Figure 8 essentially further confirms that, despite their small numbers and relatively moderate ideological leanings, female Republican senators do not seem to differ fundamentally from their co-partisans: The relationship between Year First Elected and women-focused bill sponsorship is negative for both Republican women in the Senate and the House, again conforming with the regression results. There are actually fewer outliers in the Senate, creating a much tighter confidence interval.


Male Republican senators fall in between their female co-partisans of both chambers as far as number and spread of outliers are concerned, but again these variations between the three subsets do not suggest that there is something fundamentally different about the

representative behavior of Republican women in the Senate.



(a) Female Republicans (Senate)


(b) Male Republicans (Senate))



(c) Female Republicans (House)


Figure 7: Bills, by Year First Elected)

Lastly, a look at floor speech patterns confirms much of what we have observed for ads and bills. No relationship exists between Year First Elected and floor speech activity in either of the three groups, but again, female Republican senators do not appear to be outliers in a meaningful way, suggesting that the representative behavior displayed by the Republican women in the Senate is not unique, despite their decidedly moderate ideological leanings.



(a) Female Republicans (Senate)

(b) Male Republicans (Senate))



(c) Female Republicans (House)

Figure 8: Floor Speeches, by Year First Elected)

While these comparisons merely provide anecdotal and circumstantial evidence of the reliability of the results for female Republican senators, they remain useful as yet another piece of the puzzle. In other words, while they may not tell us much by themselves, they support the case made by the regression results presented above. Additionally, by providing a basis for the assumption that Republican female senators are not outliers, the case for the examination of representational framing and conceptualization of women’s issues in Chapter 4 by subgroup of legislator can be made more confidently. While Republican women in the senate may not be outliers regarding their likelihood to engage in representative activity on behalf of women, they may (and Chapter 4 confirms this) differ from their co-partisans in

how they conceptualize women's interests.

6 Conclusion

To summarize the results, representational activity on behalf of women appears to be influenced by other types of women-focused representational activity, as well as by demographic, contextual, and institutional factors. Men and women, Democrats and Republicans, Representatives and Senators, all speak or act for women, but they choose different kinds of representational actions.

This strongly suggests that different factors and mechanisms are at work for different kinds of representational activity. Differences between men and women, between ads, bills, and speeches, and between members of the House and members of Senate indicate a rather complex pattern of factors coming into play when it comes to representational activities.

While there is clear and consistent support for H1 and H2 (women and Democrats are, overall, more likely to speak and/or act on behalf of women), the results simultaneously highlight the fact that this does not mean that men and Republicans do not also do so. In fact, there are certain types of activities (such as campaign ads) where Republican women are more likely to engage in this behavior than Democratic women (in the House) and Republican men are more likely to do so than Democratic men (in the Senate).

Overall, party seems to be less important than gender, with the likelihood of Democratic and Republican women to speak and/or act on behalf of women virtually identical, and (especially in the House) considerably higher than that of men of both parties.

Regression results show that different factors, such as gender, party, seniority/cohort, home state receptiveness to women in political office, and opponents' ads, play varying roles, depending on the type of representative behavior one is focusing on. Trends are often similar, but frequently very different between the Senate and the House.

So who speaks and acts for women? In the context of Congress, this analysis seems to

suggest that both men and women, and Democrats and Republicans do so, but (in line with H3) they display different patterns and are influenced by different factors. When they do engage in representational activities on behalf of women, though, what does the content of these actions look like? How are women's interests conceptualized in Congress? In other words, do men and women, and Democrats and Republicans, respectively, emphasize women in the context of the same policy areas? Which issues are emphasized by which subgroup of legislators in which chamber? These questions will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

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